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Abstract 
The founder of the modern Turkish nation, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk once said “do not be 
afraid of telling the truth.” In Turkey, many doubt whether the European Union has 
been true to this principle and suspect that the member states will always find new 
excuses to deny their country membership to the EU. In this paper, the major arguments 
against Turkey’s accession are reviewed and put in perspective. Is Turkey part of 
Europe and will it join the European Union? In order to answer these questions, the 
national debate on Turkey’s EU accession in Austria is put in contrast with a strategic 
view on European interests. It appears that in the context of unanimous decision-making 
and the politically highly salient issue of Turkey’s bid for membership, national self-
interests and public opinion-based politics within each member state take precedence 
over EU interests and a fact-based discussion on the consequences of a Turkish EU 
membership. However, the fate of EU member states seems inextricably tied together, 
as the economic and financial crisis has exemplified, and thus in the long-run the well-
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“What's called a difficult decision is a difficult decision because either way you go there 
are penalties.” Interestingly, this statement was made by Academy Award winner Elia 
Kazan who had actually been born as İlyas Kazancıoğlu in Turkey to a Greek family 
and later emigrated to the United States. It is as if he had foreseen the difficulties that 
his country of birth would later encounter in its quest to prove its European credentials. 
The decision whether the current member states of the European Union will accept 
Turkey into their club is a decision of great magnitude, as it will have tremendous 
repercussions on the future of “Project Europe”, its identity and structure. Europe is 
clearly at a crossroads. This partly explains why the accession talks with Turkey have 
received such large media attention and are subject of extensive public discussion 
within the EU member states. Public opinion is divided over the issue, but is currently 
clearly leaning towards rejecting Turkey's aspirations to become an EU member. The 
aim of this paper is thus to analyze the validity of several key arguments against 
Turkey’s accession. The focus of this paper will lie on arguments that play a large role 
in public debates within the EU, as public perception will ultimately determine whether 
Turkey qualifies for accession. In the introduction to “Talking Turkey in Europe: 
Towards a differentiated communication strategy” (2008), Nathalie Tocci raised the 
point that in the context of Turkey’s bid for membership, certain issues prevail in 
particular national debates while they play only a minor role in others and that therefore 
a differentiated analysis of national debates on the subject is needed. This argument 
adequately reflects the dominance of national constituencies and discourses within the 
EU framework and is remarkably helpful to identify national stakeholders and their 
underlying motives. It also highlights the fact that not all countries will be equally 
affected by Turkey’s accession. A differentiated picture of the European public, divided 
along national borders, certainly needs to be taken into account, as it will ultimately be 
the nation states which have the last word on the decision for or against accession. Yet, 
the future well-being and prosperity of “Project Europe”, also requires us to assess the 
arguments made against an accession of Turkey in national debates from a “community 
perspective” and with a focus on the strategic interests of the EU as a community. It 
appears that in the context of unanimous decision-making and the politically highly 
salient issue of Turkey’s bid for membership, national self-interests and public opinion-
based politics within each member state take precedence over EU interests and a fact-
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based discussion on the consequences of a Turkish EU membership (see Scharpf 1998, 
see also Elgström & Jönsson p. 690). However, the financial and economic crisis and its 
effects on the European Union, in particular the Euro Zone, have once again highlighted 
the already high level of interdependence between member states. It has reminded 
Europeans that the transfer of authority to supra-national institutions and the 
membership in the European community has intrinsically tied the fates of European 
states together. It has also made national governments once again painfully aware that 
negative developments in one member state could have adverse consequences for all 
others, and that the quality of decisions taken on a European level are also decisive for 
the future development of each member state. The financial rescue package for Greece 
and Ireland and the European Financial Stability Facility for other member states that 
could potentially require financial assistance in the future were not merely an act of 
solidarity or even charity- they were rooted in the recognition of a fundamental 
interdependence as a consequence of increased functional integration within the EU. 
Thus, the well-being of the community at some point converged with the self-interests 
of member-states (while this was initially highly disputed, the necessity for a concerted 
response soon became widely acknowledged) and moved into the center of national 
policy considerations. This has not yet been reflected to the same extent in other 
political debates within EU member states, such as the largely nationally framed 
discourses on future enlargement rounds and more specifically the prospective 
accession of Turkey to the EU. Community interests have not figured prominently in 
national debates on Turkey’s accession which have largely been dominated by national 
self-interests and negative public perceptions. Undoubtedly, the successful 
implementation of the financial rescue measures in the context of the economic crisis 
has been contingent on implying a sense of urgency on a national level and on the fact 
that public opinion has deemed the EU more capable of dealing with the more severe 
effects of the economic crisis than individual member states (see Eurobarometer 71 & 
72). On the other hand, it could also be pointed out that nation states have been 
extraordinarily reluctant to even engage in any type of cooperative behavior and only 
self-interests, namely the fear of devastating consequences for their own respective 
economies have prompted member states to pursue a coordinated approach.  However, 
the underlying realization that “we are all in the same boat” and that community 
interests in the long-run are at the core of each member state’s self-interest has once 
again become evident, which may also have implications for other policy domains such 
 7
as enlargement. 
Lendvai has distinguished between “an ‘Enlargement literature’, which takes the 
perspective of the EU, and speaks from ‘within’, and an ‘Accession literature’ which 
looks at things from the point of view of the candidate countries (Lendvai, p.320). I 
argue that there is yet another set of literature which focuses on enlargement specifically 
from a national perspective. This paper seeks to contrast the two dimensions “from 
within the EU” with each other. On the one hand, this paper will thus address concerns 
and negative attitudes about Turkey on an aggregated European level. This must be seen 
against the backdrop that all of these single issues have the potential to disrupt the 
accession process in each one of the national political arenas and are thus relevant in 
this context. Moreover, it is time to intensify the Europe-wide discussion and explore 
whether arguments against Turkish accession that are framed in national discourses will 
lead to similar conclusions on an aggregated level of analysis. This will help to add 
considerations on a community level to peculiar national debates and make it 
increasingly possible for outside actors to give input on national discussions. I will 
specifically analyze the consequences of Turkey’s accession for European identity and 
put emphasis on the economic dimension of accession, as these two issues can be found 
on the two extremes of the subjectivity-rationality spectrum in public debate and 
assessing the chances of success of Turkey’s bid for EU membership requires 
addressing both subjective and fairly rational concerns. 
 
On the other hand, this paper will also explore a second dimension, which focuses on 
some of the peculiarities of the Austrian debate on Turkey's accession in order to 
identify which arguments are of relevance in the Austrian context and explain why they 
have become politically salient. The country's position seems particularly interesting in 
light of the fact that the Austrian economy has been one of the main beneficiaries of the 
last rounds of Eastern enlargements (see Breuss 2006). At the same time, public opinion 
is adamantly opposed to a next round of enlargement in general and specifically one 
including Turkey. It seems as if public opinion in this context has been primarily driven 
by perceived national self-interest. Thus, it seems important to get a detailed account of 
the prevailing opinions within the Austrian discourse. These results will in turn be 
linked with the arguments made in the first section of the paper and could perhaps be 
useful in identifying gaps in the information and communication flows between the 
Austrian public and other stakeholders. This information will help to better address the 
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arguments corresponding to some of the legitimate concerns, while it will expose 
unfounded fears, exaggerations and flaws in argumentation in other instances.  
 
It has to be kept in mind that the EU has traditionally been perceived as an elite project 
that has only been marginally responsive to public opinion. In recent times, however, 
the democratic deficit of the EU has been subject to renewed debate following the first, 
failed attempt to ratify the new EU Constitution (an adapted version was later ratified as 
the Treaty of Lisbon) and has led to increased awareness within European political 
elites that the public must be won over before major endeavors on the European level 
are undertaken. Politicians in the EU are thus more likely to take public opinion within 
their national electorates into consideration when deciding on Turkey's bid and the 
picture that the public holds of Turkey will undoubtedly play a decisive role in Turkey’s 
accession process. Dobson (2008) has argued that “no amount of consulting the many 
aesthetic or sociological or religious or linguistic mythologies that underpin and color 
our personal and ethnic and national self-definitions will help us discover exactly which 
set of values defines the EU” (p.6). Yet, in political reality, it may be precisely these 
mythologies that ultimately drive public opinion and political decision-making and thus 
merit a more thorough analysis.  
 
Emphasis should thus be put on the political narratives that dominate the discourse on 
Turkey's EU ambitions. These narratives should be screened for the validity of their 
core arguments and it should be analyzed how they evolve over time. As mentioned 
above, the focus will turn to the Austrian public and its interpretation of various key 
issues surrounding Turkey's bid for EU-membership. It is of particular interest how 
much background information is available to the Austrian public when it comes to 
precisely these key arguments that figure prominently in public discourse. The aim is to 
uncover the core of several arguments and contrast them with contradicting factors. In 
this process, the punctuated equilibrium model will be taken into account in order to 
explain sudden spikes in public interest and the debate that has taken place in Austria as 
a consequence of domestic political changes, previous EU enlargement rounds and 
external events, such as economic crisis. Results will indicate whether an information 
campaign to highlight existing misperceptions and provide the public with more in-
depth information on the issue is promising at all or whether the public is already 
knowledgeable about the circumstances surrounding Turkey’s bid for EU accession. It 
 9
is also of great interest to explore which factors could potentially form an irrevocable 
core of beliefs that would make a full accession of Turkey seem unlikely.  
 
2.  Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Integration Theories 
The theoretical framework of this paper is rooted in integration theory. There exist a 
variety of theories that are applied to analyze and explain European integration. A small 
selection of integration theories will subsequently be introduced in order to put the issue 
of Turkey’s prospective EU accession and EU enlargement into the wider context of 
European integration and to illustrate why this particular issue is of such relevance to 
the future of the European integration process. Moreover, this will serve as a starting 
point to discuss the increased importance of analyzing public opinions on European 
issues and illuminate the differences between competing theoretical approaches in 
explaining the relationship and interactions between the different spatial levels within 
the European Union, mainly the national and the supranational ones. Two theories have 
clearly dominated scholarly debates on European integration, namely neofunctionalism 
and intergovernmentalism. Both theories inherently support “the assumption of 
functionalism that the sheer existence of a mismatch between the territorial scale of 
human problems and of political authority generates pressures for jurisdictional reform” 
(Hooghe & Marks 2008, p.3), although they come to quite different conclusions about 
the underlying drivers and consequences of integration. 
 
2.1.1  Neofunctionalism 
According to neofunctionalism, European integration can be defined as “a process 
whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their 
loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions 
possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The end result of a 
process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the 
pre-existing ones” (Haas, 1968, p. 16). Haas defines political community in terms of 
“loyalty of citizens to their government or set of institutions” (Haas 1964). “In contrast 
to traditional realist theories, neofunctionalism contests both that states are single 
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unified actors and that states are the only relevant actors in international relations” 
(Niemann 2006, p. 15).  
 
“Neofunctionalism rests on three main propositions: that positive spillover from new 
economic integration will provide for social, cultural, and national integration; that this 
process will gather pace, spurring the creation of a new supranational identity; and 
technocrats (or non-state actors) that help in the transition will eventually replace heads 
of states and hold the reigns of power” (White 2010, p. 14; see also Haas 1964). It 
focuses on technocratic decision-making, concentrates on incremental change rather 
than institutional change brought about by the treaties and implicates learning processes 
by political elites (Niemann 2006, p.12).  
 
In neofunctionalism the supranational institutions of the EU are the main drivers of 
further integration. “The advance of European integration is both indexed by and 
contained within the expanding authority, competence and jurisdiction of supranational 
institutions, accompanied conversely by the constrained autonomy, diminishing 
competence and contracting exclusive jurisdiction of national governments” (Puchala 
1999, p.318). In addition, integrationist momentum is of course also created by the 
insight of national elites that national solutions may carry considerable limitations and 
may not be suitable to address issues that arise as a consequence of previous (mainly 
economic) integration (see Niemann 2006, p. 16).  
 
Neofunctionalism is based on the assumption that functional integration in one policy 
domain would entail pressures for integration in other areas. As more issues shifted to 
the European level, the ensuing “webs of interconnectivity” would make spillovers 
inevitable. Subsequently, elite decision making would eventually give way to a process 
of politicization in which European issues would engage mass publics, but Haas also 
believed that politicization would actually lead national governments towards further 
integration (Hooghe & Marks 2008, p.20; White 2010, p 14). However, in light of the 
negative sentiment of national constituencies with regard to ever-more functional 
integration, this assumption has not (yet) proved to be adequately reflected in empirical 




It needs to be kept in mind that neofunctionalism in its essence does not attach 
significant importance to public opinion, as it assumes a “permissive consensus” in 
favor of European integration and views European integration as an elite-driven project. 
Consequently, the focus lies on the change of elite attitudes rather than changes in 
public opinion (Niemann 2006, p.15). Another underlying assumption of 
neofunctionalism is that “citizens and political actors will increasingly shift their 
loyalties to the new supra-national institutions and consequently to a center which 
supersedes the pre-existing one” (Haas 1968, p. 5). This transfer of allegiance which 
also entails a certain shift in identity has been highly disputed. In an analysis of 
comitology committees within the administrative system of the EU, Wessels, for 
example, did not detect such a transfer of loyalty. Consequently, he hypothesized that 
while national political actors (in this case national civil servants) are drawn and 
integrated into the supra-national political system of the EU, their allegiances did not 
shift towards a “European center”, but remained firmly responsive to their national 
“clientèle” (Wessels 1998, p.227) 
 
2.1.2 Intergovernmentalism 
Intergovernmentalism is a theory firmly rooted in a realist perspective on European 
integration. It is based on the premise that the nation state is at the center of the 
decision-making process throughout all phases of the “policy life cycle” within the 
European Union and that European states would continue to control the pace of 
integration (see White 2010, p. 15). Intergovernmentalism thus conceives regional 
integration as an outcome of bargaining among national states. Adherents of the 
intergovernmental theory of European integration identify converging national interests 
of states (economic interests in particular) emerging out of the currents and pressures of 
national politics as the key driver behind closer international co-operation in Europe 
(Puchala 1999, p. 319). Similarly, Moravcsik (1998) argued that states would only 
cooperate if they had similar interests and that the institutions they created had no life of 
their own. As an adherent and main proponent of liberal intergovernmentalism, 
Moravcsik claims “that the theory is able to explain the major turning points” in the 
history of European integration more convincingly than alternative theories” 
(Schimmelfennig 2001, p. 48). According to Elgström & Jönsson (2006, p.686) “from 
an intergovernmental and state-centric perspective on the character of EU negotiations, 
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EU decisions are determined by bargaining among state executives and generally reflect 
the lowest common denominator (see Moravcsik 1993; Marks et al. 1996, p. 345). Each 
government is primarily concerned with its own self-interests. No executive is willing to 
accept policies which carry negative consequences for its respective country. Apart 
from their own self-interests member states also have a collective interest in pursuing 
politics that preserve their status as “the masters of the treaty” and their power vis-à-vis 
supranational institutions (see Ipsen 1994). The intergovernmentalist claim that nation 
states are the only relevant actors in international relations has been repeatedly 
questioned in the context of European integration. Throughout their research endeavor 
on the European political framework, Hooghe & Marks for example argue to have 
“detected direct connections between domestic groups and European actors, which led 
them to reject the claim that states monopolize the representation of their citizens in 
international relations” (Hooghe & Marks 2008, p.2). 
 
 
A comparison between the two theoretical streams of neofunctionalism and inter-
governmentalism led Hooghe & Marks (2008, p.4) to conclude that “neofunctionalists 
are most concerned with day-to-day policy making, in which transnational groups 
played a large role (see Stone Sweet & Brunell 1998), while intergovernmentalists are 
most concerned with the major treaties (see Moravcsik 1998).” However, within the 
complex system of the European Union and the myriad shapes that European 
integration has taken in various policy areas it should be considered that European 
integration actually has come to encompass “both the sophisticated accommodation of 
converged national interests via the construction of governance regimes and the 
consolidation of a supranational polity” (Puchala 1999, p.329). In the context of 
Turkey’s accession process to the EU, an intergovernmentalist viewpoint is often the 
point of departure, as the final decision for or against Turkish EU membership 
constitutes a decision of great magnitude and requires a unanimous decision taken by 
the European Council (thus by the member states), which additionally has to be ratified 
by each member state. This is exacerbated by the fact that public discourse on Turkey’s 
prospective EU accession is taking place within the context of national political arenas 
and continued by inter-state negotiations at the European level. However, 
intergovernmentalists have been largely disregarding the pressure of public opinion on 
the national positions within the EU framework, public contestation and intra-state 
 13
opinion formation. Moreover, the influence of supra-national institutions such as the EU 
Commission on this issue cannot be disregarded. Thus, it should be considered that an 
intergovernmentalist viewpoint may not be exclusively able to explain the complex 
decision-making process in this case and needs to be complemented by neofunctionalist 
interpretations of several steps within the “policy life cycle”. In fact, even a different set 
of theories may be needed to grasp the mere complexity and importance of this decision 
for the European Union and explain the underlying drivers of opinion formation with 
regard to the Turkish accession process or at least complement assumptions directly 
derived from intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism. 
 
2.1.3 The Postfunctional Theory of European Integration and the Concept   
of Multi-Level Governance 
The multi-level governance approach to European integration of Liesbet Hooghe and 
Gary Marks, as outlined in “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From 
Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus“, provides valuable insights into the 
nature of European integration and will in this paper be applied to the policy domain of 
EU enlargement. The basic premise of this theory is that the interaction and 
interdependence between the European supranational and intergovernmental level, the 
respective national political systems and other spatial levels of political governance has 
created a complex system of governance with increasingly blurred lines between these 
political arenas. The authors explain regional integration as a discrepancy between the 
need to efficiently tackle problems on the best-suited spatial level and the pre-existing 
structure of political authority. They emphasize the importance to understand the 
mobilization of identity and the politicization of specific policy issues. This is attributed 
to the fact that according to them „the challenge for a theory of multi-level governance 
is that the functional need for human co-operation rarely coincides with the territorial 
scope of community. Communities demand self rule, and the preference for self rule is 
almost always inconsistent with the functional demand for regional authority” (2008, 
p.2). Hooghe and Marks point to the non-coercive nature of European identity 
formation and contrast it to the forces that have marked traditional identity formation in 
nations and states and also highlight the need to thoroughly investigate the role of newly 
emerging multi-level social identities in the European context. They argue that “Europe 
is faced with a tension between rapid jurisdictional change and relatively stable 
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identities”. However, they emphasize that a strong national identity does not per se 
correlate with a negative perception of European integration and “what matters is 
whether a person conceives of her national identity as exclusive or inclusive of other 
territorial identities” (Hooghe & Marks 2008, p.13).  The authors cite Thomas Risse 
(2002) who states that “Europeanness or ‘becoming European’ is gradually being 
embedded in understandings of national identities” and observes that “Europe” has 
increasingly formed part of national politics and national politics have become more 
relevant to decision making on Europe. It is the assumption that the politicization of 
European issues in national politics leads to the development of a “European layer of 
identity” complementing national identity which distinguishes the postfunctionalist 
theory from the fusion theory developed by Wessels. The fusion theory similarly 
stresses a Europeanization process of national political systems. Wessels defines this 
Europeanization “as a process by which governmental, parliamentary and non-
governmental actors shift their attention to the Brussels arena, involve their resources 
and invest ‘time’ to participate” (Wessels 1997, p. 36).  This theory stresses “the 
‘checks and balances’ between the national and the European institutions in preparing, 
making, taking, implementing and controlling EC/EU binding decisions” European 
Commission Report 2002, p.58),  and thus places emphasis on institutional fusion 
processes and new forms of institutional arrangements, in which national actors become 
engaged at a European level.  
 
 
Hooghe & Marks postulate that “the European system of multi-level governance has 
become more tightly coupled”. Partly, they attribute this to public referenda that have 
become a tool in national political arenas to legitimize European treaties and tackle the 
EU’s alleged “democratic deficit” (Hooghe & Marks 2008, p.13ff). In recent years, 
several of these referenda have yielded negative responses and led to a number of severe 
crises within the EU. The outcome of the recent referendum in Switzerland on the ban 
of minarets has once more exemplified that direct democracy in which public opinion is 
the predominant factor can at times yield surprisingly different results than previously 
expected by political elites.  
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2.2 The Importance of Public Opinion 
Politicians in national governments throughout Europe have started to worry about the 
electoral consequences of their European policies on a national level. The mobilization 
of exclusive national identity among mass publics by right-wing parties has induced “a 
deep reluctance on the part of governments to hazard public debate on further 
integration” (Hooghe & Marks 2008, p.21). According to Schoen (2008, p. 345) “some 
studies suggest that European issues do indeed play a role in shaping vote choice in 
national elections” (e.g. Evans, 1998, 1999b, see Carrubba and Timpone, 2005). In his 
study on Germany’s federal election in 2005, he analyzed if attitudes towards Turkey’s 
entry into the European Union affected voters’ choice in this election. The evidence 
showed that citizens’ opinions about Turkey’s accession to the European Union are only 
mildly shaped but by no means determined by group memberships and long-term 
political predispositions (p. 351).  
 
Mair (2000) argues that the lack of congruence between the electoral and the decision-
making arenas in the multi-level governance system of Europe leads to a “localization” 
of the European integration process at the level of national politics. “Public responses to 
Europe are refracted through national institutions and patterns of discourse that reflect 
distinct historical trajectories” (Hooghe & Marks 2008, p.13). This argument holds 
particular truth in the context of European enlargement, as it points to national 
peculiarities which underpin the enlargement debates in each member state. The perhaps 
most intriguing aspect of this theoretical framework with regard to this particular 
research paper is thus built on the assumption that public opinion and national 
constituencies are playing an increasingly important role within the European context 
and that European issues have reached national political arenas, acquire local relevance 
and are re-framed or “localized”. Hooghe and Marks hypothesize that “a brake on 
European integration has been imposed not because people have changed their minds, 
but because, on a range of vital issues, legitimate decision making has shifted from an 
insulated elite to mass politics” (2008, p.13). It has to be kept in mind that “enlargement 
is unpopular with EU voters, many of whom associate it with rising illegal immigration, 




In the case of EU enlargement, the EU member states, at least formally, dispose of the 
ultimate decision-making authority, putting national political arenas into the focus of 
attention. However, this is preceded by comprehensive bargaining processes at all levels 
of the European political system and accompanied by mutual influence between the 
various levels of political action. Intergovernmental interaction within the EU 
framework and supranational elements in the process cannot easily be detached from 
national discourses. In this context, bargaining theory can provide a valuable 
contribution to the analysis of the EU’s decision-making framework with regard to 
Turkey’s bid for accession. A decision to accept Turkey into the European Union 
requires unanimity by the member states. Thus, the bargaining power of each country 
increases and especially small countries can exploit this situation to extract concession 
from its EU partners (Moravcsik & Vachudova 2003, p.14). As argued by Scharpf, this 
naturally raises the likelihood that member states engage in behavior that focuses on 
their respective self-interests. This in turn comes at the expense of common benefits to 
the EU (Scharpf 1998, see also Elgström & Jönsson 2000, p.690) and common interests 
affecting the European Union on an aggregated level, which fall behind and are often 
neglected. According to Elgström & Jönsson (2000, p.2) bargaining processes in this 
context are characterized by every member-state’s insistence on getting as much as 
possible for itself, without caring about the consequences for other players. The authors 
also emphasize that within bargaining structures with a veto option for individual 
member states “the benefits received under the present policy become the base line 
below which nobody will settle” (p. 264). Unanimous voting requirements thus foster 
structural inertia in which “it will be very difficult to obtain major changes; in fact, there 
is a strong inclination to preserve existing rules” (see Scharpf 1988; Elgström & 
Jönsson 2000, p. 686). 
 
Viewed from this theoretical perspective, Austria’s position on Turkey’s EU accession 
should be predominantly driven by Austrian national self-interests. However, this may 
seriously underestimate the impact of public opinion on the position of any Austrian 
government towards enlargement, as national positions are often not fact-based, but 
rather opinion-based. Thus, an analysis of public opinion will provide valuable insights 
into the future disposition of Austrian foreign policy. However, it is vital to question the 
validity of this argument in the context of EU enlargement. In Austria, for example, it 
can be observed that public support of an accession of Croatia has risen from 34% in 
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2002 to 55% in 2005, while simultaneously support of Turkey's membership has 
decreased from 32% to 10% (ESI Report 2008, p.6). Can this be attributed to 
accentuated opinions representing actual preferences of an informed public? Does this 
adequately reflect differing circumstances of these two candidate countries or is this 
shift in public support simply a product of elite-decisions and strategic choices, as 
basically argued in a report of the European Stability Initiative on the Austrian debate 
on Turkey’s accession bid (ESI Report 2008)?  
 
As indicated above, public opinion is not a static phenomenon and can be subject to 
change over time. The concept of deliberative bias (see Fishkin 1997) is based on the 
underlying assumption that deliberations on a specific issue improve the level of 
information and reduce error.  Thus, according to this concept, a well-informed public 
will make more sound judgments than a “pre-deliberative” public (p.40). In the case of 
deciding on Turkey’s accession bid to the EU, it would mean that extensive public 
discourse would lead to a more informed decision. By screening several arguments 
frequently made against an accession of Turkey for their validity, this paper also seeks 
to make a contribution towards an informed public, although the sheer complexity of 
several issues at hand might not in all cases allow  to scratch far below the surface, as 
this would by far exceed the scope of my research. However, it is supposed to serve as a 
valuable overview of the issues and link a fact-based community perspective with an 
assessment of Austrian national public opinion and political discourse. 
 
2.3 How can the term „public opinion” be defined? 
It is important to clarify which concept of public opinion is applied in this paper, as the 
lack of a clear definition of this term would induce a certain degree of ambiguity into 
the research framework. There has been a variety of definitions of the term public 
opinion and it is perhaps one of the most contested terms in social sciences. Several 
attempts to define public opinion have centered on an elite-based view. Hennis (1957), 
for example, argues that only the opinions of the “relatively best-informed, most 
intelligent and most ethical citizens” form public opinion, if they are publicly expressed. 
Luhmann (1974) conceptualizes public opinion in his systems theory as “thematic 
structure of public communication”. It serves as a filter through which societal needs 
and expectations are selected as political issue and become part of the political 
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discourse. This implies a certain preponderance of political elites in the context of 
agenda-setting. Others have argued that public discourse has to be widely accessible, as 
public opinion serves as oversight over governing individuals and entities. It should thus 
be regarded as legitimizing power within a democratic, political system (see Nohlen, 
Dieter- Lexikon der Politik, Band 7, Politische Begriffe). In the course of this thesis, a 
focus is also put on a democratic, political system whose protagonists are driven by 
opinion polls and whose primary aim consists in maximizing their votes. It should be 
kept in mind that generally, every vote counts for the same in a democracy. 
Consequently, elements that introduce a hierarchical order between individual opinions 
to the term “public opinion” are largely discarded in this context, although it is 
acknowledged that opinion leaders and elites will in many cases exert disproportionate 
influence on public opinion (see Entman 2004, p.14), especially in terms of agenda 
setting. Thus, the concept of public opinion that is applied carries resemblance to the 
term “mass public”. The expression “public opinion” will be used specifically to include 
all citizens- also in the event of silent majorities or unqualified or in extreme cases, even 
unvoiced opinions. 
 
2.4 How does elite manipulation take place? 
The increasing importance of public opinion polls and the newly-found enthusiasm for 
decision-making by referendum has seemingly made European politics more susceptible 
to distortions in mass opinion in recent years. It has opened the door for political elites 
or certain political parties to intensify the influence of symbolism, emotional memories, 
and other sources of error and use these phenomena to their own advantage. It has to be 
kept in mind that elite manipulation of public opinion does not per se imply that the 
public will be completely uninformed about a specific issue. Rather, “public opinion on 
Europe is particularly susceptible to construction: i.e. priming (making a consideration 
salient), framing (connecting a particular consideration to a political object) and cueing 
(instilling a bias)”, according to Hooghe and Marks (2008, p. 14). These tools are 
applied by members of the political elites to shape public opinion in their favour. Often, 
politicians and other members of the political elite “present isolated, unrepresentative 
facts, frame issues tendentiously and seek to evoke an emotional response rather than 
encourage rational deliberation” (Kuklinski & Quirk 1998, p.24). This may lead some to 
argue that the information people receive is per se sketchy, misleading, or manipulative.  
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However, this is not necessarily the case, as information provided by elites can offer 
important cues to a public that is not inclined to be fully informed on a particular issue. 
Mondak (1993) argues that “heuristic processing, reliance on simple rules of judgment, 
provides a cognitive mechanism that may enable citizens to advance informed yet 
efficient issue appraisals” (p.167). Thus, citizens can use political heuristics to reduce 
the complexity of their political judgments (see Lupia 1994). According to Kuklinski & 
Quirk, citizens with little knowledge on a particular subject can draw on statements of 
certain members of the political elite who they generally trust or deem knowledgeable 
on this particular issue to shape their own opinion (Kuklinski & Quirk 1998, p.5; see 
also Carmines and Kuklinski 1990). One of the most common political cues in a modern 
democratic society is the political party: “By merely attending to party labels, voters can 
compensate for a lack of reliable information on the candidates’ policy positions” (p.8). 
Alternatively, the public can use the positions of interest groups whose policy 
preferences they generally support as cue. In this respect, the role of the media consists 
in providing citizens with statements and positions of these groups or political leaders 
on specific issues.   
 
Chaiken (1987) argues that in heuristic processing receivers rely on simple decision 
rules to judge the validity of persuasive claims.  In this context, it seems helpful to make 
the distinction between “hard” and “easy arguments”. When hard arguments are used, 
reasoning or evidence support claims about the consequences of a proposal. Easy 
arguments, on the other hand, convey a simpler message, relying more on symbolic 
language and are aimed at generating an emotional response without providing 
significant background information to substantiate the claims. “Pure assertion, which 
can evoke emotion and is easily represented in memory, is what most readily changes 
opinion. The preference for easy arguments will often affect collective opinion. It will 
cause distortion whenever one side in a debate can appeal to easy arguments, even if 
largely misleading, while the other side has more to explain” (Kuklinski & Quirk 1998, 
p.32). 
 
As argued in Kuklinski & Quirk (1998), psychologists distinguish between "central" 
and "peripheral" processing (p.17) - a distinction which can also be applied when 
analyzing public opinion formation. According to the literature, decisions are 
exclusively based on heuristics when people are in conditions of low cognitive ability 
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and motivation, and both on heuristics and information processing when people are in 
condition of high cognitive ability and motivation (see Roccato et al. 2006). According 
to Fiske & Taylor (1991) people use central processing particularly when attention and 
motivation are high: “they employ substantially more mental resources, think more 
systematically, and allow data to shape inferences” (pp. 475-480). Similarly, Petty and 
Caccioppo (1986) find that heavy involvement in an issue triggers a process in which 
arguments are processed centrally, and persuasion will depend on their relevance and 
quality. “When attention and motivation are low, however, peripheral processing leads 
to people employing fewer resources, relying on simple heuristics, and using top-down, 
stereotypic inferences” (Fiske and Taylor 1991, pp. 475-480). Low personal 
involvement prompts people not to pay full attention to messages. Thereby persuasion 
becomes contingent upon such peripheral cues as the source's expertise (see Hass 198l), 
trustworthiness (see Eagly, Wood, & Chaiken 1978;), attractiveness (see Eagly & 
Chaiken 1975), and similarity to the self (see Goethals & Nelson 1973). 
 
2.5 The dynamics of policy development 
Another interesting question in the context of assessing Turkey’s bid for EU 
membership is the dynamics of policy development within the EU. The punctuated 
equilibrium theory, originating from the field of paleontology, is applied to political 
processes and policy change (see Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones 2001). It can be 
used to explain incremental policy development, which is punctuated by non-
incremental policy change. Moreover, the theory describes how long periods of 
inactivity in politics and decision-making are punctuated by brief periods of rapid 
policy change (see Robinson et al. 2004).  This assumption seems especially applicable 
to the framework of the European Union, and – if linked to the level of politicization of 
a particular issue – can provide valuable insights into the decision-making process 
within the system of multi-level governance. Particularly, EU enlargement rounds 
should be considered triggers of policy change, especially with regard to the 
institutional set-up within the Union. Moreover, the punctuated equilibrium model is 
particularly interesting if put into the context of multilevel governance and Turkey’s 
accession bid, as it helps to analyze the interplay between various levels of governance. 
In the case of Turkey’s application process for EU membership, the underlying driver of 
non-incremental policy change is rooted in an, at least temporarily, increased level of 
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political salience of this issue in national political arenas. Thus, spikes in public interest 
and rises in the intensity of public debate concerning Turkey's EU accession constitute a 
variable that could help determining the pathway of future decision-making processes 
regarding Turkey’s bid for membership within the EU framework. Most of the time 
supranational institutions (particularly the EU commission) take the lead in monitoring 
and assessing the progress of applicant states, funding and implementing concrete 
policies as well as interacting with local policy makers within the member states. At 
crucial points however, the discussion is taken to national political arenas and the 
member states become the dominant actors within the framework, at which point 
politicians seek to capitalize on sudden spikes in public interest, or to exploit 
thematically controversial issues (see Elgström & Jönsson 2000, p.692). Therefore, the 
continuous work of EU institutions is occasionally interrupted and at times overruled 
and redirected by member states that have the ultimate decision-making authority on the 
issue of enlargement. This seems to coincide with the trajectory of the issue of Turkey’s 
accession bid to the EU in the minds of the public. Long periods during which the issue 
remains below the surface of public attention and is practically dormant within public 
discourse, are interrupted by brief periods or milestones during which the issue 
suddenly attains high political salience. Whereas citizens apply peripheral processing 
throughout these dormant stages of the political debate on Turkey’s EU accession bid, 
they resort to central processing during stages of political contestation. This is also line 
with the expectations of Elgström & Jönsson (2000, p. 692) who observe “state 
predominance and competition in areas where important national interests are at stake 
and more co-operative behavior in less politicized surroundings of a technical nature”. 
However, the argument is extended to include a dynamic perspective throughout the 
“policy life cycle” with a focus on a specific issue rather than a classification of a 
variety of issues.  
 
3.  The Austrian Debate on Turkey’s Accession Bid to the European Union 
In the case of Austria, the concept of multi-level governance can be used to explain a 
remarkable turn of political elites with regard to the question whether Turkey should 
join the EU.  
 
The two major parties, the conservative ÖVP (Austrian People’s Party) and to some 
degree the social democratic SPÖ (Austrian Social Democratic Party), had been rather 
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strong proponents of Turkey’s accession prior to 1999. However, the tide shifted 
towards an outright rejection of Turkey’s EU ambitions by 2004 at the latest. What had 
happened meanwhile that would cause such a dramatic change in opinion? The 
campaign for the 2004 elections to the European parliament was dominated by anti-
immigrant rhetoric by the right-wing FPÖ (Austrian Freedom Party) which emphasizes 
more strongly than other parties the cultural-linguistical basis of the Austrian identity 
(Spohn 2003, p.20). In this context it seems worthwhile to explore what perception 
Austrians actually have of Austrian identity. Haller (1996) tried to illuminate the key 
features that Austrians assign to a “true Austrian”. It is interesting that “being born in 
Austria” is important to 71% of the respondents and only for 53% “being a Christian” is 
a precondition for being considered a “true Austrian”, but that the dimensions “speaking 
German” and “feeling as Austrian” rank considerably higher and are important to 92% 
of the respondents, with “being an Austrian citizen (90%) ranking only slightly lower. 
This could perhaps indicate a slow and gradual departure from the prevailing notion of 
ius sanguinis to a more civic perception of nationality. These findings however seem to 
stand in stark contrast to the tone in political debates and election campaigns and to 
some extent also to recent election results in Austria.  
 
Fig. 1 Features of a “true Austrian” in the opinion of interviewed person (%) 
 
(source: Haller & Ressler 2006) 
 
Compared to other right-wing or populist parties in other European countries, the FPÖ 
is well entrenched within the national political system and has been able to secure a 
significant share of the votes in public elections throughout recent decades. The 
discussion on Turkey’s EU accession was and still is to a large degree embedded in the 
discourses on immigration, immigrant integration and public security (see Röhrlich, 
2009), which have been predominantly shaped by the FPÖ, or at least in which it has 
taken the lead over time. The party has managed to link these issues intrinsically 
together in public perception, forming a complex set of issues, to which the FPÖ offers 
 23
simple, straight-forward solutions that might not take all the complexity of the matter 
fully into account, but explain complex cause-effect relationships in a politically 
utilizable way. Minkenberg (2001) explained the rise of the FPÖ “with its ability to 
mobilize the ethno-cultural and xenophobic layers of an Austrian national identity”. 
 
The FPÖ has aimed at capitalizing on the negative overall public sentiment towards 
immigration which is expressed in the findings of an analysis of the Austrian dataset of 
the European Social Survey. This data depicts the prevalent negative attitude towards 
immigrants. Despite the fact that most respondents (28.6%) were undecided on whether 
immigrant make the country a better or worse place to live 48.8% had a slightly or 
strongly negative attitude (7.8% believed strongly that immigrants make the country a 
worse place to live), while only 21.1% displayed a positive attitude towards the 
immigrants’ contribution to the living conditions within the country and only 2.2% 
firmly believed that immigrants make the country a better place to live. 
 
Fig. 2 Immigrants make country worse or better place to live 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Worse place to live 179 7.4 7.8 7.8 
1 143 5.9 6.3 14.1 
2 215 8.9 9.4 23.5 
3 283 11.8 12.4 35.9 
4 294 12.2 12.9 48.8 
5 689 28.6 30.2 78.9 
6 154 6.4 6.7 85.6 
7 145 6.0 6.3 92.0 
8 101 4.2 4.4 96.4 
9 31 1.3 1.4 97.8 
Better place to live 51 2.1 2.2 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2285 95.0 100.0   
Refusal 15 .6    
Don't know 105 4.4    
Missing 
Total 120 5.0    
Total 2405 100.0    
 (source: European Social Survey 2006) 
 
This development was exacerbated by the most influential newspaper Kronen Zeitung, 
which is said to mirror Austrian public opinion, while also directly shaping popular 
views and putting certain issues into the spotlight of public scrutiny (see Filzmaier & 
Hajek 2004). The newspaper has pursued a largely anti-immigration policy and has 
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repeatedly denounced Turkish EU membership (see Röhrlich 2009; Günay 2008). The 
influence of the Kronen Zeitung is widely recognized by Austrian political elites, 
thereby further magnifying it. It has to be taken into account, however, that the 
concentration in the media sector is even higher in other countries, which obviously 
does not necessarily lead to such low approval rates in the context of Turkey’s accession 
bid.  
 
So what other factors, except the existence of a remarkably accepted right-wing party, 
have contributed to the reservations against Turkish accession? Another dimension 
which could help to shed some light on the rather sudden shift in party opinions lies in 
the interrelation between the question of EU enlargement and the more general 
discourse on the European Union and its “democratic deficit” in Austria. The decision 
of an EU accession of a candidate country as well as the decision to start accession 
negotiations with a particular country are ultimately made in a European context and 
require unanimous agreement of all the member states in the Council of the European 
Union. According to Marckhgott (2007) this entails that single national political parties 
and other actors on a national level are not necessarily expected to assert their opinion 
on a European level by their constituencies, which causes them to adopt a position that 
shapes its political profile and maximizes the political capital of the corresponding actor 
domestically and is firmly rooted in opinion polls. Consequently, parties are keen on 
proving responsiveness to the public will in European matters. The consequence is a 
governmental position characterized by populism whose actual successful assertion on a 
European level remains highly doubtful to the constituency. In the view of this author, 
this applies particularly to the Austrian enlargement discourse. 
 
From 2004 onwards, the SPÖ, as opposition party to the ruling ÖVP/FPÖ coalition used 
the issue of Turkey’s accession bid to criticize the ruling parties for their inadequate 
response to public concerns and their inactivity in Brussels in preventing negotiations 
(see ESI Report 2006b). This was done to in order to shape the SPÖ’s profile in 
domestic politics. The issue of Turkey’s application to join the EU was thus one of the 
first European issues, which has been effectively transformed into an issue of salience 
within the national realm. As predicted by Hooghe and Marks, the major parties at the 
center of the political spectrum were in a generally defensive position and over time lost 
control of the public discourse (see Hooghe & Marks 2008). After a certain point they 
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tried to counter the FPÖ by imitating the party’s statements and views, albeit in a more 
moderate and constructive form. However, they had lost political initiative and were 
clearly lacking the ability to defend a project that they perhaps were not so convinced of 
to begin with. Whereas EU enlargement to include Eastern European countries was a 
project of the grand coalition in Austria that was tangible, concrete and with immediate 
effects and the Balkan states were traditionally within the sphere of interest for Austrian 
politicians due to strong historical ties, Turkey’s EU accession was seen as a long-term 
project whose implications would not become effective until some distant time in the 
future. Therefore, prior to 2004, it seemed that supporting Turkey’s accession would fit 
well into an overall strategy of visible support of EU enlargement in general. Yet, while 
various government statements underlined the common cultural heritage of the Danube 
region (see Streitenberger 1997), Turkey’s membership perspective was not similarly 
endorsed by Austrian elites. According to Esra LaGro (2006, p.12) “the [Eastern] 
enlargement process was and still is a window of opportunity for Austria because the 
formerly peripheral member state of the EU found that its place was shifting towards 
the centre of Europe and the EU.” 
 
Only in 2004 did the picture become more differentiated and the membership 
perspective of candidates was assessed on an individual basis. Once the distant prospect 
of Turkey’s eventual accession received a more immediate perspective, as negotiations 
were set to begin later that year, negative sentiment rose considerably and erupted into a 
heated public debate. Interestingly, this debate had not taken place in 1999, when 
Turkey was granted official candidate status. At the European Council in Helsinki it 
was decided that “Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of 
the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States” (The Council of the European 
Union, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999, “Presidency Conclusions”, 
Chapter I, Article 12) Similarly, in 2002, the EU promised to open accession 
negotiations “without delay” at the end of 2004, provided that the Commission would 
conclude that Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria (see The Council of the 
European Union, Copenhagen European Council, 12-13 December 2002, “Presidency 
Conclusions”). As late as in 1998, Viktor Klima (SPÖ), at that time Prime Minister of 
Austria, expressed a favorable view on Turkey’s accession perspective: “Turkey has an 
accession perspective; it has the ‘eligibility’, which needs to be confirmed. We want the 
dialogue with Turkey, we have to be a fair partner and can thus for example not block 
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the financial support package or have the Customs Union, with significant advantages 
for the EU and major disadvantages for Turkey, remain in effect indefinitely” 
(Subcommittee on the European Union, Austrian National Council, June 3, 1998). 
 
This is a clear sign that European issues- and Turkey’s EU accession had previously 
been considered to be only an issue at the European level- have received increasing 
importance in national political contestations and are actively used to shape the political 
profile of political parties. The political elites pursued opinion-polls driven politics and 
gave way to short-term political considerations that have so far prevented a rational 
debate on the merits and short-comings of a full membership of Turkey. This view is 
reflected in a statement of an ÖVP strategist in interviews to the European Stability 
Initiative, arguing that “changing public opinion on Turkey is a steeper challenge than 
convincing Austrians to vote for EU-accession in 1994, or getting them on board for the 
2004-enlargement round. Our primary task is to win elections” (ESI Briefing 2006b, 
p.6). 
 
According to Mayer & Rosenberger (2008), it was the FPÖ which has made the 
question of Turkey’s EU accession a highly politicized issue in Austria. It picked up on 
the negative notion and inertia to change the status quo within the Austrian public and 
included it in its campaign “Austria First”. With regard to the two mainstream parties 
ÖVP and SPÖ they generally observe a de-politicization strategy concerning EU topics 
and emphasize that they (the ÖVP even more so than the SPÖ) manage this by 
anchoring its argumentation in European affairs in abstract concepts such as “Europe as 
a peace project”, which do not lend themselves to daily political contestation. In 
Kritzinger & Steinbauer’s view (2005, p. 116), ÖVP and SPÖ both deny „any particular 
emotional involvement, based on ethnic or religious arguments and claim to assess 
Turkey’s bid for membership solely on the basis of a rational analysis of economic and 
political factors.” Representatives of the SPÖ have stressed the importance of the EU’s 
ability to incorporate new member states from 2004 onward. The influential SPÖ 
politician Josef Cap, for example, publicly opposed Turkey’s membership on several 
occasions stating that “consolidation needs to come first” (Plenary of the Austrian 
National Council, October 21, 2004), that “when the EU will soon have 27 member 
states, the functioning of existing institutions will have to be insured” (Plenary of the 
Austrian National Council, June 21. 2006) or that “an accession of Turkey would 
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“overwhelm the European Union” (Subcommittee on the European Union, Austrian 
National Council, December 12, 2007). 
 
In order to de-emotionalize public debate, the two main political parties picked up the 
concept of a public referendum (see Günay 2008, p.74). It was argued that this 
referendum would give the decision the necessary democratic legitimacy and would 
prove that the concerns of the Austrian public are adequately taken into account. 
Interestingly, it seemed that the latter point had gained in relative importance. 
(Gaulhofer in Die Presse, January 30, 2008). The ÖVP only demands a referendum in 
the specific case of Turkey, “reflecting the particular sensitivities of the Austrian public 
on this particular subject” (MEP Othmar Karas, ÖVP), while it retains the general 
strategy of ruling out similar referenda in the case of other accession candidates. The 
SPÖ has shifted its strategy towards demanding public referenda whenever a decision 
on a European level will considerably alter the face of the European Union, which 
includes important treaties and enlargement rounds (Günay 2008, p.74). In fact, Austria 
is the only European country whose political elite has pledged its continued 
commitment to adopt the policy instrument of a public referendum in the case of 
Turkey’s accession bid. France, which also stated that Turkey’s accession would be 
subject to a national referendum, initially tied the referendum to the more generally 
formulated condition “that a referendum be held prior to a country's EU accession if it 
represents more than 5% of the overall EU population.” (Euractiv, June 25, 2008). 
However, the constitutional amendment that was introduced in 2005 under former 
President Jacques Chirac has, in the meantime, been revoked by the French senate. 
 
The policy measure of a public referendum has achieved that the discussion about 
Turkey’s accession to the EU has subsided in Austria, albeit it seems to have been only 
postponed to a distant point in the future. In the meantime, it looks as if only little, if 
any, political capital could be gained from once again inciting the debate on Turkey’s 
EU membership. The ruling parties could in this case always counter with the argument 
of having already established that the Austrian public will have the last say on this. The 
unpopularity, however, remains and agreement to Turkey’s EU accession has been 
steady at exceptionally low numbers. Thus, despite of the return to pragmatic 
negotiations for now, it has to be kept in mind that every Austrian government will be 
aware of the negative sentiment within the Austrian electorate and could therefore be 
 28
tempted to play a passive, if not outright destructive role throughout the negotiations. 
Kayalar rightfully states that “government preferences do not take shape in a vacuum 
but public opinion sets the borders of how far the governments can go” (Kayalar 2006, 
p.74). The boundaries of any Austrian government therefore seem to have become 
irrevocably determined by domestically motivated political considerations. More 
generally, the question remains when and how instruments of direct democracy should 
be applied, but this would definitely go beyond the scope of this paper. However it 
needs to be borne in mind that the Austrian public was also outright opposed to Eastern 
EU enlargement prior to the accession of the Central- and Eastern European countries 
(see e.g. Eurobarometer 53, spring 2000). Krausneker et al. (2001) analyzed the 
enlargement discourse in Austria prior to the Eastern enlargement round. The results of 
their media analysis suggest that the enlargement discourse was strongly influenced by 
the discourse on employment and more specifically the fear of unemployment and that 
the impact of enlargement was largely set in a negative context. The authors point out 
that negative cues were over-represented in the enlargement discourse and that 
“insecurity” in a wider sense is one of the recurring themes within the debate. Yet, 
Austria seems to be among the main economic beneficiaries of this enlargement round 
(see Breuss 2006).  
 
There seems to be yet another dimension that may have an effect on the Austrian 
position on Turkey’s bid for EU membership. After the end of the Cold War, Austrian 
foreign policy had been subject to a fundamental reorientation, which was shaped by an 
“Europeanization” of its foreign policy and culminated in the subsequent accession to 
the European Union. Austria got relegated to a small country that was no longer granted 
the same special role within the realm of international relations that it used to enjoy 
before the fall of the Iron Curtain. During the Cold War period, Austria had managed to 
position itself as a neutral location for negotiations and Vienna still is the seat of several 
international organizations such as the IAEA, UNIDO, UNODC and OSCE. Its active 
foreign policy had helped to built up an excellent reputation in the realm of international 
relations from the 1960s and especially the 1970s onward, which prompted Henry 
Kissinger to comment that “Chancellor Bruno Kreisky had parlayed his country’s 
formal neutrality into a position of influence beyond its strength” (Kissinger 1979, 
p.1204). This role as mediator and the corresponding status on the international parquet 
were however, out of proportion with the actual size and relevance of the country and 
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thus Austria’s importance somewhat declined (see Gärtner et al. 2005; see Busek 1998, 
p.431). The public referendum on Turkey’s EU accession could once again, if only 
briefly, put Austria in the spotlight of the international community and would entail a 
privileged role within the European Union. In the aftermath of its accession to the 
European Union, Austria has become painfully aware of its relative insignificance in a 
club, in which the largest members seem to be “calling the shots” (Günay 2008, p.68). 
This fear of insignificance and the need for a recognized and inflated share-of-voice 
may also be behind the Austrians’ relatively strong preference for unanimous decision-
making in the Eurobarometer 53 (Spring 2000) survey (when this question was asked 
for the last time). The EU-15 results show support for majority voting in the EU, with 
45% of respondents opting for this choice over 38% who prefer unanimous decision-
making in the European Council. In Austria, however, only 31% favors majority voting 
procedures, while 52% support unanimous decision-making processes. Intuitively this 
would be explained with a general tendency towards unanimous voting structures by 
smaller states. However, this is not reflected in the data, as only in Greece and Austria 
there is a majority for such voting procedures.  
 
Austrian political elites often are under the impression that public referenda which had a 
negative outcome in individual member states, such as in the case of Ireland, France and 
the Netherlands, actually enhanced the bargaining position of precisely these states and 
led to concessions that would prove beneficial to the respective countries and increase 
their visibility and importance. The political elites understand that Austria may not be 
able to sustain prolonged pressure by the other EU member states if negotiations with 
Turkey have been successfully concluded and all other member states have ratified the 
accession. However, the public referendum on Turkey’s accession would in their view 
signal Austria’s exceptionality and could be used as a bargaining chip to extract 
concessions from the other member states (see Elgström & Jönsson 2000, p.694). Also, 
this would move Austria back into the focus of international affairs. Fittingly, the 
former President of the Austrian Parliament, Andreas Khol, concluded that Austria was 
“the voice of the EU’s silent public”, indicating that Austrian political elites only 
expressed what seemed to be a wide consensus not only in their own country but 
throughout Europe. This would imply that either political elites in other countries were 
too timid to outright oppose Turkey’s accession or that these elites were too detached 
from public opinion to understand or care about the needs and concerns of their 
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constituencies. In certain ways, this statement also portrays Austria as the underdog that 
is willing to stand up against the almighty “bureaucrats in Brussels”, which is positively 
perceived by Austrian voters. This is underlined by the fierce resistance of the Austrian 
government against the opening of negotiations which would explicitly state the goal of 
accession. During an emergency meeting of the EU’s foreign ministers this prompted 
Luxemburg’s Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn to say that “the ratio remains unchanged 
at 24 to 1” (Focus Online, October 03, 2005), referring to Austria’s isolated position 
among the EU member states. However, domestically this was exploited as a big win of 
Austrian foreign policy. The relatively negative sentiment towards the EU and its 
institutions in Austria can mainly be attributed to the fact that Austrian politicians have 
excessively used the EU as “scapegoat” to justify unpopular political decisions and 
actions in the past years (see European Commission Report 2002, p. 225).  
 
In order to comprehend the twists and turns of the Austrian public debate on Turkey’s 
EU accession it seems vital to look into the conception of history that is prevalent in 
Austria with regard to Turkey. The fear of the Turks has been widespread and 
pronounced in Austria throughout the past centuries. In its most extreme form this is 
reflected in a fresco, to be found on the outer wall of the dome in Graz, a city of Austria, 
dating back to 1485, which displays “the three plagues of God”: locusts, the pest and the 
Turks (Polenz 2010, p.9). Kritzinger and Steinbauer (2005) identify two central 
elements that dominate the Austrian historical narrative on Turkey. The first element 
consists of the sieges of Vienna, or more accurately the reconstruction of these events in 
the minds of Austrians. These collective memories have found their way into 
schoolbooks, popular legends and have given names to several public places, especially 
in Vienna. The image of the Turk resembles that of a savage, barbaric warrior with a 
culture full of greed and insidiousness, which poses a threat to the Christian Occident. 
In contrast, the corresponding construction of the “Austrian/Viennese self” seeks to 
carve out heroic and noble characteristics thus portraying the typical Austrian 
personality as antagonistic to the allegedly inherent Turkish personality traits. The 
construction of Austrian historical narrative is predominantly shaped by the two sieges, 
while, by and large, centuries of cooperation between the Austrian-Hungarian and the 
Ottoman Empire or periods of Habsburg predominance over the Ottomans on the 
Balkans are neglected (p.109). It is also frequently forgotten that some Protestant 
Hungarians (a linguistic reminiscent can be found in the German expression 
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“Kruzitürken”- its literal meaning “Turks of the Cross”- or an amalgamation of the 
word Kuruzen- Hungarian rebels to the Habsburg- and Turks, which is used as a 
swearword) fought along-side the Muslim Turks during the siege of Vienna because 
they enjoyed a higher degree of tolerance under Ottoman rule than as subjects of the 
Catholic Habsburgs (Polenz 2010, p.9). 
 
The second element that has decisively shaped the Turkish image in Austria is the 
discourse on Turkish guest workers. The Austrian population has perceived cultural 
differences between itself and Turkish immigrants significantly stronger as compared to 
other immigrant groups. Turkish immigration is perceived as a prolonged threat to 
Austrian culture and viewed as a continuation of Turkish attempts to conquer Austrian 
territory. Right-wing politicians often refer to Turkish migration flows as the “3rd siege 
of Vienna”, but Kritzinger and Steinbauer (2005) argue that this belief has, albeit more 
subtly expressed, been widely incorporated into mainstream Austrian beliefs. 
 
 
4. Austrian Public Opinion 
Austrian public opinion is, with the exception of Croatia, strongly opposed to any 
further enlargement of the EU. 62% of the Austrian respondents of the Eurobarometer 
survey in 2006 were against the accession of Macedonia, 73% opposed the accession of 
Albania, 59% did not want Bosnia and Herzegovina to join the EU and 65% negated the 
accession perspective of Serbia (Eurobarometer 66, 2006). This skeptical attitude 
towards enlargement is also confirmed by a survey conducted by the Austrian Society 
for European Politics in 2005 (different levels of opposition and support can be 
attributed to a time component and especially to different wordings in the respective 
surveys). According to this study, only an accession of Croatia would currently find a 
majority in Austria (52% in favor, 21% against), whereas an accession of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is only supported by 29% of respondents (44% against), an accession of 
Montenegro would be rejected by 45% (28% in favour) and also the accession of 
Macedonia (24% in favour, 50% against), Serbia (25% in favour, 52% against), Kosovo 
(20% in favour, 57% against) or Albania (19% in favour, 59% against) would be clearly 
rejected. A survey in November 2010, again conducted by the Austrian Society for 
European Politics found that 68% of the 1004 respondents would support an accession 
of Croatia, while only 18% rejected it. This shows that Austrian favor Croatia’s 
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accession considerably more than in 2005, which also reflects the progress that has been 
made in accession negotiations. In the case of Macedonia 39% of respondents are in 
favor, while 37% are against an accession of this country, which shows increasing 
support for the accession perspective of Macedonia. Support for an accession of Turkey 
is at comparatively low levels with only 17% of respondents supporting its accession 
bid, while 69% reject an admission of Turkey into the EU. 
 
The Eurobarometer survey of fall 2009 indicates that 28% of the Austrian respondents 
could envision the accession of new member states, while 65% reject this idea 
categorically. In comparison, an average of 46% of the European respondents are in 
favor of further enlargement steps, while 43% dismiss the idea of further enlargement 
rounds. The case of Croatia is yet another example that proves how quickly public 
opinion can turn or can be influenced on this issue. The approval rates regarding an EU 
accession of Croatia rose from 34% in 2002 to 55% in 2005 (ESI Report 2008, p.6) and 
to 68% in 2010 (survey of the Austrian Society for European Politics). Within the same 
period, support for Turkey’s accession fell from 32% to 10% in 2005 and according to 
the survey of the Austrian Society for European Politics in 2010 stabilized at relatively 
low levels of 17% of respondent supporting Turkish accession (mind differently phrased 
questions, which could distort findings and limit comparability). It also needs to be kept 
in mind that Austrian public opinion has traditionally been skeptical towards EU 
enlargement. According to Eurobarometer 53, conducted in the spring of 2000, only 30 
% of the Austrian respondents were in favor of accession of the 13 mostly Central- and 
Eastern European applicant countries. A study conducted on behalf of the Austrian 
Society for European Politics in March 2010, exploring the attitudes of 752 respondents 
towards Austria’s membership in the EU and enlargement, found that in hindsight, a 
majority of Austrians now takes a positive stand on the EU-accession of the neighboring 
countries Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 56% of the respondents 
think that the accession of these countries was “a good decision”, whereas only 19% 
offered a negative opinion. In July 2003, 40% of the respondents had rejected the 
accession of the Czech Republic, 38% the accession of Slovakia, 25% the accession 
Slovenia and 21% were opposed to an accession of Hungary.  
 
The negative sentiment towards enlargement is also accompanied by a rather negative 
image of the European Union itself in Austria. 73 % of the respondents in a survey 
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conducted on behalf of the Austrian Society for European Politics in March 2010 think 
that Austria should remain a member of the EU, while 21 % are in favour of a 
withdrawal. This number is particularly high among poorly educated people (34%) and 
older segments of the population (66+ yrs. - 27%). Only 65% of the respondents think 
that the decision to join the EU was right, whereas 30% are of the opinion that Austria 
made a mistake by joining the EU. It also needs to be taken into account that 21% of 
respondents have experienced personal disadvantages (for 47% EU accession has had 
personal advantages) as a consequence of EU membership and 24% argue that the 
country has suffered from disadvantages following EU accession (for 58%, Austria has 
benefited from EU accession). Moreover, the Eurobarometer survey 73 in spring 2010 
revealed that 48% of the Austrian respondents felt that the country has overall not 
benefited from EU accession (EU-27 average: 35%). These results only briefly touch 
upon the general opinion on the European Union in Austria and a more thorough 
investigation of attitudes towards the EU is not within the scope of this paper. They are 
merely included here to highlight the fact that the discourse on enlargement and 
Turkey’s accession bid in particular cannot be entirely detached from the general 
discourse on the European Union. However, this does not explain the particularly 
negative sentiment towards an accession of Turkey compared to other accession 
candidates.  
 
According to a survey conducted by the Austrian Society of European Politics in 2005, 
8% of the respondents already regarded Turkey as ready to join the EU, 28% saw this 
perspective within 10 years, 22% thought Turkey would be in a position to join the EU 
within the next 20 years and 32% dismissed Turkey’s accession perspective altogether 
(see Marckhgott 2007). In the Eurobarometer survey 69 in 2008, it was asked, whether 
the respondents would be “strongly in favor”, “fairly in favor”, “fairly opposed” or 
“strongly opposed” to an accession of Turkey if the country fulfilled all the official 







Fig. 3 Attitudes of Europeans towards Turkey’s EU accession per nationality (%) 
 
(source: Eurobarometer survey 69, 2008) 
 
With only 16% of the Austrian respondents “strongly in favor” or “fairly in favor”, 
Austria ranks last among the member states in support of Turkish membership.  
 
The Eurobarometer survey 66 in 2006 affirms the image of Austria as a country that is 
adamantly opposed to Turkey’s EU accession. 84% of the Austrian respondents view 
the cultural differences between Turkey and the EU member states as too significant for 
Turkey to join the EU. This perception of an unbridgeable cultural gap is only similarly 
strong in Germany (74%). The EU average lies at 61% and – with the exception of the 
UK (46%) and Spain (49%) – a majority of the respondents in each member state 
supported the claim. In the case of Austria, this result clearly indicates the importance of 
cultural and religious elements in the Austrian debate on Turkey’s EU accession. 
According to the Eurobarometer survey 66 in 2006, Austrians (84%) are in line with 
overall public opinion in the EU (85%) that Turkey will need to systematically respect 
human rights in order to become an EU member. Moreover, 81% of the Austrians were 
concerned about substantial migration flows into the wealthy EU member states upon 
Turkey’s accession. Albeit well above the EU average of 66%, the results in some of the 
other European societies were comparably negative. The statement “to join the EU in 
about ten years, Turkey will have to significantly improve the state of its economy” was 
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apart from Austria (83%) also supported by a solid majority in other affluent European 
societies, the net contributor states of the EU, such as Germany (83%), the Netherlands 
(84%) and Sweden (81%). The highest level of agreement to this statement could 
however be found in Greece with 94% of respondents in support. 
 
The potentially positive effects of Turkish membership do not seem to be widely 
acknowledged by the Austrian public. Austrians seem among the least inclined to 
support statements emphasizing Turkey’s European credentials or indicate potentially 
positive effects of an EU accession of Turkey. Only 18% of Austrian respondents 
agreed that the accession of Turkey could positively impact on the security situation in 
the region and only 24% see the positive demographic impact that a relatively young 
Turkish population could potentially have on the EU with its ageing societies. With 
regard to the question whether Turkey at least partly belongs to Europe by its 
geography, only 42% of the Austrian respondents gave a positive answer, while 56% 
did not think Turkey even partly belonged to Europe. In contrast an average of 56% of 
European respondents considered Turkey a part of Europe by its geography. Only 
Greece (40%) and Cyprus (35%) have had lower scores than Austria on this question. 
Asked whether Turkey historically at least partly belongs to Europe, only 33% of the 
Austrian respondents agreed to that statement, while an average of 40% of the European 
respondents saw Turkey historically anchored in Europe. Greece (15%) and Cyprus 
(8%) negate the historical “Europeanness” of Turkey even more clearly. This time, also 
French respondents (30%) were more negative than Austrians. In three countries, 
however, the historic European credentials of Turkey seem undoubted: in Poland (61%), 
Sweden (63%) and Hungary (73%) there seems to be a wide consensus that Turkey is 
historically a part of Europe.  
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Fig. 4 Attitudes regarding arguments for and against Turkey’s accession   
(source: Eurobarometer survey 66)  
 
A Eurobarometer Flash survey in February 2009 asked respondents to rank the 
importance of the dimensions “Freedom and Democracy”, “Immigration issues“, 
“Ageing of European population“, “EU’s role in the world“, “Economic issues“,  
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“Stability at European Union's borders“ and “Cultural and religious issues“ for future 
enlargement rounds. 51% of Austrian respondents thought “Freedom and Democracy” 
to be one of the two most important issues to be considered for future enlargement 
rounds, 37% ranked “Economic issues” among the top two issues, for 33% 
“Immigration” is one of the top two priorities, followed by 24% for whom “cultural and 
religious issues” are a major factor. 16% of the Austrian respondents emphasized 
“stability at European Union's borders“, 11% the “EU’s global role” and 7% gave 
priority to the issue of “ageing of European population“. The survey reveals that 
compared to the European average, the Austrians attach particularly high importance to 
the dimensions of “immigration” and “cultural/religious issues”, as well as “freedom 
and democracy”, whereas demographic, geo-strategic or even economic considerations 
are less significant relative to the EU average in the context of enlargement. It has to be 
kept in mind that this survey rated dimensions for future enlargements in general. 
However, it allows drawing important conclusions for the specific case of Turkey and 
the overall results might in turn be significantly influenced by this case which is the 
most visible and most widely discussed enlargement option within the public realm. 












(source: Eurobaromet Flash Survey 257, February 2009) 
 
The Flash Eurobarometer also offers important insights on the multilevel governance 
system of the EU as perceived by its citizens. “The survey asked respondents for their 
views on which issues should be taken into account prior to future EU enlargements; 
they were asked to give their opinions from a personal, national and EU-level 
viewpoint” (Flash Eurobarometer No.257, 2009, p.36). The results indicate the different 
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importance that is assigned to several issues by respondents with regard to different 
levels of analysis. Cultural and religious issues were more important for Austrian 
respondents on a personal level than viewed from a national or European perspective. 
This may remind us how important this dimension really is for Austrians and how 
prominently it figures in public discourse. Despite the fact that this assumption may be 
somewhat thwarted by the data specified above, which displays other dimensions with 
much higher levels of importance to Austrian respondents, it is clearly a sign of the 
relevance that the cultural dimension unfolds within the personal realm. Personal 
considerations are often at the center of voting decisions and thus indirectly influence 
political discourse. At the same time, it is difficult to engage in a rational discourse on 
issues that seemingly touch the core of people’s lives and are thus subject to a large 
degree of subjectivity. 
 
Fig. 6 Considerations for future enlargements: Cultural and religious issues  
Issue relevance on different levels, compared to within-country average of the three levels 
 
 (source: Flash Eurobarometer No.257, p.45) 
 
In contrast, high importance is attached to the immigration issue on a national level, 
whereas it is viewed less important on a European or personal level by Austrian 
respondents. The Eurobarometer survey 72 in 2009 shows that 29% of the Austrian 
respondents associate the EU with cultural diversity. At the same time, however, 23% 
fear the loss of Austrian cultural identity. These findings are complemented by the 
results of a survey conducted on behalf of the Austrian Society for European Politics 
conducted in 2010. According to its findings, only 48% of the respondents feel that the 
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„Austrian way” has not been compromised by the country’s EU-accession, which 
constitutes a significant increase from 32% in 2005. Still, these results also indicate the 
prevailing distrust towards the perceived “cultural interference” by the EU. Is it perhaps 
this fear that causes Austrians to assign such high value to the immigration issue on the 
national level? And how can it then be explained that the dimension of “cultural and 
religious issues” does not produce similar results? This could be explained by the fact 
that immigration is an issue that not only encompasses a cultural and identity 
component, but is among other factors also strongly influenced by economic 
considerations. However, this assumption is contradicted by an analysis of a 
representative sample of the Austrian population (European Social Survey dataset on 
Austria), which reveals that a clear majority sees the national economy benefit from 
immigration, while a 48.8% of responds to some degree feel that immigrants make the 
country a worse place to live in. 
Fig. 7 Responses of Austrians on the question whether immigration is good or bad for the country's 
economy 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Bad for the economy 118 4.9 5.2 5.2 
1 93 3.9 4.1 9.3 
2 132 5.5 5.8 15.2 
3 182 7.6 8.0 23.2 
4 199 8.3 8.8 32.0 
5 545 22.7 24.1 56.1 
6 250 10.4 11.1 67.2 
7 298 12.4 13.2 80.4 
8 242 10.1 10.7 91.1 
9 92 3.8 4.1 95.1 
Good for the economy 110 4.6 4.9 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2261 94.0 100.0   
Refusal 8 .3    
Don't know 136 5.7    
Missing 
Total 144 6.0    
Total 2405 100.0    






Fig. 8 Responses of Austrians on the question whether Immigrants make country worse or better place 
to live 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Worse place to live 179 7.4 7.8 7.8 
1 143 5.9 6.3 14.1 
2 215 8.9 9.4 23.5 
3 283 11.8 12.4 35.9 
4 294 12.2 12.9 48.8 
5 689 28.6 30.2 78.9 
6 154 6.4 6.7 85.6 
7 145 6.0 6.3 92.0 
8 101 4.2 4.4 96.4 
9 31 1.3 1.4 97.8 
Better place to live 51 2.1 2.2 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2285 95.0 100.0   
Refusal 15 .6    
Don't know 105 4.4    
Missing 
Total 120 5.0    
Total 2405 100.0    
(source: analysis of the author, raw data- ESS Austria) 
 
Fig. 9 Considerations for future enlargements: Immigration 
Issue relevance on different levels, compared to within-country average of the three levels 
 
 (source: Flash Eurobarometer No.257, p.44) 
The Eurobarometer survey 72 in 2009 revealed that Austrians “do not have the feeling 
that the European Union through its actions has a significant influence on their actual 
living conditions”. Only 13% of the respondents thought that the EU constitutes the 
biggest single political factor with influence on their lives, whereas 43% see the 
national political institutions as the main source of influence with relevance for their 
personal lives. In order to keep things in perspective, however, it is necessary to look at 
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the European average, which is leaning even more towards the national level (45%) and 
assigns even lower value to the EU realm (11%). The Eurobarometer survey 73 in 2010 
measured trust in political institutions. As displayed below, Austrian respondents are in 
line with the European average in trusting the EU as an institution. However, in Austria 
there is a comparably high trust in national political institutions. 
 
Fig. 10 Trust in the EU and national institutions 
 
 (source: Eurobarometer 73, spring 2010) 
This once again underlines the continued dominance of national political arenas within 
the system of multi-level governance but does not undermine one of the basic 
assumptions of this paper, namely that European issues have often become so closely 
intertwined with issues at the national levels that they cannot be decoupled from each 
other. However, these findings indicate on which level political contestation of salient 










5. An Assessment of Arguments against Turkey’s EU Accession from a 
Community Perspective 
5.1 Rounds of European Enlargement  
There have always been critical, cautious and outright opposing voices with regard to 
more or less intense enlargement debates before each accession round in the past. A 
report of the European Stability Initiative, looking into the enlargement debate (ESI 
Report 2006a, “Beyond Enlargement Fatigue”), cites Francois Mitterrand as an 
example, who at the time was still the leading opposition politician in France and would 
later go on to become long-term president under whose aegis precisely the countries 
mentioned below later joined the EU. In 1977, he told the magazine Nouvel 
Observateur: “One has to be careful not to turn the common market into a mere free 
trade zone. Neither Greece nor Spain are in a position to join the Community. 
Accession is neither in their interest nor is it in our interest. Interim steps are desirable.” 
The report also mentions Perry Anderson, a renowned scholar on European affairs, who 
noted in 1996 prior to the eastern enlargement round that enlargement was posing a 
threat to the achievements of European integration. “The most immediate effect of any 
extension to the east, even of modest scope, would be a financial crisis of heroic 
proportions.” Eastern enlargement would “cripple the existing institutions of the Union” 
and derail the introduction of a single European currency. Yet, what later caused the 
financial and ensuing economic crisis did certainly not originate from Eastern European 
countries but was rooted in what became largely known as “subprime mortgage crisis” 
in the U.S. real estate market. However, some of the Eastern European countries turned 
out to be highly affected by the economic downturn. This has been somewhat been 
overshadowed by the events in Greece and other Mediterranean countries. 
 
Anderson argued that “the cost of integrating Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia 
and Poland “would mean an increase of 60 percent in the Union budget today and that 
there was no chance of the existing member states accepting such a burden.” (Anderson 
1997, p.126; see ESI Report 2006a). The European budget, however, has not increased 
by 60% as will be further elaborated on later in this paper (see p.114 ff). These 
statements should merely underline the need to include a certain level of uncertainty 
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into the model of analysis. What seemed inconceivable 10 years ago is now a reality. It 
can be observed that even though Anderson’s interjections may have been legitimate 
concerns at the time they were made, they quickly proved irrelevant in light of the 
ensuing dynamism that the prospect of enlargement induced into the European 
framework. It needs to be acknowledged that such objections serve its main purpose in 
the pre-accession state with the aim of shaping public discourse. At that stage they are 
certainly important to inspire the ensuing reforms of the EU institutions needed to 
accommodate the altered needs of a growing and deepening Union. What is interesting 
in any case is that enlargement has always entailed considerable transformation 
processes within the EU, thus leading to an adaptation of existing structures. Therefore, 
an enlargement round should be also be viewed as external event that challenges 
entrenched patterns. Consequently, the transformational dimension of the enlargement 
process within the EU cannot be overstated.  
 
The economist Joseph Schumpeter centered one of his theories on the concept of 
“creative destruction”- a term he used to describe the transformation accompanying 
innovation processes. According to him, innovation is the driving force behind 
sustained long-term economic growth and predominantly shapes the evolutionary 
character of the capitalist system (Schumpeter 1942, pp. 82-85). It can be argued that 
creative destruction cannot be solely confined to a narrow concept of economic activity, 
as the institutional framework of the EU has become a main influence on economic 
activity in Europe. When applied to the dimension of EU enlargement, it can be 
hypothesized that enlargement tends to trigger a process of creative destruction of 
previously existing institutional agreements.  Without any doubt, a core set of values 
and beliefs continues to reflect onto European political life, while other, less distinctive 
values may disappear or be replaced by newly arising value conceptions. Most changes 
in fact take place on a procedural level. EU enlargement thus mainly induces dynamic 
change to the set of values, changing its composition while not changing most of the 
main ingredients. This view is in some ways disputed by Dannreuther (2009, p. 201) 
who associates “profound changes with the EU’s eastward enlargement, which 
developed an internal dynamic and momentum, transforming the very nature and self-
identity of the Union in the process.” Another interesting aspect with regard to 
European enlargement rounds is mentioned by Richard Baldwin stated in his book 
“Expanding Membership in the European Union”. He argues that “there is reason to 
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suspect that economic integration of Europe may actually increase the temptation 
among existing EU members to keep potential entrants out so as not to spread the gains 
from membership too widely” (Baldwin 1995, p.50; see Pegram 2009). 
5.2 “Turkey's accession is incompatible with Europe's identity” 
Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), revised in the Treaty of Lisbon, 
forms the legal basis of enlargement and states that “any European State which respects 
the values referred to in Article 2”, which cover freedom, democracy, respect for human 
rights and the rule of law, “may apply to become a member of the Union”. It is the word 
“European” that is source of some confusion, as the EU has never actually specified 
which countries qualify as European and on what grounds. From a geographical point of 
view, Cyprus, for example, would most likely not meet this criterion. In the case of 
Turkey, it has often been argued that the country is not part of Europe – neither 
geographically, nor culturally or historically. In fact, 54% of European citizens that 
were interviewed in Eurobarometer 63 in spring 2005 identify Turkey as too culturally 
different to join the EU (Balytska 2006, p. 17). In the Transatlantic Trends survey of 
2008, 57% of Europeans and even 55% of Turkish respondents agreed that Turkey has 
such different values that it was not part of the West, with the highest agreement in 
Germany (76%), France (68%), and Italy (61%) (see GMF Transatlantic Trends 2008, 
p. 21). By 2010 the number for Turkey had dropped to 48% in Turkey (still only 30% 
see Turkey as part of the West based on common values) but for Europe the number 
even went up slightly to 58%. However, while a membership application of Morocco 
was outright dismissed as coming from a non-European country (see Independent 
Commission Report 2004, p. 13), the EU has considerably struggled with the question 
whether Turkey is a European country or not, which signals that the situation may not 
be as clear cut as it may appear at first sight. A brief look at the historical relationship 
between Turkey and Europe will help to reveal the nature of the relationship, although a 
thorough analysis of Ottoman influence on Europe and centuries of distinct 
interdependencies as well as fierce conflict would by far exceed the scope of this paper. 
Yet, it should be kept in mind that the dividing line between “Occident” and the 
“Orient” has been fairly porous and that cultural exchange, the transfer and fusion of 
ideas has been the norm rather than the exception throughout history (see Stråth 1999). 
Interestingly, ancient Greece is often portrayed and mystified as the cradle of European 
or Western civilization. What is often not mentioned, however, is that the Aegean coast 
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of Turkey was part of this ancient Greece (Ignacio Ramonet in Le Monde Diplomatique, 
November 2004) and that Greek thought, science and philosophy as well as literary and 
other accomplishments have to a large degree reached Europe by way of the Islamic 
world. There, works were translated from Greek into Arabic, nurtured and preserved 
from destruction and negligence that doomed their faith in the Byzantine Empire.  They 
actually “re-entered” the “European conscience” in Spain during Islamic rule. One of 
the centers, where Hellenistic ideas had survived was Haran in Mesopotamia, today in 
the province of Şanlıurfa in South-Eastern Turkey. This is not meant to claim in any 
way the European credentials of several countries en route but merely to illustrate how 
someone could challenge the arbitrariness with which the borders of an allegedly closed 
cultural circle have been drawn (Gutas 1998, p.14).  
 
Ottoman history is closely intertwined with the history of Europe. This alone does not 
answer the question, however, if the Ottoman Empire traditionally constituted a part of 
Europe or was merely an external influence. While at times it was specifically included 
in the European framework of powers, at other times it served as the embodiment of the 
“other” and was portrayed as a common enemy to Europe (Independent Commission 
Report 2004, p. 10). From a political point of view, a rather steady path towards 
inclusion of the Ottoman Empire into the European context can be observed along 
which cultural exchange and blending has taken place. Until its defeat in the battle of 
Vienna in 1683, the Ottoman Empire had been preoccupied with advancing further into 
Europe and had deliberately drawn a line between itself and all the European powers – a 
line that was also readily reinforced from the other side on the grounds of a cultural and 
religious chasm. It was by far not the only power that was pursuing an expansionist 
policy, however. After this battle, the Ottoman Empire increasingly came to 
acknowledge the rules of the “European game” and accepted the jus publicum 
Europeum, thus becoming much more responsive to inner-European dynamics (see 
Adanir 2005). The Treaty of Paris in 1856 accepted the Ottoman Empire as part of the 
European state system (Aydin 2005, p.218). The incorporation of the Ottoman Empire 
into the European context is associated with a concurrent rise of the concept of nation 
states and competing national interests that largely replaced a previously reigning sense 
of European brotherhood that was founded upon Christianity as unifying factor. The 
Ottoman Empire was never officially recognized as “essential to European balance”, as 
this explicit wording would have entailed an agreement to grant compensatory gains to 
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balance any gains made by other major powers. Still, it was for centuries a part of the 
European alliance systems, was invited to join the European Concert in the 19th century 
and took part in WWI (see Adanir 2005). It should be mentioned that the conflicts 
between the Turks and the Europeans can hardly be said to have been any more 
belligerent than intra-European conflicts. Despite the fact that the Ottoman armies were 
often the adversaries of European powers on the battlefield and that the Ottomans 
served as the projection of largely unfounded fears in Europe, the same could be said 
about the Germans in France and the French in Britain at some point in the not so 
distant past. It has to be acknowledged, however, that this view on European political 
reality throughout history would consequently also open up a long-term accession 
perspective for Russia as a formerly major player in European power politics and 
essential part of the European balance of power system, although it is doubtful that this 
would ever be desired by Russia, which has its own super-power ambitions. Aydin 
argues that the Ottoman Empire continued to be excluded from European identity, as 
this identity used to be increasingly framed in terms of “being civilized”, a status that 
was not granted to the Ottomans in the minds of Europeans from the 19th century 
onwards (Aydin, 2005, p.218). After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the newly 
founded Turkish Republic under Ataturk aimed at modernizing and “Europeanizing” 
Turkish society and moved the country culturally closer to Europe, precisely to “make it 
civilized” and transfer the achievements of European societies to Turkey. It is widely 
perceived that EU accession would constitute the pinnacle of Ataturk’s modernization 
project that would ultimately anchor Turkey in the community of “developed nations” 
(Flam 2003, p.4). 
5.2.1 Cultural Comparability 
Numerous researchers from a variety of fields have been trying to measure cultural 
proximity between countries, to assess and understand cultural differences or to chart or 
group national cultures on a map of cultural characteristics. These studies could perhaps 
provide a first starting point from which to explore the question of cultural proximity 
between Turkey and the EU member states. Yet, it has to be kept in mind that these 
studies have often evolved out of an analysis of work-related aspects and that without a 
detailed account of the context of a specific relationship between countries, such 
cultural maps and indices do not constitute an adequate tool to make overarching 
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assumptions on cultural proximity. They can, however, be useful to get a first grasp of 
the differences and similarities that often drive cultural relations. 














     
(source: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/)  
In his study of national work related values, Geert Hofstede distinguishes four 
dimensions to help characterize and differentiate cultures: power distance, 
individualism, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance. In order to complement his 
model he later also incorporated a 5th dimension at a later stage, Long-Term Orientation.   
• The Power Distance Index (PDI) measures the extent to which the less 
powerful members of organizations, institutions and the family accept and 
expect that power is distributed unequally.  
• Individualism (IDV) on the one side versus its opposite, collectivism, is the 
degree to which individuals are integrated into groups and to what extent they 
build their identity on collective. 
• The dimension of Masculinity (MAS) versus its opposite, femininity, refers to 
the distribution of roles between the genders. It measures whether men’s values 
within a culture lean towards an assertive and competitive pole, which has been 
labeled “masculine” or to a modest and caring pole, which Hofstede labeled 
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“feminine”. The higher the country ranks on this masculinity dimension, the 
wider is the gap between the values of men and women within this culture. 
• The Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) seeks to measure a society's tolerance 
for uncertainty and ambiguity. It indicates to what extent a culture causes its 
members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. 
Hofstede's work has been repeatedly criticized for oversimplifying, unjustly associating 
cultures with nations and building on the assumption that each nation inherently has one 
uniform culture. Moreover, it is argued that the main sample he used to develop his 
theory is comprised of IBM employees worldwide. Thus his model may be distorted by 
the influence of corporate and organizational culture (for a detailed review see for 
example McSweeney 2002). This needs to be kept in mind, when his framework is used 
to measure cultural proximity. A look at the scores of several European states reveals 
the striking discrepancies between the different EU countries with a great variance on 
all four dimensions of the model. It also shows that the profile of Greece and Turkey 
converge on all dimensions and that according to Hofstede’s model these two countries 
show a higher level of cultural proximity than for instance Austria and Germany.  






Results taken from the European Social Survey indicate the generally high level of 
involvement in politics in European societies and again underline the variance of 
national preferences within the EU. They also show the prevailing dichotomy in Turkish 
society. While a relatively high number of Turkish respondents assign a high 
importance to politics in their lives, the results for European countries are comparatively 
low. Interestingly, though, when Austrian and Turkish responses are compared on the 
question how often respondents discuss political matters with friends, it turns out that 
Austrians are more engaged in political discussions with their peers. This could be 
explained by the fact that politics may be a more private matter in Turkey or that 
political contestation in Turkey is more salient, underlining the dichotomy within 
Turkish society.  
Fig. 13 Importance of politics in life (%) 
 (source: ESS- European Social Survey) 
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Fig. 14 How often do political discussions with friends take place? 
 
 (source: ESS- European Social Survey) 
In comparison to Austrian respondents, Turkish respondents are strongly divided over 
the question whether they have freedom of choice and control over their lives. In 
Turkey about a quarter of respondents said that they have no control at all over their 
life, meaning that what they do has in their opinion no real effect on what happens to 
them. This could potentially be attributed to religious believes regarding “kismet” or to 
the hierarchical structure of Turkish society. 
Fig. 15  Freedom of choice and control in and over one’s life? 
 
 (source: ESS- European Social Survey) 
 51
It is relatively more important for Turkish respondents that they can achieve something 
in their job, which supports the findings of the Ingelhart-Wetzel Cultural Map that links 
Turkey closer to survival values, rather than values of self-expression. These results 
may be fueled by economic circumstances; however, they also indicate a high 
performance orientation of Turkish society.  
Fig. 16 Important in a job: that you can achieve something 
 
 (source: ESS- European Social Survey) 
With regard to the concept of family, Turkish respondents seem to be more traditional 
and show respect and love for their parents unconditionally, while relatively more 
Austrian respondents think that their parents have to earn this respect. The underlying 
factor could be rooted in the more traditional values within Turkish society that put 
emphasis on the authority of the institution of family.  
Fig. 17 Respect and love for parents (always vs. earned) 
 
(source: ESS- European Social Survey) 
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5.2.2 What is Europe? 
European borders can be defined along geographical, economic, ethnic, ideological and 
cultural lines. The European Union has traditionally defined itself as an organization in 
which all member states share common values, but national identities continue to play 
the dominating role within the mindset of Europeans. An explicit aim of the European 
Union is thus to preserve differences in national identities of member states, while 
emphasizing similarities, which is expressed in the term “unity in diversity”. It is not 
unreasonable to speak of “European cultural pluralism”(Yukleyen 2008, p. 123) and the 
analogy between the EU and an orchestra in which several distinct instruments form an 
ensemble (see Johnson 1991, 9-10) is certainly apposite (interestingly, the percussion 
section in the modern orchestra is actually owed to Ottoman influence- Quataert 2000, 
p.8). On 25 March 2007, the Berlin Declaration, marking the EU’s 50th anniversary, 
underlined its “common ideals”: the individual, human dignity and equality of men and 
women. Other values stressed by the declaration are peace and freedom, democracy and 
the rule of law, as well as tolerance and solidarity (see Euractiv, “European Values and 
Identity”). There has been criticism that the universal values, which have been portrayed 
as the foundation of the EU, have at best at times served as a marker of European 
identity and are only the tip of the iceberg. Without any doubt, they cannot conclusively 
establish credible boundaries for “European civilization” throughout history, as the 
existence of fascist and autocratic regimes in various countries has shown. They can, 
however, serve as a marker of EU membership and thus EU institutions have figured 
prominently in defining the foundation of Europe as a (political) project since WWII 
(see Yukleyen 2008, p.120). Some have stressed the importance of “a common cultural 
heritage, with foundations in ancient Greece, Christianity, and Europe of the 
Enlightenment” (Müftüler-Baç 2000, p.26) as the dominant drivers of European values, 
which are thus only applicable to countries that have historically been exposed to these 
influences. Despite the fact that the terms stated in the Berlin Declaration have provided 
a framework for universal values, these values have deliberately been kept ambiguous, 
thus open to different interpretations. They have allowed Europeans to avoid the 
question what it means to be European for some time. Interestingly, it is the accession 
process of Turkey that has ultimately forced Europeans to confront the question which 
universal values the EU actually represents, what constitutes Europe and what defines 
its borders. Thus, Turkey’s membership bid in itself has already left a profound impact 
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on European identity and self-perception. It should be kept in mind that universal values 
challenge existing identities as a process of transcendence is likely to lead to more self-
consciousness and self-awareness (see Park 1914). Without an understanding of one's 
own identity, it is unlikely that anybody will subscribe to these values. National 
identities in Europe have thus changed as a consequence of mental interaction with the 
“European space”. A new national identity is created, incorporating universal and 
particular elements, universal European values and emphasized particular national 
traditions, which may however have been transformed compared to the stage prior to the 
formation of the EU. European self-definition has changed as a result of the process and 
development of the European Union, which is one of the most coherent arguments in 
defiance of an essentialist view on European identity. As an essentialist view implies 
inherent traits and inalterability (see Yukleyen 2008, p.117), it does not seem well 
suited to explain the identity of a group of countries that has been subject to such 
profound and transformational change throughout the last century.  
 
5.2.3 Accession Talks with Turkey already Challenge European Identity 
It should be taken into account that Turkey’s bid for membership has already led 
Europe to confront the question what defines the nature of European identity. In the 
absence of a clear, positively formulated vision of European identity, Europe has for a 
long time resorted to rather diffuse, negative boundaries to define “what Europe is not”.  
The accession talks with Turkey have created a certain pressure to specify and explain 
existing demarcations and to respond to accusations of prejudice on religious, cultural 
or ethnic grounds. This challenges entrenched patterns of demonizing Turks and merely 
referring to Turkey as the “other” and “outsider”. (Erzan & Kirisçi, 2004, p. 5). Many 
important scholars have taken on the task of defining Europe and the Turks or Ottomans 
have often served as a negative marker to identify the boundaries of Europe throughout 
the centuries. “Montesquieu defined the features of Europe, namely law, morality, 
aristocracy, monarchy and liberty by contrasting them with Asian despotism” (Yapp 
1992, pp.147). Quataert points out, however, that Machiavelli and later Montesquieu 
and Bodin also used the example of effective, incorrupt and disciplined Ottoman 
administration to inspire European monarchs, their soldiers and administrators to better 
behavior in times when criticism of monarchs still posed a danger for one’s life 
(Quataert 2000, p.7). “Montesquieu was one of the first to express the notion of Europe 
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as a geographical, cultural, political and intellectual entity with its own history and its 
own distinctive features. In substituting secular for religious distinctions Montesquieu 
helped to invent Europe” (Yapp 1992, pp.147ff). In contrast, Leibniz's ideal resembled 
the medieval concept of the respublica Christiana represented by the Holy Roman 
Empire and the Christian church. Thus, it quickly becomes evident how different ideas 
on European identity coexist at the same time and compete for public support. In “Essai 
sur les moeurs”, Voltaire argued that the Ottomans were not especially despotic and that 
their government was no more arbitrary than those of many European states, and he 
preferred to describe the Ottoman state as democratic. Voltaire saw the causes of 
difference between Turks and Europeans in climate, government and religion, with the 
treatment of women constituting the most decisive difference (Voltaire 1833, p. 1532; 
cited in Yapp 1992, pp.147ff).  
 
In light of the fact that several member states have announced that a Turkish accession 
will be subject to a public referendum, analyzing public perception of Turkey in EU 
member states seems vital, as it will ultimately influence the outcome of the accession 
talks. Opponents of Turkey’s accession often raise the argument of negative public 
sentiment in a number of member states and the importance of the EU’s responsiveness 
to the people’s will. They emphasize the democratic deficits of the EU and their desire 
to strengthen the power of the electorate in the decision making process. Certainly, 
opponents of Turkish accession rely on public referenda as a roadblock of last resort to 
prevent Turkey from becoming an EU member state. Indeed, a negative attitude towards 
Turkey’s accession to the EU persists among the population in several European 
countries, which could have serious consequences for Turkey’s EU ambitions. For 
example, according to a poll conducted by Le Figaro newspaper (April 08, 2009), 82% 
of the French citizens oppose accession of Turkey to the European Union. France 
originally pledged that Turkey’s accession will be subject to a public referendum 
(Barysch, August 24, 2007) but by now it seems uncertain whether this referendum will 
ever take place at all. More generally, a certain resistance to change can be observed 
among national constituencies within the member states, as Europe has experienced the 
immediate economic and social pressures, that globalization and the current recession 
has put on them in recent years. Former EU trade-commissioner Peter Mandelson 
emphasized in a speech given to a Turkish audience during his tenure that “in the EU 
many of the dissenting voices on Turkish membership are the same voices raised 
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against globalization. They reflect wider questions in European society: unemployment, 
migration, social tensions. Genuine anxieties that need to be addressed. It is hard to 
have a rational debate on Turkey and the EU while Turkey is the projected image of 
everything we fear about a changing world” (speech by Peter Mandelson at the Centre 
for European Reform Bosphorus Conference, 2006).  
 
More generally, Oscar Handlin referred to this phenomenon in his essay “Group Life 
within the American Pattern” by arguing that “fear in periods of hazardous changes, 
gives rise to the reluctance to tolerate dissent and further encourages the concept of an 
assimilating society” (p. 412). Sometimes Turkey’s accession is perceived as 
unwelcome but inevitable change by national constituencies, who clearly see the EU as 
elite project and criticize its “democratic deficit”. According to the Transatlantic Trends 
Survey 2010, conducted by the German Marshall Fund, only 23% of European 
respondents currently support an accession of Turkey. Yet, 51% of the respondents 
think that Turkey is likely to join the EU, which could either mean considerable 
disillusionment with democratic decision-making in the EU and a perceived lack of 
responsiveness of EU institutions and national governments to the public will or the 
acknowledgement of strategic interests and more informed decision-making on the part 
of European politicians. It could also be explained by the fact that respondents could be 
simply underestimating how widespread the rejection of Turkey’s EU ambitions 
actually is among European constituencies.  
5.2.4 Ethnic homogeneity in European Societies? 
European societies function under the premise of a dominant ethnic majority and thus 
implicitly exert pressure on ethnic minorities to assimilate to a mainstream culture. But 
is this assumption necessarily valid? In “Racial Assimilation in Secondary Groups”, 
Robert E. Park (1914) highlights the fact that the “homogeneity that individuals of the 
same nationality exhibit have been greatly exaggerated...neither inbreeding nor 
interaction has created a more than superficial likeness or like-mindedness (p. 606). 
What has been labeled as solid, even primordial national identity in many European 
societies could also be regarded as an unstable composite of different ethnicities and 
distinct regional stocks. In “Human Migration and the Marginal Man”, Park (1928) 
quotes Griffith Taylor, who states that “the whole teaching of ethnology shows that 
peoples of mixed race are the rule and not the exception [and that] every nation, upon 
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examination, turns out to have been a more or less successful melting pot.” Members of 
a nation which is perceived to be founded upon homogeneous ethnicity have been 
subject to superficial uniformity. It is the same uniformity that is often presupposed 
with regard to immigrant groups whose members might in fact have widely varying 
backgrounds, beliefs, values and outlooks, as is the case with Turkish minority groups. 
Certainly, in European societies this perceived homogeneity has been compounded by 
the fact that these processes started several decades and sometimes even centuries ago 
and thus different views, values and ethnic backgrounds have been allowed to fuse to a 
certain extent; however, in many cases, it is not a centuries-old ethnic identity, but a 
mindset that has developed fairly recently. Breuilly (1996) argued that “the myths of 
common descent, which often surround claims of ethnic homogeneity, are often who 
selected, modified or even fabricated by nationalist elites who use them to forge a sense 
of loyalty to the national community they claim to represent” (pp. 150-152). In the case 
of Austria, a country with a strong sense of ethnic identity – a fact that is reflected in a 
very stringent citizenship regime based on ethnicity – it has to be taken into account that 
the country’s identity has evolved out of an identity that for centuries had been 
embedded into the context of the multi-ethnic Austro-Hungarian Empire. At the turn of 
the 19th century, the percentage of foreign born inhabitants in Vienna, then the capital of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was considerable. “Dotted with Czech, Slovak, 
Hungarian, and Polish family names, Vienna's telephone directory is a testimony to 
immigration's impact on Austria” (Jandl & Kraler, International Centre for Migration 
Policy Development). Roughly 30% of the Viennese population around 1900 had 
originally been born in “non-German” parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and 
another 10% were born in foreign countries. Despite the fact that substantial return 
migration took place after the dissolution of the Empire following WWI into the newly 
formed successor states, a large number of first and second generation immigrants 
remained in the city, thus permanently altering its ethnic composition (Fassmann & 
Muenz 1995, p. 166). Granted, it has to be acknowledged that the fluidity of Viennese 
(and for that matter Austrian) identity at that point is rooted in the phenomena of 
industrialization and rapid urbanization and was facilitated by Vienna’s position at the 
core of a multi-ethnic empire. These conditions entailed social and cultural changes of 
great magnitude and have changed the spatial and societal framework within which 
identity is forged in a somewhat revolutionary way. It could be argued that only colossal 
social developments will trigger such a profound change in identity and disrupt 
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entrenched traits. While this may very well be the case, it seems to me that such events 
rather serve as a magnifying glass through which one can observe changes in an 
accelerated way that would otherwise stay beneath the surface and occur at a much 
slower pace. The people from all parts of the Empire that migrated into Austria have by 
now, of course, blended into the “new Austrian ethnicity” beyond recognition. It should 
be mentioned that this ethnicity has been transformed and thus does not resemble 
Austrian ethnicity prior to these immigration flows. This clearly supports the argument 
that ethnicity is always in flux and is not a static phenomenon. Thus, the notion to 
preserve homogeneity at the status quo can be seen as an entirely arbitrary decision and 
a deliberate effort to “declare” homogeneity from a certain point onwards. Also, the EU 
as mosaic of member states with distinct national identities is at best subject to rather 
superficial homogeneity. Even one of the most fervent Europeans, Jean Monnet, was of 
the opinion that “Europe has never existed – one has genuinely to create Europe.” (Jean 
Monnet, quoted by Anthony Sampson, The New Europeans, 1968, p. 6), thus taking a 
distinctly constructivist view on Europe. The existing level of uniformity that has been 
achieved ultimately seems derived from universally applicable values. If Turkey 
adheres to these values an accession of Turkey will transform but not generally 
challenge the European framework within which national identities are interpreted. It 
will also highlight Europe’s need to address the question of how it wants to deal with 
diversity in general.  
 
5.2.5 Copenhagen Criteria 
The Copenhagen Criteria that were laid out by the European Council in 1993 establish 
general requirements that an aspiring country must meet in order to become eligible for 
accession to the European Union. These accession criteria constitute the target that 
stands at the end of an individual accession process. To join the EU, a new Member 
State must meet three criteria: 
• political: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and respect for and protection of minorities;  
• economic: existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;  
• acceptance of the Community acquis: ability to take on the obligations of 
membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and 
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monetary union.  
 
For the European Council to decide to open negotiations, the political criteria must be 
satisfied (Europa Glossary “Copenhagen Criteria”). The specific road-map towards 
accession varies from country to country, as individual problems have to be addressed 
and the timeframe of negotiations may vary according to difficulties encountered in the 
process. Also, the speed at which a country progresses towards meeting the Copenhagen 
Criteria will vary due to the conditions within a candidate country, which will speed up 
or delay accession talks. However, in principle, Turkey is subject to the same criteria 
that apply to other prospective member states. This was emphasized by the Helsinki 
European Council of December 11, 1999 which concluded that “Turkey is a candidate 
State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other 
candidate States.” Many politicians, other decision-makers and scholars emphasize the 
need for the EU to honor the principle of “pacta sunt servanda” especially in the domain 
of enlargement. They argue that if explicit rules are laid out, they have to be generally 
applied or the EU runs the risk of being regarded as unreliable, inconsistent and driven 
by double-standards in its policies, which may have severe repercussions with regard to 
its credibility and influence in international affairs (see Balytska 2006, p.7). 
 
5.2.6 Europe as a Christian Club? 
Repeatedly, the argument is being brought forward that the “European civilization” is 
based on a solid Christian core and that Turkey as a majority Muslim nation will have 
no space in Europe. The European cultural landscape seems thickly permeated by 
Christian roots. Universal values that constitute a major building block of the European 
Union are predominantly based on the thoughts of Enlightenment, but certainly have 
some of their origins in Christian principles and morals. Also, Christianity has, over 
centuries, undoubtedly been the single most influential contributor to European arts, 
architecture and law systems. Major historical events have been shaped by Christianity 
and have left a footprint in the collective memory of European states (see Huber 2004). 
Most Europeans affiliate themselves culturally with Christianity, and even if they do not 
actively practice their religion or attend church regularly, religion continues to play an 
important role in people’s lives. According to the Bertelsmann ReligionsMonitor in 
2008, 75% of Europeans can be considered religious, with 25% of the respondents 
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rating themselves to be even highly religious. In this survey, 57% also report that they 
attend church services more or less regularly. The European Social Survey (ESS) and 
Eurobarometer in spring 2004, however, asking respondents to indicate weekly 
attendance of religious service, found that only roughly 20% of Europeans do so. What 
seems important with regard to Turkey’s accession bid is that Europeans seem to be 
strikingly tolerant in their religious views. 92% of respondents agreed that “every 
religion is likely to contain a kernel of truth” and that “it is important to be open to all 
religions” (67% strongly, 25% somewhat). Particularly, Italian respondents were 
extremely tolerant (71% agree strongly, 22% somewhat). This is interestingly in light of 
the fact that Italians were also the most religious throughout Europe (44 % highly 
religious, 45% somewhat religious). However, the “Immigration Trends 2008” survey 
came to the result that 39 percent of European and 43 percent of Italian respondents 
think that Western European way of life and Islam are not reconcilable. This points to a 
generally tolerant attitude towards other religions. But when scratching the surface and 
asking more concrete questions regarding the compatibility of other religions with the 
allegedly open Western societies, a tougher stance, particularly towards Islam is 
revealed. In the same survey, about a third of the respondents also want to make the 
origin from a country with a Christian heritage the decisive accession criterion for 
immigrants to Europe (p.12). Yet, in order to keep these results in perspective, it needs 
to be mentioned that also 42% of respondents in the U.S. supported the same statement. 
It can thus be argued that the perception of the irreconcilability between Christian and 
Muslim ways of life is widespread throughout the Western world. Is this a new 
phenomenon that is a direct consequence of the events of 9/11 and the threat of further 
terrorist attacks by Islamic extremists? This claim can hardly be substantiated in light of 
the fact that for centuries similar opinions have been prevailing in public discourse 
throughout Europe. Turkish and Ottomans have often been demonized and were 
attributed an image of blood-thirsty savages. The word “infidel” that is nowadays used 
by Islamic terrorists to refer to Europeans and Americans and which carries a highly 
negative connotation influenced by a sense of religious supremacy, was in the past often 
used by Europeans to refer to the Ottomans who were depicted as the incorporation of 
evil (see Delanty 1995; Yapp 1992; Quataert 2000). 
 
The religious relief in Europe is undoubtedly highly diverse and the picture that is 
painted by several studies looking into the nature of religious beliefs in Europe appears 
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to be fairly complex. Member states are comprised of either an Orthodox, Protestant or 
Roman Catholic majority population. Additionally, there are sizeable Muslim 
populations in numerous European countries. It would be misleading to label them as 
part of a pan-European Muslim minority, however, and European Muslims can hardly 
be viewed as a homogenous group, as minorities in each countries are confronted with 
different national circumstances and have entirely different ethnic backgrounds. Despite 
the fact that Europe’s secularization is widely taken for granted, 27% of the respondents 
in the Bertelsmann ReligionsMonitor indicated that religion has a major influence on 
their political views. While in a large number of member states a more or less strict 
separation between church and state has been implemented on an institutional level, 
religious undercurrents continue to impact on public opinion. Granted, levels of 
religiosity may not comparable to other parts of the world and religiosity is certainly not 
as openly displayed as in the US; however, religion’s impact on society has not 
disappeared but has rather been transformed, as it has grown more subtle and is now 
more related to indirectly shaping values and opinions. There exist large variations 
between countries, with Poland, Ireland and Italy being the most and France as well as 
the Nordic countries being among the least religious. Differences between Protestant 
and Catholic Europe are striking when it comes to religious participation and the 
predominantly Protestant countries seem to be much more secularized than their 
Catholic counterparts.  It may be argued that the divide between Christianity and Islam 
is not comparable to the cleavage between different Christian confessions, such as 
between Roman Catholics and Protestants, but it should be acknowledged that faith-
based homogeneity has increasingly proved to be an illusion – a “relic from ancient 
times”. Religious homogeneity has perhaps occurred on a much smaller spatial level but 
certainly not on a European scale. While European politicians (perhaps justifiably) 
stress the Christian nature of Europe, the separation between church and state is 
ubiquitous, despite the fact that several countries officially recognize one strain of 
Christianity as state religion. Christian morals also seem to have lost its monopoly in 
public debate. Abortions, for instance, have been legal in most European countries for 
years and divorces are widespread throughout the continent. However, Europe’s 
Christian credentials have implicitly been deeply entrenched in the rules that form the 
foundation of the EU and no single country would be able to change that (see Huber 
2004). Just as minority groups have not jeopardized national frameworks based on 
Christian values that are upheld by a majority, one country in the EU alone will not be 
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able to jeopardize Europe’s Christian roots and orientation. It is true that the integration 
of immigrant groups may pose a serious challenge to liberal democracies. As pointed 
out by Jenkins “after centuries of rebelling against religious authority, the coming of 
Islam is also reviving political issues most thought extinct in Europe, including debates 
about the limits of freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the right to proselytize” 
(Jenkins 2007). Issues such as women’s rights, the burkha or even forced marriages and 
honor killings are testing the limits of European liberal values and tolerance. This is 
emphasized by Russell Hardin (2004) who posed the question of “where an otherwise 
liberal state should stand on its dealings with illiberal immigrant groups?” (see also 
Wikan 2004, p.194). Thus, discourse about the integration of (especially Muslim) 
minority groups with hierarchical and patriarchal structures could – apart from all its 
difficulties – actually strengthen Europe’s value base, as it causes Europe to specify the 
nature and the extent of individual and political freedoms that are part of the foundation 
of the EU.  
 
Repeatedly, the concern has been voiced that Muslim minorities in some European 
countries could at some point become a majority within their respective national 
constituency. These countries could then join forces with Turkey to revert some of these 
fundamental European values. This claim, however, is not supported by factual data and 
simply based on exaggeration, as Muslim minorities will certainly not become a 
majority in any European country within the next decades. Islam is the largest religious 
minority in Austria with 338,988 Muslims, which represents 4.22% of the population 
according to the 2001 census (source: Statistik Austria). In 1971 only 0.3% of the 
Austrian population was registered officially as Muslims. And even in 1991, only 
158,776 Muslims were counted in the same survey (2% of the population). The 
duplication of Muslims in Austria within 10 years has also in part been explained by a 
growing willingness of Muslims to speak publicly about their religion, in particular of 
those from Turkey. A recent study by the Fund for Integration estimated that the 
number of Muslims in Austria has risen further to 515.914 people, constituting 6.2% of 
the population. This number comprises 252.845 Muslims with Austrian citizenship and 
263.069 citizens of a foreign country (Marik-Lebeck 2010, pp. 5-6). In comparison, 
there are approximately 3.5-5 million Muslims in France, representing 6.0-8.5% of the 
total population (58.5 million). Germany has the largest Muslim population in Western 
Europe after France. Approximately 4 million Muslims live in Germany (see Study of 
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the Pew Research Center in 2009 for a comprehensive account of Muslim populations 
worldwide). The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office estimates that 825,000 
Muslims live in Italy, of which between 140,000 and 160,000 are Italian born. A 2006 
report by the US Department of State on religious freedom estimated that approximately 
one million of Italy’s 58.5 million residents were Muslim, roughly 1.7% of the entire 
population. There are almost one million Muslims in the Netherlands, representing 
5.8% of the population. It has been argued that the accession of Turkey might leave the 
EU better prepared for embracing its already existing diversity. Above all, if a country 
whose population mainly adheres to another religion, such as Turkey, agrees to honor 
the principles of the EU, it would further contribute to their moral validity.  
 
The argument that Europe is essentially based on the notion of Christendom has been 
repeatedly brought forward throughout history. The German historian Heinrich Sybel 
(1858), for example, stressed the central role of the crusades in forging European 
identity. It is often argued that religious markers of identity served as the single most 
important unifying factor in European self-consciousness until well into the seventeenth 
century, and the narrative of Christendom and a Europe which is historically firmly 
rooted in a Christian community has been persistently brought forward throughout the 
centuries (for a detailed account see Perkins 2004). Similarly, in the Ottoman Empire a 
faith-based identity prevailed. Politically the Muslims divided the world into lands 
under Muslim rule (the "Dar al-Islam") and lands under non-Muslim rule (the "Dar al-
Harb"). Rather than using the category of “Europe”, the division into a southern “Rum” 
and a northern “Firangistan” retained popularity until long into the seventeenth century, 
emphasizing the Ottoman perception that the Carolingian Empire in conjunction with 
the Roman heritage and especially Christianity, or more narrowly the Roman Catholic 
Church, was culturally at the center of the European continent. Both expressions 
actually represent a view previously articulated by the Byzantines and thus did not 
represent a revolutionary concept to describe the political landscape of Europe (Yapp 
1992, 142 ff). It should be noted that an East-West Schism in 1054 caused a religious 
split within the territories of the former Roman Empire and established two power 
centers of Christianity, with Constantinople as the center of the Eastern Orthodox 
Church in the Byzantine Empire and Rome as the base of the Roman Catholic Church in 
the former Western Roman Empire (see Encyclopedia Britannica). Goffman (2002) 
emphasizes the Byzantine heritage that served as a legacy to the Ottoman Empire. The 
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Ottomans largely adopted the Byzantine tax structure and – similar to the Byzantine 
Empire – anchored identity in a common religious ideology in order to rule the often 
very same territories that had previously made up the Byzantine Empire. In certain 
ways, the impression of the Ottoman Empire was that of a successor of the Byzantine 
Empire, albeit it constituted an “evil version” in the eyes of many Europeans. However, 
Goffman does not leave out other main sources of cultural influence, such as Turkic, 
Persian, Seljuk and Arab elements. 
 
5.2.7 A Historical Relationship 
It would by far exceed the focus of this paper to give a detailed account of the events 
and circumstances that led to the formation and rise of the Ottoman Empire. However, 
for the sake of completeness, it is necessary to briefly touch upon the developments that 
paved the way for the Ottoman Empire to emerge as the most powerful player in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. This may also shed some light on the roots that would later 
shape Ottoman society and could help to answer the question to what extent their 
empire was founded upon markers of “European influence”. The rise of the Ottoman 
Empire dates back to a period largely marked by anarchy and interregnum in Anatolia. 
The Battle of Manzikert between the Byzantine Empire and the Great Seljuk Empire 
under Sultan Alp Arslan in 1071 permanently weakened the Byzantine Empire and 
limited its influence within the region. Several principalities in Anatolia were 
established by Turkoman tribes and originally virtually all of them were vassals or had 
pledged allegiance to the Great Seljuk Empire and subsequently the Seljuk Sultanate of 
Rûm, the remnants of the Great Seljuk Empire in Anatolia. However, after the defeat 
against the Mongols in the Battle of Köse Dağ in 1243, the Seljuk Empire lost much of 
its power base and had to further loosen its already weak grip of the border regions to 
the West of its territory. It was not until about 1300 that the Ottoman Empire was 
founded by Osman I. It evolved out of the Beylik Osmanoğlu that had initially been 
granted as dominion to Osman’s father Ertuğrul and constituted one of the Turkoman 
principalities, which subsequently struggled for power in the power vacuum in the 
border regions between the Byzantine and the Seljuk Empire. During these times, the 
Ottomans labeled themselves as “ghazi warriors” – warriors of Islam – who sought to 
expand the dominions of Islam at the expense of the infidels. Quataert (2000, p.6) points 
out that the Ottomans used this identity to attract fighters in the name of Islam, thus 
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fortifying their claim to certain frontier territories and establishing a firm power base 
(for more detailed accounts see Matuz 2006, pp.23-34; Shaw 1976, pp.12 ff).  
 
Many historical events can be drawn upon to explain the fear and loathing that the 
Ottomans have evoked throughout Europe. More precisely, these feelings have often 
been framed in religious terms and were universally applied to describe the Muslim 
world. They can be traced back beyond the siege of Vienna in 1683 to the conquest of 
Constantinople in 1453 - or even to the battle of Kosovo in 1389 or in Malazgirt in 1071 
and became more pronounced since the Ottomans' suppression of a revolt in Bulgaria in 
1875 and 1876 which has sometimes been labeled “the Bulgarian massacres” (Mansel 
1989, p.35). More recently, the alleged genocide of Armenians during WWI has 
fortified the image of the Turks as a savage and violent society, although these events, 
despite having been brought to the attention of Western publics largely through the 
accounts of Christian missionaries, have generally been framed in secular terms. 
 
In the eyes of the Ottomans, the “Holy Roman Empire” left a lasting and defining 
footprint on European identity even beyond its actual existence. In Ottoman jargon, 
Franks were often equated with “Europeans” and Christianity remained the principal 
anchor of identity in the eyes of the Ottoman Muslims. “The Franks no more resemble 
the Turks than night resembles day”, reported an Ottoman ambassador sent to the court 
of Louis XV, and added that “if you turned a Turk upside down you got a Frank.” 
Statements like these indicate the cultural distance and the perception of cultural 
superiority on the part of many Ottomans. This perception changed at the end of the 
eighteenth and in particular during the nineteenth century, which cannot only be 
attributed to losses on the battlefield and a subsequent shift in the power balance in 
favor of European countries or because the Ottomans began to see Europe as a distinct 
entity of nations with specific characteristics. This change in perception also reflected a 
changed European self-perception. It had shifted from the formerly prevailing idea of 
Christendom towards the more secularly framed notion of “les affaires d’europe” which 
became evident in several statements from the end of the seventeenth century onwards 
(Yapp 1992, 142 ff). Similarly, Delanty (1995, p.37) argues that with the beginning of 
the seventeenth century “the idea of Europe began to replace Christendom as a cultural 
frame of reference for the construction of new forms of identification” and that “in this 
transformation Europe no longer signified a geographical area but a system of values”. 
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Neumann (1999, p.46) even argues that already “by the end of the 14th century the 
‘Turk’ was seen more as a secular and cultural menace than as a religious or ideological 
threat.”  
 
Austria retained “the language of Christianity” when referring to the Ottomans  longer 
than most other European powers, as Christian rhetoric could be used to rally support in 
Germany against the Ottoman invader and provide an excuse for building up a strong 
central government in Vienna. Throughout the centuries, the Austro-Hungarian branch 
of the Habsburgs (as well as the Spanish branch) and France repeatedly used the 
Christian-framed discourse as a diplomatic weapon of reproach against each other in 
their struggle for power and influence, arguing that the other's approach was contrary to 
“true” christian beliefs (Ladurie 1998, p.59). France under Francois I was the first 
nation to use a more secular approach partner in its foreign policy deliberations 
regarding the Ottoman Empire in the first half of the sixteenth century and view the 
relations with the Ottoman Empire strategically rather than religiously motivated. “The 
main object of these contacts was political - to use the Ottomans to keep the Habsburgs 
in check - but the unpopularity of this policy, regarded as a betrayal of Christendom, 
compelled French rulers to disguise the nature of their proceeding. Thus, in its external 
communications, the state always emphasized France’s first priority of protecting of the 
holy places and Latin Christians, followed by the promotion of commerce. Until the 
eighteenth century, the political aim was relegated to third place” (Yapp 1992, p.143). 
This is interesting in light of the fact that European governments have in recent years 
often been criticized that they would hide their true thoughts and intentions regarding 
Turkey’s accession bid, albeit against the backdrop of religious considerations. It also 
shows that historically elite interests and public opinion on Turkey have continuously 
been diverging.  
 
France viewed the Austrian engagement against the Ottomans in the name of 
Christendom favorably as it committed Austrian resources which it feared could 
otherwise be employed in Italy and Germany. Clearly, the diversion of resources on the 
part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire served France’s strategic interest in 
counterbalancing the Habsburgs in Europe. It was argued that “nothing better 
contributes to maintain the peace between the Christian princes (the “tranquility” of 
Europe) than the fear which the Turkish forces can inspire in their neighbors” (Duparc 
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1969, pp. 229-231; cited in Yapp 1992, p.144). For several centuries Islam had been the 
principal rival and threat to Latin Christendom. This was not only evident in religious 
domains but since the Catholic Church was also a formidable political power this threat 
also figured prominently in military considerations. When Mehmet II, “The 
Conqueror”, conquered Constantinople in 1453 and made it the new Ottoman capital, 
Istanbul, this ended a long period of crusades. It gave rise to widespread fear of 
Ottoman expansion into Europe, which in turn influenced public perception and entailed 
propaganda that sought to promote the image of the Turks as barbaric, blood-thirsty and 
savage (see Bartholomew Georgiewitz 1553, cited in Yapp 1992, p. 144). Delanty 
emphasizes the important role that “the fall of Constantinople” and the following 
periods of fear and defeat played in the formation of European modernity. He argues 
that “the origins of European identity can be found in the sixteenth century resistance to 
the Turks” and that “this was a consciousness that was sustained by the principle of 
exclusivity rather than on any immanent collective cohesion and buttressed by the 
image of the Orient as the common enemy” (Delanty 1995, pp.36-37).  
 
This image was gradually replaced over the centuries, as the threat of Ottoman conquest 
declined and “although few eighteenth century western European referred any longer to 
the Ottomans as the terror of Europe, as had Richard Knolles in the late sixteenth 
century, the image that replaced it – the sick man of Europe – was hardly any more 
positive and more inclusive only in a negative sense. Not respect or inclusion but 
contempt replaced fear in the minds of many Christian Europeans” (Goffman 2002, 
p.19). However, Quataert also describes another prevalent picture of the Ottomans in 
Europe “in which the Ottomans were not only terrible, savage and ‘unspeakable’, but 
also sex-crazed, harem-driven and debauched […] and the Ottoman East [served] as the 
degenerate site of pleasures supposedly absent or forbidden in the civilized vigorous 
West where Europeans by contrast allegedly were restrained, sober, just, sexually 
controlled, moderate and rational” (Quataert 2000, p.7). Interestingly, nowadays the 
views of debauchery and promiscuity are sometimes expressed by Muslims with regard 
to modern European societies. Ogier Ghislain de Busbecq, in his book Turcicae 
legationes epistolae quatuor (1589), carves out an entirely different image of Ottoman 
society with an emphasis on “military and administrative skills, a tolerant government, a 
system of justice which was simpler, quicker and less corrupt than that of Europe, a 
stable social order and personal characteristics such as endurance, sobriety, cleanliness, 
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politeness and hospitality” (see also Yapp 1992). 
 
Some people argue that the customs union between the EU and Turkey has already 
anticipated a large share of the positive economic benefits that could be reaped in the 
event of Turkey’s accession. Sometimes, it has been questioned whether Turkey’s 
choice to engage in such a customs union has actually served its strategic interests and 
strengthened its bargaining position with regard to the enlargement process. It has made 
the Turkish market largely accessible for European businesses and put Europe in a 
privileged position compared to other global business partners. Thus, the Turkish 
bargaining chip of granting access to a large, emerging market has in some ways been 
prematurely given up. Besides the benefits for Turkey of getting privileged access to the 
vast European market, the behavior of the Ottoman Empire a few centuries ago may 
also shed some light on this decision. In this context it seems important to review one of 
the strategic instruments that were employed by the Ottoman Empire to strengthen its 
relations with Europe. The system of capitulations, granting privileged access to the 
Ottoman market for French, Dutch and English merchants, had “both political and 
economic aims, such as coalition formation in the West, protection of traditional trade 
routes, securing strategic goods, supporting economy and maximizing the revenue from 
tax collection. The main logic behind this measure was that these privileges would 
attract new merchants from these countries, thus increasing trade and business between 
the Levant and Western Europe” (Bulut 2008, 259). The capitulations were assumed to 
boost economic development within the Empire and strengthen existing trade routes and 
economic relations. Particularly the importance of coalition formation should not be 
underestimated in this context. States such as the Netherlands, England or France that 
pursued a less religious foreign policy course or at least stated their religious motives 
less explicitly, were favored and thus strengthened in an inner-European context. 
Similarly, it could be argued that the Turkish agreement to the customs union was also 
meant to strengthen pro-Turkish forces within the EU. It becomes evident that the 
system of capitulations in the Ottoman time worked largely in favor of Protestant 
countries, which could be rooted in their more pragmatic foreign policy, their tradition 
in trade, but could also merely signal the antagonistic position of the Ottoman Sultan 
and the Pope.  
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5.2.8 Turkey- a Unique Case? 
A regression model by Basak Yavcan, exploring European public opinion towards an 
accession of Turkey, comes to the conclusion that resentment of Turkey’s membership 
to the EU stems from fear with regard to Europe’s identity and is mostly not founded 
upon tangible economic concerns (p. 20). This is interesting in light of the fact that the 
Eurobarometer Flash survey 257 (February 2009), aimed at assessing general attitudes 
towards EU enlargement and not specifically towards Turkey’s accession, paints a 
different picture. According to this survey, populations in member states attach high 
importance to “freedom and democratic values” (49.7%) and “economic issues” 
(39.7%), while “cultural and religious issues” (20.7%) rank surprisingly low. Only in 
Italy, the cultural and religious issues (39.8%) take precedence over other 
considerations. Italy also scored particularly high on “immigration issues”, as did 
Austria, Ireland and the UK.  The diverging results of these two studies could be an 
indicator of the uniqueness of Turkey’s case but perhaps also reflects a shift in priorities 
given the changed economic climate between 2006 and 2009. In times of a recession, 
economic considerations are assigned more weight than in times of a booming 
economy. In Yavcan’s study, non-urban residents seem to be less inclined to reject 
Turkey’s accession than urban residents. This could be attributed to the fact that the fear 
of immigration is more pronounced in urban conglomerations that have traditionally 
been the destination of migratory flows (Yavcan, 2006, p. 17). Again, this is not 
supported by the recent Eurobarometer survey (February 2009), as no significant 
differences between the urban and rural population were detected on whether they 
attached any importance to immigration issues when it comes to future EU enlargement 
in general. This leads to the assumption that the Turkish case indeed constitutes a 
special case that is fairly detached from general opinions on future enlargement, but 
could also highlight the importance of phrasing survey questions on such a sensitive 
issue carefully, as different wording may result in completely different responses. In her 
inquiry into the comparability of the Turkish accession bid vis-à-vis the applications of 
previous accession candidates, McLaren (2007) finds similar sources and patterns of 
opposition of EU constituencies towards an accession of Turkey and the accession of 
CEE countries prior to their accession in 2004. She emphasizes, however, that 
tremendously high levels of rejection of Turkey’s membership by far exceed the levels 
of rejection experienced by previous accession candidates; a fact which she mainly 
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attributes to contextual factors such as large Turkish immigrant communities within 
individual member states: “that experience with migration from Turkey may be a key 
contextual explanation for hostility to this candidacy. Instead of creating a ‘we-feeling’ 
and empathy for the Turkish candidacy, such migration appears to be having 
counterproductive effects” (p. 273). 
 
McLaren also renounces the argument of Jones & van der Bijl (2004) who hypothesize 
“that greater geographical proximity promotes a stronger ‘we-feeling’ between the 
candidate and the member state. Thus, the greater the geographical proximity is, the 
greater the support for a candidate country will be.”  In the case of Turkey this argument 
does not prove to be valid, as some of the most adamant opponents of Turkey’s 
accession, such as Germany and Austria are geographically closer to Turkey than its 
most outspoken supporters, such as the UK, Sweden and Spain. Also Greece, the 
neighbor of Turkey, cannot be said to be an enthusiastic supporter of Turkey’s EU 
ambitions. But then, perhaps closer cultural interaction could serve as an indicator of 
more support for Turkey’s accession? Viewed from this point, frequent interaction with 
a relatively large Turkish immigrant community within a particular country, should lead 
to decreased prejudices. Jan Dirk Kemming and Özlem Sandikci (2007) paint an 
ambiguous picture in their findings regarding the question whether familiarity and close 
contact with a large Turkish immigrant community impacts positively or negatively on 
the general sentiment towards Turkey's accession. They find that the effect strongly 
varies with the degree of integration of these communities into mainstream society, 
which for example results in stronger support for Turkey's accession in the Netherlands 
or the UK, as opposed to France and Germany where close interaction has essentially 
resulted in more prejudices and thus had a rather negative effect. It should be kept in 
mind that the mere existence of large immigrant communities does not necessarily 
translate into significant interaction between the majority population and ethnic 
minorities and thus does not in itself lead to closer cultural proximity and familiarity. 
Furthermore, it has to be acknowledged that the national discourses on immigrant 
integration are framed in different ways and within them cultural exchange may carry a 
positive or negative connotation, which often shapes the perception and interpretation of 
cultural interaction by individuals. 
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Kemming & Sandikci also conclude that the perception that religion plays a more 
important role in Turkey than in “secularized Europe” seems to weigh more heavily on 
public opinion, than the mere fact that a majority of Turkish nationals are Muslims. It is 
thus the perceived impact of religion on the country’s posture rather than the nominal 
affiliation of Turkish citizens to Islam that European citizens seem to reject. This is 
interesting in light of the fact that Turkey is perhaps one of the most secularized states 
and has for decades excluded any form of political Islam from the public domain, which 
should be emphasized by its leadership. However, this currently seems unlikely, as the 
current leadership to the contrary is rather keen on expanding the role of religion in 
society and in political considerations. All in all, it certainly becomes evident that 
Turkey could make use of a coherent nation brand management strategy, in order to 
positively reshape public sentiment towards Turkey within the EU (see Kemming & 
Sandikci 2007). This leads us to the next major argument that has figured prominently 
in the debate on Turkey’s accession and is viewed by many scholars as the main 
differentiating element between Turkey’s accession bid and the bid of other current or 
previous accession candidates. 
 
5.3 “A Membership of Turkey will Result in Uncontrollable Migration 
Flows” 
It is often argued that Turkey’s accession to the EU will result in considerable migratory 
flows from Turkey into the current member states of the European Union. Sometimes 
this is linked with the argument that Turkey’s accession will erode Europe’s Christian 
heritage. Occasionally, fears have been voiced that massive Turkish immigration 
following the accession will dramatically increase the leverage of Muslim voters within 
the political systems of current member states, which in turn could dilute many rules, 
laws and even values that have been characteristic of Europe. Discourse on immigration 
from Turkey in the aftermath of an accession is closely connected with the more general 
discourse on immigrant integration. Avci & Kirişci (2008) accurately point out that “the 
image of Turkey in the minds of many Europeans has been formed by their encounter 
with Turkish immigrants. This encounter by and large has been a negative one and ex-
acerbates European fears that Turks will actually invade their societies if Turkey was to 
become a member of the European Union. It is very telling that the representative of the 
Konrad Adenauer Foundation (supported by the Christian Democrats in Germany), in 
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Turkey, Frank Spengler, argued that Turkey’s membership went not through Diyarbakır 
but Kreuzberg” (p. 167). In this chapter, however, I will argue that a certain degree of 
distinction between these two largely separate issues, one being Turkey’s EU accession 
and the other being immigrant integration in European societies, seems important in 
order to adequately assess the actual impact of a potential Turkish membership. 
 
In assessing the issue of migratory flows into the EU, one has to consider that the 
magnitude of migration flows will depend on the economic factors of income disparity 
and unemployment rate in both the EU27 and Turkey at the point of accession. The 
existing income differential between Turkey and the European Union will certainly 
offer an important incentive for Turkish citizens to migrate into more affluent EU 
member states. It has to be remembered that past migration of Turkish citizens into 
Western Europe was the consequence of increased demand for cheap labor in various 
European economies and active recruitment efforts on the part of these host countries. 
Indeed, economic growth and development in the country of origin will lead to some 
return-migration and reduce the incentive to emigrate (see Grabbe 2004). The 
experience of USA with Mexico in the NAFTA context, however, indicates that from a 
short- to medium-term perpective economic development could initially actually lead to 
an intensification of migratory flows, as relative improvements in economic prosperity 
create more incentives for outward migration, reduce barriers for migration and will 
only in the long run reduce migratory flows (see Skeldon 1997).  
 
Erzan et al. (2005) emulated the actual experience of EU countries with free movement 
of labour in the context of previous enlargement rounds for Turkey, and projected net 
immigration flows of 1.1 million. When they additionally took past Turkish guest 
worker data into account and emulated it for Turkey in 2015, they arrived at net 
immigration flows of 1.8 million until 2030. In both scenarios immigration subsided 
after an initial hike following EU accession and the implementation of free movement 
of labor (p.117). When they confined free labor movement trends to the free labour 
mobility experience of Greece, Portugal and Spain and applied these trends to Turkey, 
they projected net immigration flows until 2030 did not exceed 1 million. Combining 
data of the Southern Europe sample with past Turkish guest worker data led to total net 
immigration until 2030 of slightly below 2 million, doubling the forecast based on the 
actual membership experience of the Southern European member states (Erzan et al. 
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2005, p.120). According to a study conducted by Lejour et al. (2004), a maximum of 2.7 
million Turkish nationals are expected to migrate to the EU. This is within the range of 
1.3 and 2.7 million of potential immigrant stock that was put forth by Erzan & Kirisçi 
(2004, p.2) and also within the estimates of the Impact Study of the European 
Commission in 2004, which projected migratory flows between 0.5 and 4.4 million until 
2030 (COM (2004) 656). Also, these figures have to be seen in comparison with a long-
term immigration potential of 2.9 million people from the new CEE member states to 
the former EU15 countries which De Mooij and Tang (2003) concluded in their study. 
A migratory flow of this magnitude would equal approximately 0.54% of the EU27 
population. These estimates have to be viewed with great caution, as factors such as the 
income gap, the standard of living, educational opportunities and geopolitical stability 
cannot be adequately assessed at a point where there is not even a realistic prediction of 
an eventual accession date. There is yet another fact that cannot be disregarded in this 
context. The Accession Negotiation Framework between Turkey and the EU which was 
adopted in 2005 specifically allows for “long transition periods” and “permanent 
safeguard clauses” by member states to restrict the freedom of movement of people 
from Turkey in the aftermath of Turkish accession (Article 12). This in turn means that 
the member states will actually be in a much better position to manage migratory flows, 
as push factors within Turkey are internalized and can thus be addressed through EU 
policies; thus, they will be in more control to decide what level of migration they are 
willing to accept. 
 
It is certain that Turkish immigrants will not proportionately disperse over EU territory, 
which is why some member states will be more affected by these migration flows than 
others. It has to be taken into account that migration is influenced by network effects in 
their ethnic community, which leads to the conclusion that countries with an already 
considerable Turkish immigrant community will receive a disproportionate share of 
these new immigrants (Lejour et al. 2004, p. 35). Germany is thus expected to receive 2 
million of these potential 2.7 million people, which would constitute a considerable 
share of the overall population. The prospect of immigration flows at such a large scale 
induces negative public sentiment towards Turkey’s accession in Germany and other 
highly affected countries. It is, however, not inconceivable that immigration will be 
tackled on a European level in the future to ensure that the short-term burdens of large 
immigration waives are shared more evenly. In fact, according to the “Immigration 
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Trends 2008” survey of the German Marshall Fund (p.31), 53% of the respondents wish 
for a close cooperation between the member states to come up with a coordinated, 
common immigration policy, instead of individual action by each state. It was not 
specified, however, how far this coordination should go and in light of the recent 
financial crisis it becomes evident that such burden-sharing would currently find no 
majority among national constituencies.  
 
In terms of the effects on national economies, the skill distribution of Turkish 
immigrants will be of interest. Turkish immigrants to the EU have traditionally been 
competing for low-skilled jobs. Lejour et al. argue that an increase in the prospective 
labor force within the EU will increase the bargaining power of employers vis-à-vis 
unions and especially increase pressure on low-wage workers, thus lowering overall 
wages. Consequently, they state that according to their model, “wages for low-skilled 
workers in the EU will fall by 0.9% more, relative to those for high-skilled workers as 
immigrants compete for low-skilled jobs” (Lejour et al. 2004, p. 11). Flam (2003) 
attributes this to the fact that “in a country in which immigrants complement the 
existing skill structure rather than stand in direct competition to it, productivity and 
wages will generally benefit from or at least be less affected by immigration. If a 
country’s workforce is thus highly skilled, influx of low skilled immigrants will have a 
more positive economic impact” (p.14). This should be kept in mind, when the different 
countries’ positions towards low-skilled immigration are assessed. Also, the level of 
education of Turkish immigrants may change and Europe may increasingly be able to 
attract highly skilled immigrants from Turkey. The “Immigration Trends 2008” survey 
shows that 64% of the respondents did not think that “immigrants take jobs away from 
native born” and even 77% agree that “immigrants generally help to fill jobs where 
there are shortages of workers”. The overall effects on GDP of Turkish immigration are 
estimated to be positive for the EU (0.5%), while they are negative for Turkey (1.8%) 
(see also Lejour et al. 2004, p. 11). The social costs of immigration, however, are far 
more difficult to measure than purely economic costs. Increased criminality, 
“ghettoization” in cities and social tensions weigh heavily on public perception of 
immigration and can impose considerable costs upon society. Therefore, they are highly 
relevant problems that need to be addressed by the member states (Flam 2003, p.16). 
Immigration is not the most pressing issue that Europeans are concerned with at the 
moment, according to one of the last Eurobarometer surveys (Eurobarometer 71). Only 
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4% of the respondents identified it as the most pressing issue while other issues that are 
directly related to immigration in public discourse, such as unemployment, crime, and 
several institutions of the welfare state have ranked considerably higher.  
 
The immigration and integration debate in many member states seems inextricably 
linked with the debate on Turkey's accession. Yet, from an analytical perspective, there 
are good arguments to partly detach the strings of argumentation from each other. 
Solely additional migratory flows that can be directly attributed to Turkey joining the 
EU and the accession’s impact on overall immigrant integration should form part of the 
debate on Turkish accession. Fundamental questions as to what extent and how existing 
ethnic minorities should integrate and be integrated into mainstream society and which 
adequate integration measures are at the disposal of member states to meet their goals 
will have to be addressed in any case. These questions will persist no matter how the 
relations between Turkey and the EU evolve and existing Turkish immigrant 
communities in European countries are highly improbable to become any smaller if 
Turkey’s bid for EU membership is rejected. This is supported by an econometric study 
by Erzan et al. (2006), also cited by Avci & Kirişci (2008, p. 158), “which analyzes 
different possible scenarios of immigration from Turkey to EU member countries 
between 2004 and 2030.  Interestingly it suggests that less Turks are likely to immigrate 
if Turkey becomes a member than if Turkey is left out of the EU. The scenario is based 
on the assumption that past trends of Turkish immigration will continue and that Turk-
ish membership will occur in 2015. It will be accompanied by unhindered freedom of 
movement with accession and it is forecasted that 2.1 million Turks will have migrated 
by the year 2030 under these circumstances. In the opposite scenario which assumes no 
membership hence no free movement of labor and also a slow down in the Turkish 
economy the numbers would be 2.7 million.” It should perhaps be specified what is 
meant by “a slow down in the Turkish economy”. The last scenario assumes that 
Turkey’s EU accession is suspended, which leads to a situation in which high growth 
cannot be sustained (meaning that urban GDP would grow at 4% annually with 1.5% 
productivity increase and rural GDP would stagnate) and unemployment climbs 
(approaching 20%)  while the prevailing EU visa regulations are retained. The numbers 
in both scenarios are exclusively based on past immigration trends from Turkey only in 
order to factor in the prejudice that “Turkey is not any other South European Country 
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and that unlike Greece, Portugal and Spain, Turkey has a nomadic tradition” (Erzan et 
al. 2005, p.120). 
 
The entanglement of Turkey’s membership bid and immigrant integration issues will, at 
least for some time to come, continue to occur in public debate and thus the success of 
integration measures will in some member states directly correlate with the acceptance 
of Turkey's EU bid in the eyes of the general public. Still, in light of the need for a more 
informed discussion on Turkey’s prospective membership from a European perspective, 
it seems important to highlight the short-falls of a public debate that does not 
distinguish between these separate issues.  Moreover, it needs to be emphasized that 
many of the problems in connection with immigrant integration can be traced back to 
failed policies of immigrant-absorbing states and are not inevitable byproducts of 
immigration. In addition, the up-side potential of an accession of Turkey should not be 
completely discarded, as it will most likely alter the identity and the composition of 
these immigrant communities and may impact on the integration of Turkish immigrants 
into European societies (see Avci & Kirişci 2008, p.161). An accession of Turkey could 
also contribute to ease these pressures rather than aggravating them, as it would serve as 
a gesture of inclusion, thus creating a more favorable climate for integration, especially 
for Turkish immigrants. Similarly, a rejection would also prove to have an effect on the 
integration of Turkish minorities. It could cause serious repercussions by further 
alienating these minority groups from “the project Europe”.  
 
 
Migration can be displayed as the product of “push and pull factors” and an assessment 
of the economic and geopolitical situation at the time of accession will offer more 
accurate insights into the size of migratory flows than the mere projection of past trends 
into the future. Also, it should be noted that the demographic structure of Europe with 
an increasingly aging population will require substantial immigration influx to 
complement policies designed to sustain current economic levels and the structures of 
welfare states (Erzan & Kirisçi, 2004, p.3). In the “Immigration Trends 2008” survey by 
the German Marshall Fund (pp. 50-53), 52% of the respondents actually recognized the 
need to “encourage immigration for employment purposes” as viable measure to tackle 
the problem of an aging society, whereas 44% gave a negative response. This measure 
was thus favored over “raising the legal retirement age” (23% positive) and 
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“encouraging people to have more children” (44% positive). However, it needs to be 
kept in mind that in several states, such as Poland, Italy and Germany measures 
designed to increase of the natural birth rate are favored over additional migration and 
public opinion in some countries can be far less favorable towards migration than the 
EU average. In any case, a membership of Turkey would certainly positively impact on 
the EU’s overall age structure (Hughes, 2004, p. 16). However, immigration can only be 
a part of a more comprehensive solution to the ageing problem in Europe as “migration 
is likely to only make a small contribution […], since the immigration levels needed to 
fully counteract ageing would be extremely large. Moreover, the demographic benefit of 
immigration is a short-term one, because immigrant fertility behavior tends to take on 
the patterns of the host society in the long run” (see Castles & Miller 2009, pp. 223- 
224). In this context, it is perhaps interesting to highlight that a regional survey 
conducted in Turkey by Hacettepe University, Ankara, jointly with the Netherlands 
Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) and Eurostat (2000) revealed that the 
migration tendency of people aged and above was extremely low (see Oztas-Ayhan et 
al. 2000) and that according to the UN projections, the share of people aged 55 and 
above will have nearly doubled by 2030 in Turkey. Applied to their net immigration 
projections for Turkish migration into the EU until 2030, Erzan et al. found that they 
had to scale down their existing numbers by about 300,000 (Erzan et al. 2005, p.124).  
 
5.4 “The Cyprus issue is unresolved and Turkey still does not recognize 
Cyprus” 
One of the key issues that has repeatedly clouded the relations between Turkey and the 
European Union and still proves to be one of the main obstacles on the way towards 
Turkey’s accession to the EU is the unresolved situation of the island of Cyprus which 
is still divided along ethnic lines between the roughly 80% majority Greek Cypriot and 
20% minority Turkish Cypriot communities. The island has been “divided politically 
since 1963 and militarily since 1974” (Akyel 2010). The southern Greek Republic of 
Cyprus has been separated from the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (TRNC). The latter however, is not recognized by any state other than Turkey. 
Consequently, the Republic of Cyprus enjoys de jure sovereignty over the whole 
territory of the island. This is also reflected in the fact that “the entire island entered the 
EU on 1 May 2004, although the EU acquis - the body of common rights and 
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obligations - applies only to the areas under the internationally recognized Greek 
Cypriot Government, and is suspended in the areas administered by Turkish Cypriots” 
(source: CIA Factbook 2010).  
 
In 2002, negotiations under the auspices of the UN were supposed to lead to an 
agreement and reunite the island before Cyprus was to sign the Treaty of Accession at 
the beginning of 2003. However, the proposed settlement was rejected by the Turkish 
Cypriot side. In 2004, there was a last attempt to ensure reunification before an EU 
accession of the Republic of Cyprus. “Greek and Turkish Cypriots held referendums on 
the UN-sponsored plan to re-unite their island. While the Turkish Cypriots accepted this 
latest proposal, the so-called Annan plan, the Greek Cypriot side rejected it” (Hannay 
2006). The decision to allow the Greek part of Cyprus to join the EU before a 
permanent settlement on reunification had been reached has been widely criticized 
throughout Europe (see Tocci 2004, p.174). Clearly, a window of opportunity has been 
lost and the EU as foreign policy actor has thereby given up some of its leverage to 
resolve the underlying issues that are preventing a permanent solution. Despite initial 
objections from France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, the negotiation process for 
Cyprus was started with only the Greek part of Cyprus, without any binding 
commitments towards unification. This happened against the backdrop that Greece 
managed to link Cypriot accession with the Eastern enlargement and threatened to 
boycott the Eastern enlargement as well as the Customs Union with Turkey (Friis 2002, 
p.28). At the point of accession, one of the conflict parties became a member of the EU 
and thus disposes of veto rights with regard to Turkey’s accession bid with tremendous 
repercussions for this ongoing process. 
 
It is actually the UN which holds the central mediator role in the Cyprus conflict and the 
EU has not, at least officially, taken the lead in drafting an agreement that would entail a 
reunification of the island (see Tocci 2004). However, in the context of its relationship 
with Turkey, the European Union undoubtedly has a special interest in resolving the 
Cyprus issue. David Hannay, the former UK Special Representative for Cyprus from 
1996 until 2003, has pointed out the basic predicament that the EU is facing with regard 
to a settlement in Cyprus and the Turkish accession bid: “The best illustration of the 
centrality of the EU dimension to the chances of success or failure in this negotiating 
phase is to pose two questions. Is it even remotely conceivable that Turkey could be 
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accepted into an EU of which Cyprus is already a member, if the status quo on the 
island remained and no settlement of the Cyprus problem had been reached? And 
secondly, is it even remotely conceivable that a Turkey, definitively rebuffed by the EU, 
would strike a deal on Cyprus which the Greek Cypriots could accept?” (Hannay 2009, 
p. 2). In his book, Cyprus: The Search for a Solution, he gives a detailed account of the 
Turkish involvement in the negotiations of a settlement in Cyprus and emphasizes the 
Turkish leverage over the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community (see Hannay 2005). 
Thus, he argues that a failure of the accession process of Turkey would put an end to the 
aspirations for a peaceful settlement in Cyprus between the two ethnic communities.  
 
A study, conducted by Lordos, Kaymak and Tocci, exploring public opinion in both 
Cypriotic communities with regard to the peace process, concluded that “64% of the 
Greek Cypriots and 65% of the Turkish Cypriots desire a mutually acceptable 
settlement to emerge from the peace process and 67% of the Turkish Cypriots and 90% 
of the Greek Cypriots either reject or find the status quo merely tolerable” (Lordos, 
Kaymak & Tocci 2009, p.5). Yet, both communities are highly pessimistic about the 
outcome of current negotiations. 56% of the Greek Cypriots and 61% of the Turkish 
Cypriots do not think that the peace process will result in a settlement (Lordos, Kaymak 
& Tocci 2009, p.4). It thus becomes evident that although there is a desire for the 
successful conclusion of negotiations and dissatisfaction with the status quo, both 
communities are highly pessimistic and do not think that a settlement will take place in 
the near future (p.6).  
  
This is also reflected in their anticipated voting choices, with 34% of Greek Cypriots 
and 37% of Turkish Cypriots determined or leaning towards casting a “no” vote, while 
only a mere 23% of Greek Cypriots and 41% of Turkish Cypriots are definitely or at 
least leaning towards voting “yes”. Particularly the Greek Cypriots display high levels 
of undecided voters (44%), but also the Turkish Cypriot community seems largely 
undecided (22%), which is why the authors seek to uncover the determining factors that 
will be relevant to the decision-making process for these swing voters (Lordos, Kaymak 
& Tocci 2009, p. 12, 13). For Greek Cypriot swing voters, the security and guarantees 
provisions in the plan, which influence 85% of swing voters, are the most important 
element of a future settlement, followed by territory (60%), citizenship (57%), property 
(53%) and governance (39%), whereas Turkish Cypriot swing voters will look at 
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security and guarantees (66%), property (49%), power-sharing (44%), the economy 
(39%) and the legal status of sovereignty (34%) to decide whether to support an 
agreement (p. 27). Results reveal that these voters will “above all look into the 
substance of the plan, rather than be influenced by the positions of particular actors, 
such as their family, friends, and the political party they are affiliated with, their 
president or their motherland” (p.26).  However, the authors found the position of 
Turkey to be highly relevant and Turkey’s influence to be evident, as 28 percent of the 
Turkish Cypriot swing voters assigned importance to Turkey’s position on the 
negotiated settlement. Furthermore, they note “that the Greek Cypriot swing vote is 
highly sensitive to the perceptions of Turkey’s post-settlement intentions, that is, 
‘whether Turkey will have convinced me that it intends to honor the agreement’ (45%). 
Thus, taken together, these two findings highlight the critical role that Turkey will play 
in securing a Cyprus settlement” (Lordos, Kaymak & Tocci 2009, p. 12-13). 
 
In 2009, during his visit to Cyprus, the Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou stated 
that “the goal is for Turkey to become a full member”. He elaborated that he was not in 
favor of a special association of Turkey with the EU, as long as it fulfilled its 
obligations, but he also emphasized that “it cannot be permitted for Turkey to have 
occupation troops in an EU member state, specially for a candidate country”. According 
to the president of the Republic of Cyprus, Demetris Christofias, it is imperative that 
“Turkey must not only honor the customs protocol but should recognize the 
administration in Nicosia and normalize relations” and added that “Turkey has 
obligations it must comply with or it will not be able to continue on its accession course 
without obstruction” (SETimes, October 20, 2009). It was precisely the failure on the 
part of Turkey to open up its ports to Cypriots ships that has prompted the EU to 
suspend 8 of the 35 negotiation chapters that form part of Turkey’s accession package. 
 
5.5 “Turkey is violating human right, disregarding minority rights and 
lacking liberal democratic values” 
It is often emphasized that Turkish society does not adhere to Europe’s core values as 
expressed in the Berlin Declaration. Human rights violations are in fact still common, 
and freedom of press and expression are clearly impeded by Article 301 of the Turkish 
Constitution, that in its amended version prohibits “denigrating the Turkish nation”. 
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There have been attempts to establish that Turkey’s poor record on human rights and its 
political and social authoritarianism is inextricably linked with its cultural and religious 
traditions (Dobson 2004, p.4). However, various institutions also report a number of 
human rights violations in the existing member states (see address by Holly Cartner, 
Human Rights Watch, 06/24/2009). In some areas, Turkey’s progress towards a more 
stringent human rights regime is clearly visible. Turkey has, for instance, abolished the 
death penalty, shortened permissible pre-trial detention periods (see European 
Commission: 2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, p. 166; 
p.55) and it looks as if the position of the military within the political system may be 
curbed after all. In other areas, however, much needs to be done and considerable tasks 
still await the government. One problem is that even in areas where legislative and 
administrative reforms have been announced, the actual implementation of these 
reforms has often been slow and largely insufficient as a result of a lack of commitment, 
financial resources and a bureaucratic structure, which has opened the door for 
continued human rights violations (see Background Paper, EUTCC Conference 2009, 
p.18).  
5.5.1 Religious Minorities 
In the case of Turkey, Christian minority rights in its Muslim majority society could 
perhaps serve as barometer for its commitment to religious tolerance. Non-Muslim 
minorities (0.2% of the population), are overall not sufficiently protected in Turkey. 
Religious identity is still displayed on every Turkish ID card, thus exposing worshipers 
of other religions. However, the same provision also still exists in most EU passports. 
The Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 that formally established the Republic of Turkey has 
granted specific protections to all non-Muslim religious minorities. This preferential 
treatment has subsequently been confined to the Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, 
and the Jewish communities (see Annual Report of USCIRF 2009). However, even 
these communities face considerable obstacles when it comes to their legal 
personalities, property ownership, educating their clerics and maintaining other 
educational institutions. The Greek Orthodox seminary on Halki that was closed in 1971 
still has not been re-opened and remains a symbol of discrimination against Christians 
in Turkey (Chislett 2009, p. 15). Some difficulties for non-Muslim communities also 
derive from the fact that most of them also constitute ethnic minority groups, which 
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further raises suspicions regarding their allegiance to the state and Turkey’s territorial 
integrity. 
5.5.2 Freedom of expression 
The harsh reaction and outrage in Turkey following the publication of Mohammed 
caricatures in the Danish newspaper Jyllands Posten in 2006 has aggravated suspicions 
in Europe that “freedom of expression” is not adequately valued in Turkish society. The 
initial Turkish rejection of former Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen, who Turkey held 
accountable for not dealing adequately with this insult, as NATO secretary general in 
2009 has renewed these concerns in the eyes of the European public. Throughout this 
conflict, the Danish government had argued that it could not limit freedom of 
expression, as there was no legal grounds to do so and as this represented a fundamental 
freedom, upheld and cherished by Danish society. In Turkey, however, there is a legal 
basis to restrict freedom of speech. The ban of numerous websites (as many as 1,874 in 
June 2009) speaks volumes. The recent ban of internet video platform YouTube that a 
Turkish court ordered is in fact based on this article 301 in conjunction with law 5816 
covering crimes committed against Kemal Atatürk (Chislett 2009, p.11). It was 
originally issued in 2007 after videos that had been uploaded in Greece were found to 
insult “Turkishness”. After Google, the corporation behind YouTube, prevented 
customers in Turkey from accessing videos that clearly violated Turkish law the 
platform was allowed to go online again. When a Turkish prosecutor, however, 
demanded that Google should delete this content worldwide, Google refused on the 
grounds that these videos should not be subject to Turkish law outside of the country, as 
one country should not be able to dictate video content for YouTube users worldwide 
and undermine freedom of speech on the internet. The ban of YouTube was briefly 
lifted in October 2010 but was reinstated only days later by a court in Ankara over an 
old video purportedly rather explicitly displaying an act of adultery by former 
opposition leader Deniz Baykal (Toksabay 2010 on Reuters). According to a report of 
the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media on Turkey and Internet Censorship, 
access to approximately 3700 websites (among them also websites of the gay 
community and websites informing about the situation in South-East Turkey) have been 
blocked under Law No. 5651 (the ensuing legal basis for blocking websites passed in 
2007) until December 2009. Statements of Reporters sans Frontières (RSF) speak of 
over 5000 banned websites by November, “in most cases for criticizing Ataturk or the 
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army, for perceived attacks on the nation's 'dignity' or for referring to Turkey's Kurdish 
and Armenian minorities, taboo subjects in Turkey” (Reporters sans Frontiers, 
November 03, 2010).The ban of YouTube and other websites is symptomatic of the 
restricted freedom of expression still prevalent in Turkey, which stands in stark contrast 
to European standards and has repeatedly been used as example for Turkey’s 
incompatibility with EU rules (see Claire Berlinski’s commentary on Radio Free Europe 
on July 3, 2009). The OSCE report argues “that there could be a breach of Article 10 of 
European Convention of Human Rights if blocking measures or filtering tools are used 
at state level to silence politically motivated speech on the Internet, or the criteria for 
blocking or filtering is secret, or the decisions of the administrative bodies are not 
publicly made available for legal challenge” (OSCE report 2010, p. 3).  
 
Article 301 of the Turkish Constitution that prohibits “denigrating the Turkish nation” is 
certainly not the only provision that is used to curb the freedom of the press. The 
Articles 216 (incitement to hatred) and 220 (propaganda made through media, about the 
goals of an organization, which has been established in order to commit crimes) (see 
Background Paper, EUTCC Conference 2009, p.23) that have been introduced in 1996 
in the wake of new amendments to the Law on the Fight against Terrorism equally 
increase the pressure on media outlets. The adapted anti-terrorism law torpedoes 
Turkey’s efforts to combat torture by providing detainees access to medical 
examinations and legal counsel (see Background Paper, EUTCC Conference 2009, 
p.19). Similar to other countries, Turkey has introduced clauses that remove the 
detainees’ automatic right to access a lawyer for a period of up to 24 hours (see 
Background Paper, EUTCC Conference 2009, p.21). 
5.5.3 The Military’s privileged position 
The privileged position of the military within Turkey’s political system and the direct 
influence it is thus able to exert has been subject to repeated criticism by the European 
Union. The ruling AKP has been determined to curb the power of the military in recent 
years, which is naturally met with resistance by the military. This power struggle has 
clearly become evident in the dispute surrounding the election of Abdullah Gül as 
President of the Republic of Turkey by the AKP-dominated Grand National Assembly 
in 2007. As self-perceived safeguard of the secular Kemalist republic, the Turkish 
General Staff posted a statement on its website declaring that “some circles who have 
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been carrying out endless efforts to disturb fundamental values of the republic of 
Turkey, especially secularism, have escalated their efforts recently”, warning that the 
“fundamentalist understanding [of the government] was eroding the very foundation of 
the Turkish Republic and the ideas that it was founded upon” (Capezza 2009, p.20). At 
this point, the military seemed determined to once again intervene in the political 
domain just as it had on several occasions in the past. This time, however, the statement 
which was later branded as an “internet coup” and which was to be a warning to the 
AKP to draw back in the power struggle with the secular elites proved to be without 
consequence as public opinion was against yet another coup by the military. The AKP 
responded swiftly and called for new elections in which it was able to secure a clear 
victory with 47% of the votes (see Report of the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung 2010, p. 8-9; 
Capezza 2009, p.20). In the end, Abdullah Gül became Turkey’s new President, thus 
“further consolidating the AKP’s power and effectively eliminating any future 
presidential vetoes over concerns about the constitutionalism of AKP legislation” 
(Capezza 2009, p.20) and the military’s privileged position and authority within 
Turkey’s political system had been permanently weakened. 
  
Recently, the shift in the institutional balance in favor of the AKP has fueled the 
prosecution of suspects charged with planning a plot against the AKP-led government, 
which became known as the “Ergenekon conspiracy”. The suspects “purportedly 
planned to carry out a string of high-profile murders, sow chaos and provoke a military 
coup in Turkey” (“Turkey and the army: Conspiracy theories”, in The Economist, 
January 29, 2009). The main initiators of the alleged coup plan were retired military 
officers, but prosecutors have identified a diffuse and widespread “network of plotters” 
within the so-called “deep-state”. As the group of suspects has increasingly been 
extended to government critics, “inconvenient” journalists and political rivals “the AKP 
faces growing criticism that it is using the case as an excuse to intimidate or silence 
anyone who opposes its agenda” (Capezza 2009, p. 21). 
 
Despite the fact that the underlying motivation for the AKP’s efforts in curbing the 
influence of the military is questionable and may actually be rooted in the antagonism 
between the military and the AKP and the desire to fortify its power base rather than in 
an actual commitment to democratic reform, the government has undoubtedly 
succeeded in somewhat restricting the formerly all encompassing powers of the military 
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apparatus. The recent reform, that ensures the jurisdiction of civilian courts over 
military personnel in peace time is a first step towards civilian control over the military 
and has been widely disputed by the establishment opposed to the AKP. However, 
governmental oversight over the military’s budget is still marginal and Article 35 of the 
internal service law that gives the Turkish Security Forces the duty of protecting and 
watching over the Turkish homeland and the Republic of Turkey as defined by the 
constitution is still in effect. From this article the military derives its authority to 
orchestrate a coup in the event that it perceives the secular order of the country to be 
threatened. Only a reform of the Constitution could ultimately fulfill the demands of the 
EU, but the secular establishment has repeatedly warned the AKP to refrain from doing 
so and until 2010 the AKP did by and large not want to risk this power struggle (see 
Sariibrahimoglu 2009). 
5.5.4 Turkish Constitutional Reform 
Repeatedly, the European Union has encouraged a revision of the Turkish Constitution 
which dates back to 1982 and was drawn up by the military regime that ruled the 
country after the military coup in 1980. “The Constitution’s emphasis on the state’s as 
opposed to the individual’s rights put it at variance with EU norms” (Chislett 2010, p.2). 
The EU Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Füle stated that “a revised Constitution is 
needed in Turkey to allow for a number of key reforms – which aim at enhancing the 
democratic standards, human rights and the rule of law, and thus improving the daily 
life of Turkish citizens. Therefore the Commission welcomes the willingness of the 
government to proceed in this direction” (Statement by Stefan Füle, European 
Commissioner for Enlargement, 03/29/2010). Moves towards constitutional reform in 
Turkey have to be seen in the context of “Turkish society and politics which have 
become polarized between growing religious conservatism and advocates of 
secularism” (Evin et al. 2010, p.25). The electoral victory of the Justice and 
Development Party (AK Party) in the 2002 general elections marked a new era in 
Turkish politics and the changing tides in the Turkish political system entailed “severe 
resistance from the bureaucratic elite that were so invested in the old system.” (Ete on 
The Middle East Channel of Foreign Policy, September 09, 2010).  
 
In the last decade, Turkey’s political landscape has been marked by a power struggle 
between new, more conservative and religious elites from Anatolia which form the 
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power base of the AKP and the old, secular “Kemalist” elites that have traditionally 
dominated Turkey’s political affairs and who had continuously viewed the state and 
political power as their personal legacy. The polarization of Turkish society and 
Turkey’s political landscape and the battle for power and influence between various 
interest groups has been complemented by competing ideas of Turkish identity. Turkish 
identity as promoted by its secular political and military elites for the past decades 
suggested Turkish nationalism and an identity based on a dominant Turkish culture, a 
rather narrowly defined cultural homogeneity and a modern state that is closely tied to 
the civilized Western world. On the other hand, the AKP has introduced a competing 
concept of “Turkishness”, which emphasizes a more inclusive understanding of identity, 
anchored in Turkey’s Muslim tradition and based more explicitly upon Turkey’s 
Ottoman heritage (see Breitegger 2009; for a detailed account see Yavuz 2009).  
 
While the AKP claimed that by introducing constitutional reform measures, it merely 
sought to eliminate the imbalances and injustices of the illiberal 1982 Constitution, the 
opposition under the lead of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) asserted that the core 
objective of the package was to shift the institutional balance in favor of the AKP led 
government by curbing the power and independence of the judiciary, one of the “safe-
guards” of the values and institutions of the Kemalist republic. “This fear [of the 
opposition] reflects a major and structural short-coming of Turkish democracy: the lack 
of a strong and reliable system of checks and balances on political power” (Sinan Ulgen 
in Financial Times, September 09, 2010). The judiciary’s position as protector of the 
Kemalist republic had gained even more importance in the past few years, as the 
military’s role in public affairs had been weakened by revelations in the Ergenekon 
case, European pressure on non-interference in the daily political life and changed 
societal expectations. 
 
Besides the controversial issue regarding the composition of the Constitutional Court 
and the right to select members of the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors, the 
body in charge of Court appointments, there have also been several other provisions 
with repercussions on the balance of power within the Turkish political system. For 
instance, the powers of military courts are further limited, prohibiting them from trying 
civilians in times of peace. Moreover, Article 11 of the Constitution that had prevented 
the prosecution of the leaders of the 1980 military coup, which entailed considerable 
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bloodshed, was repealed. Also, the jurisdiction of civilian courts has been extended and 
now covers trying military officers charged with plotting coups. Military officers 
discharged by the Supreme Military Council now have the right to appeal which can be 
attributed to the AKP’s perception that Islamists were the focus of previous army 
purges. Another measure, which drew considerable criticism, is the clause that elected 
deputies are now allowed to serve in parliament until the end of their term, even if their 
party is disbanded by a court. This provision is tailored to limit the secularist’s ability to 
repel and disband Islamist as well as moderate Muslim parties and can be attributed to 
the AKP’s attempt to prevent any future ban on the party imposed by the judicial system 
(Chislett 2010; Report of the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung 2010). 
 
Other changes have been largely excluded from public debate and have been of little 
political salience. They will help to align the Turkish Constitution with EU norms, such 
as protective measures for children, positive discrimination of women, extended rights 
for trade unions or the chance for governmental employees to engage in processes of 
collective bargaining. These amendments have been generally welcomed, as these 
provisions are long overdue (Report of the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung 2010, p.2). Also, the 
right for all citizens to appeal to an ombudsman has been largely undisputed, as it has 
always been pushed for by the EU (Chislett 2010). 
 
In the end, the constitutional reform package was approved by a clear majority of 58%, 
with 42% rejecting it. The voter turnout of 78% indicates how politically salient this 
reform had become (Chislett 2010, p.1). However, public debate in the run-up to the 
vote did not center on the actual content of the reform proposal or on benefits and short-
comings of the proposal, but was merely directed towards the underlying motives of the 
AKP for pursuing the constitutional reform and the fundamental reasons for the 
opposition’s rejection of the package. The EU Commission largely views the revision of 
the Constitution favorably and has repeatedly welcomed the constitutional reforms as an 
important step towards an EU accession: “The Commission welcomes the approval, by 
the Turkish people, of the Constitutional reforms in the referendum which took place on 
12 September. It demonstrates the continued commitment of Turkish citizens to reforms 
in view of enhancing their rights and freedoms. As we consistently said in the past 
months, these reforms are a step in the right direction as they address a number of long-
standing priorities in Turkey's efforts towards fully complying with the accession 
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criteria” (Statement by Stefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement, 
September 13, 2010). By speaking out in favor of the reform package prior to the vote, 
the EU Commission also lent its support and thus credibility to the proposal, which has 
certainly contributed to the clear outcome of the referendum.  
 
However, some experts have voiced strong criticism of the amendments adopted, based 
on the argument that they would solely bring about a shift in power rather than actually 
improving the status quo. Chislett (2010, p. 3) points out that “the reform package will 
introduce procedural changes to the appointments of supreme justices, allowing more to 
be appointed by the President and the legislative branch at the expense of appointments 
from state institutions controlled by the executive branch, which raises legitimate 
concerns”. Indeed, “strains of authoritarianism are still entrenched in many regulations 
and the structure of leading institutions. Ironically, the AKP government’s strength and 
authority emanates from the institutions that the Kemalist elites built to safeguard their 
own supremacy” (Evin et al. 2010, p.26).  It can be argued that the constitutional reform 
has primarily served as a means to fortify the AKP’s grip on the state and that a big 
opportunity was missed by the AKP’s unilateral approach to this reform, which came at 
the expense of thorough consultation and broad public support through compromise. 
Only a completely new constitution could in fact pave the way for a state in which 
liberal and democratic values such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press and other 
markers of modern liberal democracies are adequately protected. This is in line with 
Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Füle who stated that “a civilian constitution is the 
most important starting point for Turkey to strengthen its democratic system in line with 
EU standards” (Statement made by Stefan Füle, EU commissioner for enlargement at 
the 7th Bogazici Conference on Turkey-European Union Relations in Istanbul, via 
europeanunionplatform.org). 
5.5.5 Women’s rights and honor killings 
The  Progress Report on Turkey by the European Commission in 2008 noted that 
“domestic violence, honor killings, and early and forced marriages are still a serious 
problem”  (European Commission, Turkey 2008 Progress Report, p.20) and that 
“women in Turkey, particularly Kurdish women, were lagging far behind their male 
counterparts in areas such as education, access to meaningful employment, political 
representation and access to justice” (Background Paper, EUTCC Conference 2009, 
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p.31; see European Commission, Turkey 2008 Progress Report). Gender equality has 
not yet taken root in all parts of Turkish society and the transformation of legal reforms 
into actual real-life changes within society has been stalling. Cases of honor killings in 
Germany have repeatedly raised questions regarding the incompatibility of Turkish 
culture and Islam with Western, liberal values. Honor killings within Turkey have also 
reinforced the widespread view of the backwardness of Turkish society, dominated by 
archaic concepts of patriarchy and family honor. A lack of gender equality and poor 
treatment of women has been particularly prevalent in the Kurdish region in the South-
East of Turkey, which puts emphasis on the fact that several human rights issue in 
Turkey are interconnected. Granting the Kurdish minority more cultural freedoms could 
actually reinforce existing traditions and lead to a persistence of honor killings. On the 
other hand, cultural autonomy for Kurds may also open up the close-knit communities 
and Kurdish culture to outside influences and modernization that they have so far 
sought to avoid at any cost in order to preserve their contested identity. Turkey has 
experienced a rapid process of urbanization, having shifted in less than half a century 
from a country where 75 percent of the population lived in rural areas to one in which 
65 % now live in cities. This has been labeled as the “ruralization of towns and cities” 
(“Turkey- Geography and Demographics”), as “people put their traditions in their 
luggage, along with their pillows and sheets”, which has led to a transfer of tribal 
traditions, strictly conservative Islamic values and archaic family structures into 
Turkey’s urban areas. It is against the backdrop of the amenities of modern, urban life 
that strict family traditions come under attack and a generation gap becomes visible, as 
male family members that are still mentally stuck in their rural traditions feel threatened 
by the new lifestyle of their daughters. (Molly Moore in Washington Post, August 8, 
2001) This is not to say that honor killings predominantly occur in urban settings but it 
could explain why they continue to happen in places such as Berlin or Istanbul. They 
mainly constitute a problem in the Kurdish dominated areas around Diyarbakir, Batman 
and Bismil which are poor, rural and deeply influenced by conservative Islam. Recently, 
families have started to press the daughters to take their own lives instead. Often, the 
feudal character of Kurdish society is blamed for incidents of honor killings and forced 
suicides (see Bilefsky in NY Times, July 16, 2006; see Nielsen in Human Rights- The 
World Affairs Blog Network, March 28, 2009). 
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5.5.6 The Kurdish minority 
The Kurdish minority issue perhaps serves as the most prominent example to underline 
the poor human rights record of Turkey. Assimilationist pressures have greatly reduced 
open ambitions to achieve cultural recognition on the part of ethnic minorities, with the 
exception of the large Kurdish minority based in the South-East of the country (Flam 
2003, p. 6). Despite the fact that Turkish identity has become slightly more inclusive 
and that the current administrations seeks a rapprochement with the Kurdish minority, 
cultural recognition for the Kurdish minority has only been granted marginally even 
though it is estimated that the Kurdish minority makes up about 20 percent of the 
overall population. Granted, a local radio channel, Muş FM, has received authorization 
to broadcast in Kurdish and the state-run Turkish Radio and Television's (TRT) new 
Kurdish-language channel, TRT-6, went on the air on January 1, 2009 (European 
Commission, Turkey 2008 Progress Report, p.25). In general, however, minorities and 
particularly the Kurds experience pressures towards uniformity in a nation with a 
remarkably normative foundation and understanding of identity. In 2002, the military 
lifted the decades-long state of emergency over the South Eastern provinces during 
which countless atrocities were perpetrated under the umbrella of counter-terrorism 
(Steinvorth on Spiegel Online, May 27, 2009). Despite the fact that the situation has 
somewhat improved under the rule of the AKP, disproportionate use of force by the 
military and the police against the Kurdish minority is still subject to criticism on the 
part of the EU. The Democratic Society party (DTP), the formerly fourth-largest 
political party in Turkey, was often regarded as the mouthpiece of the outlawed 
Kurdistan Workers' party (PKK) by the Turkish government and military. It was shut 
down on December 11, 2009 by the Turkish Constitutional Court on charges of being a 
“focal point of activities against the indivisible unity of the state, the country and the 
nation”. DTP leaders Ahmet Turk and Aysel Tugluk were stripped of parliamentary 
immunity and banned from politics for five years along with 35 other party members 
(BBC News, December 11, 2009). Subsequently, the party has resurfaced in 2010 under 
the name Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), which continues to represent the Kurdish 
agenda in the Turkish parliament. The Turkish government has repeatedly emphasized 
the proximity of Kurdish political parties to the PKK which is internationally labeled as 
terrorist organization and has continuously engaged in bloody assaults on civilian 
targets throughout Turkey. It has to be taken into account that the Turkish Constitution 
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does not allow for the formation of political parties based on ethnicity, which gives the 
authorities a pretense to crack down on these organizations. Often, political officials in 
the Kurdish region are assumed to have close ties to the PKK. In July 2009, this already 
resulted in the arrest of more than 200 high-level officials of the DTP. Moreover, in July 
2009, a Turkish court jail-sentenced the mayor of Diyarbakir, Osman Baydemir, and the 
mayor of Batman, Nejdet Atalay, for labeling the PKK as guerillas when they criticized 
a military incursion, thus “spreading PKK propaganda” and “inciting separatism”. This 
episode sheds light on Turkey's strict laws on freedom of speech and the rigid handling 
of minority issues (Tran on guardian.co.uk, April 27, 2009). It also highlights Turkey’s 
insecurity when it comes to territorial integrity, which is one of the recurring themes in 
Turkish domestic and foreign policy. However, a distinction needs to be made between 
the struggle for independence and the quest for more cultural autonomy on the part of 
the Kurdish minority.  
5.5.7 The Armenian genocide 
The Armenian genocide issue remains unresolved, which influences the perception of 
Turkey’s poor human rights record by European constituencies. It is often argued that 
Turkey needs to come to terms with its past in order to overcome the anxiety in 
connection with the alleged genocide, which impedes progress in other domains of the 
human rights regime. Jacques Derrida has identified “awareness and regretful 
acceptance of the totalitarian, genocidal and colonialist crimes of the past” (speech at Le 
Monde diplomatique’s 50th anniversary celebrations in May 2004) as building block of 
his version of European identity. Viewed from this perspective, it does not seem 
unreasonable to assume that by accepting its past with its dark chapters, Turkey may 
actually move mentally closer to the European community and relate to the burdens, 
experiences and responsibilities that come with such a mindset. Equally, a motion by 
the major parties in the German parliament stresses that Turkey’s policy of denial is 
“contradictory to the idea of reconciliation that is the foundation of the community of 
values existing in the European Union” (ESI Report 2009, p. 19; German Bundestag, 
15th electoral term, Motion tabled by the parliamentary groups of the SPD, CDU/CSU, 
ALLIANCE, 90/THE GREENS and the FDP, “Remembering and commemorating the 
expulsions and massacres of the Armenians in 1915 – Germany must make a 
contribution to reconciliation between Turks and Armenians”, 15 June 2005). 
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The brief assessment of the situation in this chapter is predominantly based on a report 
of the European Stability Initiative (an Istanbul-based think-tank) from 2009 (“Noah’s 
Dove Returns. Armenia, Turkey and the Debate on Genocide”- ESI Report 2009), as in 
my opinion it provides a comprehensive, detailed and contemporary account of the 
political developments that have increased chances for a lasting thaw in relations 
between Armenia and Turkey. It is not within the scope of this paper to answer the 
question, whether or not the events of 1915 actually constitute genocide, even though 
there seems to be increasing consensus among international scholars that the events of 
1915 can be labeled as genocide (De Waal 2010, p.2). A minimal degree of context has 
to be provided in order to understand the root causes of the conflict. Subsequently, 
however, the focus will move to issues and concerns that will have to be accounted for 
if a permanent settlement between Armenia and Turkey is to be achieved.  
 
The conflict with Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora on the one hand and Turkey on 
the other dates back to World War I and the displacement of the Armenian community 
and massacre of Armenian subjects in the Ottoman Empire in 1915. The deportations of 
Armenians were orchestrated by the government of the Young Turks and fueled by its 
ideology of Turkish ethno-nationalism. The ESI Report cites Murat Bardakci, who 
published documents of Mehmed Talat (who in turn is widely believed to be the main 
architect of the Armenian deportations and massacres) entitled “The Remaining 
Documents of Talat Pasha”. These documents indicate that the number of Armenians 
living in the Ottoman Empire fell from 1,256,000 before 1915 to 284,157 just two years 
later. 972,000 Ottoman Armenians disappeared from official population records 
between 1915 and 1916. A report of the German Embassy in Istanbul from October 4, 
1916 even estimated that approximately 1.5 million Armenians were killed in 1915.  
 
According to Article II of the 1948 UN Convention on Genocide, “genocide means any 
of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:  
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
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(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”  
 
The ESI report cites Berktay, who argues that “an Armenian rebellion had resulted in 
the deaths of thousands of Turkish and Kurdish Muslims, but ‘the activities of the 
Armenian rebels had more the character of localized violence.’ According to him, the 
Ottoman response, however, was of a different order as the government created “special 
death squads” and volunteer forces of convicted criminals to conduct the massacres” 
(ESI Report 2009, p. 3).  
 
Turkey claims that the Armenians were supporting the invading Russian Army and that 
the deportations of the Armenian population were a natural answer to the disloyalty and 
the rebellion. According to the official Turkish position, Armenian casualties were 
mainly the product of disease and starvation during these deportations. Turkey denies 
any intention to exterminate the Armenian community and refers to the events as tragic 
byproducts of a war and inter-ethnic violence that resembled civil war and which cost 
countless lives among all ethnic communities in Anatolia. It denies that there was a 
genocidal policy and claims that the numbers of Armenian victims has been artificially 
inflated, while it emphasizes the high number of casualties among the Ottoman Muslims 
through deportations and killings during WWI (see ESI Report 2009, p.4; see also de 
Waal 2010, p.2). 
 
Turkey, as a successor state of the Ottoman Empire, is undoubtedly concerned that a 
normalization of relations with Armenia, an apology for the events during WWI or even 
an open admission to genocide would have severe legal repercussions, ranging from 
demands for reparations, full restitution by Armenians or even territorial claims by 
Armenia itself (see ESI p. 13, see also McCarthy 2005). However, the International 
Centre on Transitional Justice in New York stated on the question of legal responsibility 
for the genocide that “the Genocide Convention contains no provision mandating its 
retroactive application. To the contrary, the text of the Convention strongly suggests 
that it was intended to impose prospective obligations only on the States party to it. 
Therefore, no legal, financial or territorial claim arising out of the Events [of 1915] 
could successfully be made against any individual or state under the Convention” (see 
ICTJ Report 2002, p. 4.). Moreover, the ESI report also cites a leading international 
scholar of genocide and international law William Schabas who noted that “nobody but 
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Turkey can invoke international law before the International Court of Justice in order to 
claim the right to compensation for the genocide of the Armenians, something it is 
hardly likely to do.” (ESI Report 2009, p.22; Schabas 2000, p. 443). 
 
Turkey and Armenia currently do not maintain diplomatic relations with one another. 
Yet, it should be considered that Turkey initially recognized the newly independent 
Republic of Armenia after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 (De Waal 2010, p.2) and 
only cut diplomatic ties and closed the border between the two countries (which has 
remained closed ever since) in 1993 out of solidarity with Azerbaijan which at that time 
was at war with Armenia over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh (Shields et al. in The 
Wallstreet Journal, A6, October 12, 2009). De Waal (2010, p.2) emphasizes, however, 
that “the mayors of Kars and Gyumri have lobbied jointly for a re-opening of the 
border. Armenian tourists visit Turkey regularly, and thousands of Armenians live and 
work illegally there. There are weekly Armavia (Armenian Airlines) flights between 
Yerevan and Istanbul.” This indicates that some progress has already been made 
towards normalizing relations on a low-key level. Moreover, on September 19, 2010, 
the first mass was held at the Armenian Church of the Holy Cross on the Akdamar 
Island in the Lake Van, in the South-East of Turkey, which had been left to decay in 
recent decades, had only been restored in 2007 and is a museum now (Pelek, on 
Bianet.com, September 20, 2010). 
 
Azerbaijan, a close ally of Turkey with common linguistic and ethnic background has 
no interest in detaching the Turkish-Armenian settlement from a solution for the 
conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-
Karabakh (see ESI Report 2009, p. 13). This further exacerbates an already delicate and 
complex situation as it ties two issues together politically that are actually not 
intrinsically linked with each other from an analytical view point. Apart from having a 
considerable lobby within Turkey and enjoying popular support of the Turkish public, 
Azerbaijan can also exert some leverage over Turkey with regard to its natural resources 
and its privileged geographic position along several energy corridors which are of 
strategic interest to Turkey (see also chapter “Energy Relations”). Thus, Turkey will be 
keen on avoiding any disruptions in the traditionally close relationship with its “little 
brother”. At the same time, it should be kept in mind that in the aftermath of the conflict 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it was not only the Turkish-Armenian border that was 
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closed but also the border between the Azeri enclave of Nachichevan and Armenia. This 
further increased Armenian dependency on Russia, thus reviving the leverage of one of 
the major players within the region and amplifying Russia’s influence over Armenia’s 
foreign policy and its position in the frozen conflict with Turkey (see Evin et al. 2010, 
p.16).  
 
Often, this Armenian issue is also linked with the overarching motive of Turkish foreign 
policy and recurring theme in internal policies throughout most of the 20th century- 
Turkey’s territorial integrity. In some ways, it also touches upon one of the fundamental 
founding myths of the modern Turkish nation in which Turkey managed to secure its 
borders despite all efforts from foreign powers to divide up the country and the betrayal 
of other ethnicities within the Ottoman Empire. Admitting to genocide would shake up 
Turkey’s self-image of having solely been the victim of hostile foreign powers and 
internal betrayal (see ESI Report 2009, pp. 6-9; p.11).  
 
The “diplomatic warfare” surrounding the official recognition of the Armenian genocide 
by the parliaments of several countries or considerations thereof, serves as a constant 
source of insecurity within Turkish foreign policy and also has repercussions for 
Turkey’s relations with EU member states. Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, 
Cyprus, Italy, Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Greece and France have issued resolutions 
on the massacres of the Armenians in 1915, and most of them specifically referred to 
the events as genocide (see De Waal 2010 p.4). Especially relations with France were 
seriously strained after the explicit recognition of genocide by the French parliament. 
Since 2006, the denial of the Armenian genocide is a punishable offence in France 
(Röhrlich 2009, p. 27). In fact, Paris is one of the strongholds of the Armenian Diaspora 
and therefore the French government is subject to intense lobbying on the part of 
Armenians (ESI Report 2009, p.18), which may have adverse effects on Turkey’s EU 
ambitions if the conflict with Armenia cannot be resolved.  
 
The visit of Turkish President Abdullah Gül to Yerevan to watch a football World Cup 
qualifying game between Turkey and Armenia in 2008 was the start to a thaw in 
relations between the two countries. At the same time, this was the first visit ever by a 
Turkish president to Armenia (ESI Report 2009, p. 1). In 2009, the two countries were 
already on their way to overcome the tragic events of their common past and to move 
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towards a normalization of their relations when Turkey and Armenia signed a peace 
accord on October 10, 2009 which was to restore diplomatic ties and open their shared 
border (Euroactiv, October 12, 2009). However, the agreement has never been ratified 
by either parliament of the respective parties and in April 2010, Armenia suspended 
ratification of the accord. (Reuters, April 29, 2010).  
 
The road towards an agreement with Armenia not only shows Turkey's willingness to 
normalize relations with its neighbor, but also its ambition to overcome existing hurdles 
to EU accession and actively engage in resolving dwelling conflicts at its borders. A 
continued effort to bring about a thaw in relations between Armenia and Turkey would 
remove one of the major obstacles along the road towards EU accession, as the 
prolonged conflict between these two countries has repeatedly been used as a marker in 
the geopolitical argument against Turkey's accession. The argument emphasizes that the 
EU will be confronted with instable external frontiers and unresolved conflicts not only 
in the immediate neighborhood but also between Turkey and other third-party countries. 
 
5.6 “Turkey's Accession Puts the Success of Previous Enlargement Rounds 
at Risk” 
The EU’s ability to incorporate future member states has been repeatedly questioned 
and with regard to Turkey’s bid for membership, the EU has emphasized that “the 
Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of 
European integration, is also an important consideration in the general interest of both 
the Union and the candidate countries.” (The Council of the European Union, European 
Council Copenhagen, June 21-22, 1993). Viewed from an organizational perspective, 
the EU has indeed experienced rapid growth and has as a consequence undergone 
massive transformation processes with regard to its internal decision-making structure. 
The EU has also been subject to increased regional economic disparities. It is often 
argued that the previous enlargement rounds with mainly Central and Eastern European 
Countries have overstretched the resources of the EU and its ability to absorb new 




A consolidation of the EU is thus needed and is clearly articulated in the EU’s new 
accession strategy, which focuses on the “3 Cs” (see also German Federal Foreign 
Office, “conditions of the enlargement process”):  
• “Consolidation” of the EU's own commitments, 
• “Conditionality” (i.e. the requirement that accession candidates meet 
obligations), 
• “Communication” with citizens in order to win their support for enlargement 
A considerable share of the attraction which emanates from the EU stems from its 
ability to offer prospective candidates an air of stability and especially economic 
development. This “soft power” will be undermined if new members are not brought to 
EU standards in terms of GDP and standard of living (Jovanovic 2005, p. 10). A 
growing income disparity within the EU will also threaten the coherence of the Union. 
It is evident that the progress made by Romania and Bulgaria is at best rudimentary. 
Moreover, the financial crisis has once more made it clear that the economic 
development in Central and Eastern European countries still stands on shaky ground. 
Thus, the argument is often made that unless previous enlargement rounds have been 
succeeded by considerable economic growth and consolidation in the new member 
states, it should be refrained from further enlargement (see Balytska 2006, p.16). This 
should be seen in light of the fact that transfer payments to Turkey might reduce the 
amount of transfer that the new member states will receive in years to come.  
 
Turkey, perhaps more than any other country, has engaged in a comprehensive 
Europeanization project. A rejection of Turkey would thus imply that the convergence 
to a European value and belief system becomes less attractive to other states and could 
ultimately limit the EU's soft power in the future. On the other hand, opponents of 
Turkey's EU accession promote the argument that the accession process of several 
Eastern and South-Eastern European countries, such as Poland, Romania and Bulgaria 
has come too early and that by prematurely admitting them into the EU, the benefits of 
using the full leverage of the membership prospect could not be adequately harvested.  
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5.7 “Turkey's accession will impede any further in-depth integration within 
the EU”  
Turkey's accession bid forces political elites to consider several questions regarding the 
future set-up of the European Union, ranging from the speed and (functional as well as 
geographical) scope of integration to preferred methods of coordination among member 
states. The cleavage between the “intergovernmentalist” vs. the “federalist” view of the 
EU has traditionally divided member states of the EU. In various countries concerns 
remain that an enlargement of the EU to include Turkey may torpedo its further in-depth 
political integration (see Hughes 2004, p.2). It is argued that geographical expansion of 
the Union will be at the expense of further in-depth functional and structural integration 
(see Grabbe & Hughes 1998, p.5). This view is particularly widespread in countries that 
have traditionally favored a federalist EU and closer integration in a wider range of 
policy areas, such as Germany, France and to some extent Italy, which negatively 
impacts on their sentiment towards Turkey's EU accession. In countries, such as the UK 
or Nordic countries, which are generally in favor of a more intergovernmentalist EU, 
further enlargement is perceived more positively (Barysch, August 24, 2007, p. 3).  It 
should be noted that the line between these two camps is undoubtedly fluid and varies 
according to each individual policy field. Also, this perspective does not yet take into 
account which of the camps Turkey would ultimately support once admitted into the 
European Union. It is not per se certain that Turkey's accession will have a crippling 
effect on further functional integration. Undoubtedly, the point can be made that 
functional integration can only be prolonged if the already complicated framework of 
EU institutions and multi-level governance remains manageable. However, this could 
also give an incentive to additional adaptations regarding the EU's decision-making 
structure – a process that has already started with the Lisbon Treaty. Often, concerns 
have been voiced that Turkey as a member state will not play a constructive role and 
will act solely on the basis of self-interest. While this position would not be far from the 
current European reality, this is an assumption that until now cannot be substantiated by 
facts but is rather grounded on uncertainty and past experiences in the aftermath of 
former enlargement rounds which are projected on Turkey. It seems certain that Turkey 
will simply join existing coalitions within the EU, which could strengthen certain 
coalitions at the expense of others (Moravcsik & Vachudova 2003, p.19). In case 
Turkey favors functional integration it could even add the leverage of another large 
country to the “federalist coalition”. Interestingly, the coalition within the EU which 
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advocates cohesive integration far beyond the common market is promoting deeper 
functional integration in several policy domains to which Turkey could make important 
contributions upon accession. Turkey would enhance the Union's geo-strategic position, 
add military strength, provide sources of leverage and offer a network of 
complementary resources within the realm of foreign policy.  
 
An accession of Turkey would also result in a relative decline in power of the current 
large member states according to Alessandri (2010, p.17). Yet, as the results of a study 
by Baldwin & Widgrén (2005) will show, the picture is slightly more differentiated than 
it may at first appear. Turkish accession would also mean a strengthening of the 
periphery of the EU against the predominance of the center, not only geographically, 
but also when economic power is considered. The assumption that the EU institutions 
would be gridlocked after the accession of Turkey and current structures would not 
support an EU 28 or EU 29 does not necessarily hold if one considers the adaptability of 
institutional processes. A study by Helen Wallace that looked in detail into the effects of 
the enlargement round in 2004 on the decision-making processes in various EU 
institutions came to the overarching conclusion that the “EU’s institutional processes 
and practice have stood up rather robustly to the impact of enlargement to EU25 in May 
2004“ (Wallace 2007, p. 22). Baldwin & Widgrén (2005) assessed the impact of an EU 
enlargement including Turkey and Croatia on the EU’s capacity to act and its effect on 
the voting power of current member states. They found that Turkey’s accession has 
“only a negligible effect on the EU’s power to act”, whereas it will have a considerable 
impact on the distribution of power (p.137). At the time the authors conducted their 
study it was still unclear whether the new rules for qualified majority voting (termed 
QMV herafter) would apply. Despite the fact that the ratification of the Constitutional 
Treaty has failed, these reforms became incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty and will 
replace the QMV rules set out in the Treaty of Nice. The standard system of voting is 
based on the principle of the double majority. Decisions in the Council of Ministers will 
need the support of 55% of Member States (currently 15 out of 27 EU countries) 
representing a minimum of 65% of the EU's population. Therefore, only results of this 
study which were made under the assumption that the voting regime of the 
Constitutional Treaty will apply will be included, as Turkey will certainly not join under 
the Nice rules. It is important to mention that the changed rules on QMV that will be 
applied as a consequence of the Lisbon Treaty will have considerably more impact on 
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the EU’s capacity to act and the distribution of power within the EU than any effects on 
the EU’s decision-making efficiency or any shift in power as a consequence of Turkey’s 
accession. The probability that a new initiative will be passed in the European Council 
will only decrease slightly with an accession of Turkey and Croatia.  
 
The shift from Nice QMV rules to QMV rules laid out in the Lisbon Treaty largely 
favors the largest member states and the smallest member states, especially at the 
expense of medium-sized member states such as the Netherlands or Austria. Turkey 
would be the second most powerful member state in the EU (after Germany) and 
dispose of considerably more voting power than France, Italy or the UK. In general, 
large countries can be said to have a positive effect on the efficiency measure. However, 
the accession of Turkey will impact on the distribution of power in the EU. Here the 
two measurements of voting-power employed by Baldwin & Widgrén (2005) yield 
contradicting results and do not allow a clear statement of who will relatively benefit 
compared to other member states. What seems certain, however, is that Turkey’s 
accession will have a positive impact on the relative power of the larger member states, 
perhaps with the exception of Germany. From a distributional power perspective with 
an emphasis on national interest, one would thus expect, all other things being equal, 
that support for Turkish membership would predominantly come from Italy, Spain, 
Poland, UK and France and resistance especially from the smaller and medium-sized 
member states. 
 
Fig. 18 Passage probabilities in the EU Council 1957-2004 and after the entry of Bulgaria, 
Romania, Croatia and Turkey 
 
notes: The figure shows the passage probability which measures the likelihood of that randomly selected 
issue would pass in the Council of Ministers. source: Baldwin & Widgrén 2005 
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5.7.1 Alternatives to Full Membership 
It is certainly true that Turkey’s membership bid has revived discussions about the 
future set-up of the European Union. Policy-makers that are wary or outright opposed to 
Turkey’s full membership still acknowledge the need to come up with an alternative to 
full membership and struggle with a lack of options under the existing, rather static 
framework. The word “privileged partnership” that is roaming the corridors of power in 
many European capitals is, despite not being well received by Turkish political circles, 
perhaps more of an indication of the uncertainty regarding the future of the EU itself 
than an expression tailored to Turkey’s accession process. It is evident that the 
European Union will be subject to large external and internal pressures as well as 
disparities, all of which will strain the boundaries of the existing institutional 
framework. More internal flexibility may derive from a new flexible approach towards 
membership that could include modular integration (“Europe à la carte”) or the concept 
of concentric circles (“Europe of several speeds”) with several opt-in clauses for 
outsiders or safeguard clauses, long transition periods for new member states and opt-
out clauses for insiders. However, this would limit the EU’s ability to influence 
candidate states in the run-up to their actual accession and would undermine the value 
of membership by reducing its exclusiveness and thus its appeal. Most importantly, 
though, it could torpedo European cohesion, would render coordination virtually 
impossible and add enormous complexity – thereby evoking management issues (see 
Lippert 2008). Also, it would diminish the effectiveness of the “full membership card”. 
On the other hand, the question should be raised if and to what extent the concept of 
borders has become obsolete to define a Union that sets out to represent a new form of 
governance mechanism beyond the nation state. More importantly, as “full 
membership” for accession candidates is resented by an increasing number of European 
citizens, it might prove to be a barrier that cannot be easily overcome and could 
constitute a crossroads at which expectations are disappointed and resentment is created. 
The concept of full membership for applicant states thus has the potential to (if it has 
not already) become an anathema for political elites and the mass public in member 
states and applicant states alike. Repeatedly, the argument has been voiced that this 
concept induces a “black-white” division and does not sufficiently take gradual progress 
and varying levels of development and convergence in different areas towards European 
ideals and institutions into account. By removing the obstacle of full membership the 
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rigidity of the existing enlargement framework could be eased and diminish the risk of 
derailing the accession process for candidate states and avoid the ensuing antagonism of 
the rejected state or any other adverse effects to the EU. It would also take the 
complexity of accession sufficiently into account and provide flexibility to adapt 
procedures to a dynamic environment. So far, the question whether a country has 
proved worthy to join the European Union has been relegated to a simple “yes or no 
question”. In the future, this could be substituted by a more differentiated approach that 
includes peculiarities and varying degrees of progress in different policy areas. The 
question remains, however, whether such an approach does not only serve as an excuse 
to free Europe from the obligation to make a final, definite and overall decision on 
accession and ultimately on the scope and functional depth of integration. Additionally, 
it needs to be considered that the negotiation framework with Turkey has been based on 
the incentive of full membership for such a long time that a departure from this concept 
at this point of the accession process would certainly lead to considerable 
disappointment within Turkey and may even call the EU’s reliability in international 
affairs into question. 
 
5.7.2 European Neighbourhood Policy  
In this context, it seems worth analyzing the European Neighbourhood Policy (named 
ENP hereafter). Its aim is specifically to “avoid dividing lines between the enlarged EU 
and its neighbors and to offer them the chance to participate in various EU activities, 
through greater political, security, economic and cultural co-operation” (European 
Commission, Strategy Paper on the European Neighbourhood Policy, COM(2004) 373). 
In the Lisbon Treaty, it is emphasized that the “development of a special relationship 
with neighboring countries aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good 
neighborliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterized by close and 
peaceful relations based on cooperation” (Article 8 TEU) is one the goals of the EU. In 
its essence the ENP ultimately seeks to blur the force of clear cut external borders and 
adheres to the principles of open coordination. It may indeed be a forerunner and first 
indicator of the effectiveness of the concept of concentric circles and herald another era 
in the project EU. The “welfare divide” between the enlarged EU and its new 
neighbours is clearly evident and is also accompanied by a governance gap, with 
authoritarian regimes or democracies with weak institutions within the EU’s proximity 
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(Dannreuther 2009, p.194). In explaining the newly found strategic interest in 
promoting transformational processes in the countries in the vicinity of the EU, the EU 
commission stated that “existing differences in living standards across the Union’s 
borders with its neighbors may be accentuated as a result of faster growth in the new 
Member States than in their external neighbors; common challenges in fields such as the 
environment, public health, and the prevention of and fight against organized crime will 
have to be addressed; efficient and secure border management will be essential both to 
protect our shared borders and to facilitate legitimate trade and passage” (European 
Commission, “Paving the way for a new neighbourhood instrument”, COM (2003) 393 
final). This also highlights the need to control migration flows either directly coming 
from neighboring countries, or consisting of migrants who use these countries as staging 
area for getting into the EU. The EU is seeking to ensure stability within its wider 
perimeter and establish a “ring of friends” beyond its external border. Its strategic aim is 
to foster the development of these countries in order to prevent these states from 
becoming the breeding ground of organized crime and terrorist activities and a source of 
instability. According to the “European Security Strategy”, “even in an era of 
globalization, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries 
on our borders are well-governed” (The Council of the European Union 2003, p.6) 
 
The EU has often been praised for its “soft power” in bringing about policy changes and 
transformational processes in other countries. What is often forgotten, however, is that 
the transformative capacities of the EU have been predominantly contingent on 
extending the offer of EU membership to countries on the periphery of the EU in order 
to promote domestic economic and political reforms in these countries. In the absence 
of this membership perspective, the EU has mostly been lacking the ability to draw 
countries in its proximity closer to European values (Dannreuther 2009, p.188). As a 
consequence of increasing enlargement fatigue among European constituencies and the 
repeatedly questioned absorptive capacity of the EU, Europe is seeking ways to export 
the “European model” to non-members without offering full EU membership. The ENP 
is employing similar procedural measures and operational tools as the ones devised in 
the pre-accession process of applicant states, such as action plans, annual reviews and 
other benchmarks. Yet, the ENP lacks the conditionality of gaining EU membership 
upon the successful implementation of political and economic reforms and the adoption 
of the acquis communautaire, which clearly diminishes the leverage of the EU 
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compared to the pre-accession strategies that the EU is deploying towards candidate 
states (see Tulmets 2010, p.318). One of the aims of the ENP is to offer the participating 
countries “a stake in the internal market” and the scope of cooperation could be 
summarized as “all but institutions”. However, it has been repeatedly criticized that the 
incentives of the ENP as indicated in the action plans have been largely kept ambiguous 
and that the EU has not been “serious about setting clear benchmarks (and standing by 
them consistently) and offering concrete incentives (even when they perceive these to 
be costly to themselves) [which will have to change] if the ENP is to meet its core 
objectives” (Smith 2005, p. 772). 
 
The ENP provides an umbrella under which several neighborhood initiatives (TACIS 
and MEDA) and their respective financial instruments (INTERREG, PHARE, CARDS) 
are subsumed. Since the ENP builds upon existing agreements between the EU and the 
partner in question (Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, or Association 
Agreements in the framework of the EuroMediterranean Partnership), the ENP is not 
yet ‘activated’ for Algeria, Belarus, Libya or Syria since no such Agreements are in 
force up to date. The European Neighbourhood Policy applies to the EU's immediate 
neighbours by land or sea but has recently also been extended to include countries 
within the wider perimeter of Europe. – Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, 
Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. The central element of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy is the bilateral ENP Action Plan agreed between the EU and 
each partner. Previously existing PCAs and Euro-Med agreements form the foundation 
of this “new quality of bilateral relations” (Smith 2005, p.763). This differentiated 
approach “reflects a recognition of the great diversity of countries included in the ENP 
and that a ‘one size fits all’ policy is counterproductive and frustrates the ambitions of 
those genuinely seeking to engage substantively with the EU” (Dannreuther 2009, 
p.191). These bilateral agreements form the foundation of a more thorough cooperation. 
For the next budgetary period (2007-2013), approximately €12 billion in EU funding is 
available.  
 
One of the main criticisms of the ENP is that it is taking a bilateral approach towards 
transformation rather than taking a more holistic perspective that focuses on the 
facilitation of regional cooperation and cross-border activities (Smith 2005, p. 764). 
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However, in recent years the EU has responded to this challenge and supplemented its 
efforts with a growing focus on fostering cross-border and regional initiatives. One of 
the operational programs devised under the ENP is “The Black Sea Basin Joint 
Operational Programme” (hereafter Black Sea JOP). Ten countries are participating in 
the Black Sea JOP, i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Russian 
Federation, Turkey, Ukraine, Romania, and Greece. The program has established a set 
of priorities such as „supporting cross border partnerships for economic and social 
development based on common resources“, „“sharing resources and competencies for 
environmental protection and conservation and „supporting cultural and educational 
networks for the establishment of a common cultural environment“ (Black Sea Cross 
Boarder Cooperation- “Priorities & Measures”). However, the impact of this (around 
€18 million between 2007 and 2013) and similar programs is negligible compared to 
intra-EU transfer payments both financially and structurally.  
 
Upon Turkey’s accession the newly enlarged EU would border Iran and Iraq, which has 
often been named one of the main strategic, geopolitical concerns in European capitals 
(see Aliboni 2005). At this point it would have to be assessed whether to include these 
countries into the wider ENP framework. However, since there are no automatisms 
involved in the ENP, the EU would be at liberty to decide on how to proceed. If 
Turkey’s bid for EU membership was to be rejected, Turkey would “recede to 
neighborhood status”. In this case, Turkey could, similar to Russia, reject the status as a 
partner within the framework of the ENP and insist on a privileged position or reduce its 
engagement with Europe altogether.  
 
One of the reasons why the nearer and wider neighborhood is of particular strategic 
interest to the EU is the need to access the oil and gas resources of Russia, the Caspian 
region, the Middle East and North Africa and to stabilize the countries along the main 
import routes. Undoubtedly, the EU could be regarded as a hegemonial power in its 
relations with most of its neighbors was it not for its energy needs that make it 
dependent on its periphery and thus susceptible to external pressure (see Dannreuther 
2009, p.196-197).  The EU Commission projects that by 2030, total energy 
consumption will be 15% higher than it was in 2000. “What is at stake”- the 
background document on the “Green Paper - A European Strategy for Sustainable, 
Competitive and Secure Energy” (European Commission Report 2006) specifically 
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highlights that the growth rates of energy consumption become smaller over time with 
consumption virtually stabilizing post-2020. This reflects stagnating populations in EU 
member states and consequently lower economic growth. The report also states that the 
increase of energy consumption by 2030 is much lower than the growth of GDP (15% 
versus 79%). According to estimates by the International Energy Agency, the EU’s oil 
import dependence is projected to grow from currently 52% to 85% in 2030, and for gas 
from 36% to about 63% as a consequence of increased European demand and a decline 
in European domestic oil and gas production in the North Sea. Projections of the EU 
Commission draw an even bleaker picture: import dependency for oil could reach 94% 
in 2030 and gas import dependency is expected to rise substantially from somewhat 
over 50% at present to 84% in 2030 (it should be noted here, however, that also 
Norwegian oil and gas deliveries qualify as imports, although these imports seem to be 
strategically well secured). While this predicament becomes evident in Europe’s 
relations with Russia, and the EU’s careful approach towards its Eastern neighbours that 
lie within the Russian sphere of influence, this also has repercussions for the 
membership perspective of Turkey.  
 
5.8 Energy Relations 
Turkey wants to establish itself as main transit country and hub for energy resources 
from the Caucasian and Central Asian area to Europe that in turn is seeking alternative 
transit routes for Russian gas other than the Ukraine and Belarus and at the same time a 
diversification of its energy supplies away from Russia. The strategic dimension of 
energy relations in the context of EU relations with Turkey becomes evident when it is 
considered that Turkey is adjacent to countries or regions that possess 71.8% of the 
world’s proven natural gas reserves and 72.7% of the world’s proven oil reserves (BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2003; Roberts 2004, p.98). “In geographical 
terms, Turkey is clearly increasingly well placed to serve as a central transit supplier for 
the anticipated major increases in European demand”, according to Roberts (Roberts 
2004, p.112), who highlights (see tables & below) the supplies of natural gas, which 
could reach the EU via Turkey.  
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Fig. 19 Supply potential for natural gas to the EU  
 
 (source: Roberts 2004, p.112) 
The Nabucco project under the leadership of Austrian-based OMV also comprises 
Turkish companies and increasingly becomes a bargaining chip for Turkey in its EU 
accession talks. (see Ozcan, 2009; Barysch, December 12, 2007). Nabucco and the 
Turkey-Greece(-Italy) Inter-connector would allow circumventing Russian territory and 
would offer the EU advantages compared to the current situation in which it completely 
lacks bargaining options and is solely dependent on Russian natural resources and very 
few supply lines (see Roberts 2004, p.112). At the same time, it has to be kept in mind 
that Turkey itself is also overly reliant on Russian natural gas supplies and that Russia 
has not always turned out to be a reliable energy partner for Turkey either. The country 
thus also seeks to diversify its own energy supply. Russia in turn is regarding Turkey as 
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a viable alternative transit country to Europe and also as important customer with 
considerable growth in its demand, but is also wary of Turkey’s privileged position to 
act as an intermediary between other potential suppliers and European markets. In order 
to position itself as energy hub and secure its own supply Turkey has thus a strong 
interest in maintaining good relations with the EU on this issue. However, it does not 
want to entirely detach cooperation in the energy sector from the general accession talks 
and a rejection of Turkey’s EU ambitions could have negative consequences for the EU 
energy diversification strategy (see Barysch December 12, 2007).  
 
5.9 “The EU cannot afford the accession of Turkey”                                                               
In connection with Turkey's bid for EU accession, the argument is often made that the 
European Union in its current structure will not be able to afford the accession of 
Turkey with its large population but low GDP. Before accession costs can be accurately 
assessed it has to be mentioned “that future developments and reforms within the EU 
framework, which will have a considerable impact on any financial transfers to Turkey 
are difficult to predict” (Dervis et al. 2004, p.77).  
 
So far, the largest country in the EU, Germany, is also the one with the largest national 
economy. Thus, there exist hardly any concerns regarding the legitimacy of its political 
weight within the Union. However, when other large states within the Union are 
examined, this argument has been only partly valid for quite some time now, as with the 
accession of Spain and more recently of Poland, populous countries with a lower GDP 
than the EU average (particularly at the time of accession) have enjoyed a degree of 
voting power that did not at all correlate with their national economies' weight within 
the Union. In 2008, Turkey's population equated to roughly 70 million citizens. If 
current population trends continue Turkey will surpass Germany as largest EU member 
state population-wise in 2025, with 87 million people, accounting for 15.5% of the 
EU28 population (source: Eurostat). This is less than Germany’s 18.1% share of the 
EU25 population prior to the accession of Romania and Bulgaria. Will the economic 
impact of Turkey's membership thus be considerable? In order to answer this question it 
has to be considered that Turkey’s economy is just 1.9% of EU25 GDP, with a GDP per 
capita (at purchasing power parity) that is only at 27% of the EU average. Assuming 
average annual growth of 5%, it would be 2.9% of GDP in 2015 (Hughes 2004, p.3; 8). 
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The data used by Hughes is used also to illustrate the development until 2008 when the 
effects of the financial and economic crisis already had an effect on national GDPs, and 
the GDP growth rates of Turkey and the EU economies. The unemployment rate of the 
EU27, for example, which has increased tremendously throughout the crisis reached 
8.9% in June 2009. Spain was particularly hit hard, with unemployment rate reaching 
18.1% in June 2009 and also other EU countries such as Slovakia (11.2%), Ireland 
(12.2%), and the Baltic states (Estonia 13.3%, Lithuania 13.8%, Latvia 17.2%)  have 
experienced particularly high levels of unemployment (source: Eurostat). In 
comparison, Turkey's unemployment rate has risen to 13.2%, but it has started from a 
higher initial level of unemployment prior to the crisis. In 2008, Turkey's GDP 
amounted to €501 billion, in contrast to €12.5 trillion of the EU27 (source: Eurostat). 
The Turkish GDP per capita was €7,050. If purchasing power standards are applied to 
ensure adequate comparability of the data this would equal 45.7% of the EU27 average. 
It should be noted that the Turkish economy grew at the remarkable rate of 11.7% in the 
first quarter of 2010 (GDP at constant prices, source: Turkstat) and has thus by far 
outperformed the European economies which are slow to recover from the recession 
year 2009 during which the Turkish economy contracted by 4.5%. In several European 
economies, such as Germany (-4.9%), Italy  
(-5.0%), Latvia (-18.0%), Slovenia (-7.8%), Finland (-8.0%), Sweden (-5.1%) and 
others, the GDP decline in 2009 was even more considerable (source: Eurostat). 
Admittedly, part of Turkey’s spectacular growth rate in Q1 2010 rate can also be 
attributed to Q1 2009 which serves as the point of reference and in which the Turkish 
GDP shrunk by 14.5% (source: Turkstat). However, also projections of Eurostat for the 
whole year 2010 show, that with 4.7% the Turkish economy is predicted to grow at a 
much faster pace than all the European economies (forecast for EU27: 1%), some of 
which will still even exhibit a negative GDP growth. This data clearly demonstrates the 
dynamic economic recovery that Turkey has made in the aftermath of the economic 
crisis and actually indicates that the Turkish economy has gained in strength relative to 
Europe as a consequence of the crisis. It also tends to uphold previous assumptions of 
higher long-term growth rates of Turkey relative to European economies, although it 
may be too early to assess the long-term impact of the recession on growth rates.  
 
Turkey would certainly become a major net recipient under existing EU transfer 
payment schemes due to its ability to draw from structural cohesion funds and funds 
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allocated to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). At the same time its low GDP 
would entail low payments into the EU budget, as payments of individual member 
states is capped at 4 % of GDP. It has to be considered that the actual effects of 
accession on trade levels are difficult to predict because comparable data from the CEE 
region does not seem applicable. This can be attributed to the fact that the Customs 
Union between the EU and Turkey also includes the harmonization of technical 
legislation, anti-trust regulations and the protection of intellectual property (Lejour et 
al., 2004, p. 23) and thus might already have anticipated some of the positive GDP 
effects that accession of the CEE countries has entailed. Moreover, consequences of a 
rejection of Turkey's bid on trade flows cannot be accurately estimated due to a lack of 
precedent (Lejour et al., 2004, p. 29). Finally, most models that have dealt with 
quantifying financial transfers to Turkey struggle with the fact that institutional 
developments and reforms of existing policies, such as the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) and the Structural and Cohesion Policy and their respective impact on net 
transfers are difficult to predict. 
 
 It should be taken into account that the effects of the current economic crisis may not 
have been adequately accounted for in most studies measuring the financial impact of 
Turkish accession on the EU budget. The economic potency of the EU has suffered 
considerably and the ultimate effects on national GDPs and Europe’s ability to bear 
accession costs have yet to be determined. Turkey has undoubtedly been severely 
affected by the economic slump, as have been several EU member states, but as we 
have seen earlier seems to be recovering more quickly. The equation of accession costs 
will ultimately depend on the economic recovery in the EU and in Turkey and future 
economic growth rates. What is certain is that the economic crisis has led to even more 
wariness among European populations towards further enlargement and favorable 
public opinion seems to be contingent on a positive overall economic climate and a 
quick recovery of Europe’s national economies.  
 
5.9.1 Structural Policy 
Turkey will be a major recipient under the structural and cohesion policy. These funds 
are reserved for regions with a GDP per capita at purchasing power parity below 75% of 
the EU average. Under the current policy rules, the upper limit of transfers to a country 
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is 4 percent of GDP. Dervis et al. (2004) estimated under their GDP assumptions of 
around €200 billion in recent years that Turkish accession would have entailed financial 
transfers in the framework of the structural and cohesion policy of around €8 billion 
annually, if Turkey had already a member of the EU in 2004.  However, it needs to be 
taken into account that Turkey’s GDP by now is considerably higher. This does not 
necessarily have a negative impact on their future projections, as they build on Turkish 
GDP numbers as a percentage of EU GDP figures. Their assessment of membership 
costs in a future scenario is also based on the assumption that the cap on structural 
transfers on 4 percent of GDP will prevail, that the Turkish economy will grow at a 
faster pace than EU economies over the next decade and that Turkish GDP will reach 
about 4% of EU-28 GDP (at present it amounts to only around 2%) by 2015. This 
implies that the financial transfers to Turkey within the structural and cohesion policy 
would equal 0.16% of EU-28 GDP. Additionally, Turkey’s contribution to the EU 
budget would be around 1 percent of its own GDP or 0.04% of EU GDP if above-
mentioned assumptions are applied. When looking at the Eurostat figures for 2009, 
Turkey with its GDP of €440 billion would constitute 3.7% of the EU-28 GDP of 
€11,788 trillion (Turkish GDP added to EU-27 GDP of €11,785 trillion at market 
prices, source: Eurostat). Thus, according to this slightly modified model, payments 
could amount to 0,148% of EU GDP and Turkey’s contribution would equal 0.037% of 
EU GDP, which would amount to net transfers of 0.11% of EU-28 GDP or €12.9 
billion. This is also in line with other projections regarding annual financial transfers to 
Turkey in case of EU membership. 
 
According to Grethe (2004, p.18), financial transfers to Turkey would amount to €15.3 
billion in 2014 with net transfers of €12.6 billion, provided that past GDP trends 
continue. It However, transfer payments to CEE countries have until now not reached 
the 4 percent barrier and are well below this threshold. This has to be seen in the context 
of an overall EU-budget of around €120 billion. Thus, net transfer payments to Turkey 
under the cohesion policy could take up roughly 10 percent of the total budget, which 
constitutes a significant share (see Hughes 2004, p. 21). Especially in times of economic 
recession this will lead to considerable opposition, particularly on the part of the net-
contributors to the EU budget. In this context, it should be taken into consideration that 
“the experience with the current enlargement process suggests that over time the 
discussion will shift from how much it costs to who will bear the burden” (Dervis et al. 
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2004, p.77), which would place distributional conflicts at the heart of the discussion 
about the financial implications of Turkey’s accession. 
 
It should be noted that Turkey already is a recipient of EU funds under the Instrument 
for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA). These transfer payments are certainly not of the 
same magnitude as the funds that Turkey would receive upon accession and Turkey also 
is not entitled to the continuous allocation of these funds, but they are listed here to get 
a perspective of the magnitude of financial transfers and the constraints that an 
accession of Turkey would put on the EU budget. 
 
Fig. 20 Financial resources allocated to Turkey under IPA per component for the period 2007-2012 (in 
million Euro) 
Component 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 256,7 256,1 233,2 211,3 230,6 250,9 
Cross-border Co-operation 2,0 2,8 9,3 9,5 9,7 9,9 
Regional Development 167,5 173,8 182,7 238,1 291,4 350,8 
Human Resources Development 50,2 52,9 55,6 63,4 77,6 89,9 
Rural Development 20,7 53,0 85,5 131,3 172,5 197,8 
TOTAL 497,2 538,7 566,4 653,7 781,9 899,5 
 
 (Source: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/financial-assistance/index_en.htm) 
 
5.9.2 Common Agricultural Policy of the EU 
Budgetary concerns exist regarding the transfer payments to Turkey under the Common 
Agricultural Policy of the EU in the case of accession. Direct payments to producers 
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and rural development measures (e.g. payments under environmental programs and 
investment subsidies) would constitute the main cost drivers (Grethe, 2004, p. 6). When 
the costs for implementing the CAP in Turkey are assessed it has to be kept in mind that 
the CAP at the point of accession will most likely not be equivalent to current CAP 
practices, as it certainly will be modified and somewhat adapted in anticipation of 
Turkey's accession. Also, the Turkish agricultural sector will not resemble the current 
state, as technological advancements, urbanization, and economic development are 
progressing. Assuming a €55 billion budget for the CAP in 2014, Turkey would receive 
€ 3.6 billion or 5.6 percent of the CAP budget in 2014 and 8.3 percent in 2024. This 
would translate into a net transfer under the CAP to Turkey of about €1.6 billion in 
2014 in total and could rise to €2.6 billion in 2024 due to full phasing in of direct 
payments and rural development policies. France in comparison, received €1.5 billion 
and Spain €2.9 billion in net transfers under CAP in 2002. Romania and Bulgaria 
currently receive €1.7 billion annually. Thus, these numbers concerning Turkey should 
not be overstated in the light of other net transfers that take place within the CAP 
(Grethe, 2004, p. 16, 17). 
 
Oskam et al. (2005, p. 147) projected the total financial impact of Turkey’s EU 
accession under existing policies. Assuming an accession of Turkey in 2015 (which 
does not seem to be a viable assumption any longer) they concluded that “the net 
transfers to Turkey would range between €11-18 billion (2004 values), consisting of 
market and price support, and direct income payments to Turkish farmers, which would 
amount to €3.6 billion respectively (at the 2004 value of the euro), rural development 
expenditure of  €1.6 billion and funds of the structural and cohesion policy between 
€9.5 and €16.6 billion (2004 values), while they project a budget contribution by 
Turkey of €5.4 billion”. 
 
5.9.3 Negative externalities in the event of a rejection of Turkey's bid 
Negative externalities of a rejection of Turkey's bid for EU membership should also be 
taken into account when benefits and disadvantages of Turkey's prospective 
membership are assessed. It seems impossible to adequately quantify the economic 
consequences in case Turkey’s EU ambitions were to be disappointed and any 
developments will to a large extent depend on the circumstances under which this 
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would happen. Breuss (2002) tried to quantify the effects of non-enlargement for CEE 
countries prior to their accession. He identified the following components that 
contribute to the economic effects of accession (see also Breuss 2001): 
- Trade effects: elimination of tariffs and handling costs 
- “Common Market” effects: increase in efficiency and competitive price 
pressures 
- FDI and work-related migratory flows 
- Accession costs and transfer payments  
He projected that the negative economic effects (or more precisely neglected economic 
potential) of non-accession would in the long-run accumulate to 0.2-0.7 % of real GDP 
for the EU-15 and up to 10% for the CEE countries. These figures would constitute 
opportunity costs (“lost benefits”) in case of non-accession. However, through the 
customs union, Turkey is economically already more closely affiliated with the EU than 
the CEE countries prior to accession and some of the effects that he projected for the 
CEE countries would not occur in the case of Turkey. He also pointed out that the exact 
magnitude would to a large extent depend on the actual causes for non-accession. Also, 
these figures only concern immediate economic effects and do not take into account 
adverse political developments or the costs incurred as a result of instability of a large 
neighboring country such as Turkey. 
 
Projections with regard to the question how such a rejection will affect Turkish politics, 
economy and its society are difficult to make, given the fluidity of public opinion, 
expectations and international relations. However, a rejection of Turkey's application 
will certainly alienate the country from Europe (see Hannay 2009), and may lead to a 
backlash that would undermine recent reforms. A rejection could result in a change in 
leadership within Turkey and could give rise to more nationalist and extremist elements 
of Turkish society, which has the potential to disrupt economic and political stability in 
the country (see Hughes 2004, p. 12). Foremost, it could lead to an inward-looking 
orientation of Turkish politics or a clear shift in priorities away from Europe. Not only 
the rise of Islamic oriented parties with more extremist positions should be of concern 
but also a more nationalistic outlook on the part of the “westernized elites” is to be 
expected. It is unlikely that a rejection of Turkey’s bid will destabilize the political 
system in general, which could induce substantial migratory flows (see Erzan et al. 
2005, 2006), lead to violent outbursts among Turkish minority groups in Europe and 
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cause instability along the EU’s external border. However, a situation like that is not 
inconceivable. Thus, the potential downside of non-accession has to be carefully 
reviewed. The Customs Union between Turkey and the EU and the importance of trade 
ties to the EU would most likely prevent a major disruption of economic relations but 
would perhaps cause Turkey to radically shift its priorities to diversifying its economic 
ties, which will hurt Europe's economic interests in the long run. A failure to detach the 
energy component from accession talks could result in harmful consequences for 
Europe’s energy diversification ambitions. Even if Turkey refrained from deliberately 
complicating energy relations with Europe, its ability to act on behalf of Europe or as 
“Europe’s quasi- proxy” in energy negotiations in the Middle East or Central Asia may 
be seriously undermined. According to Alessandri, these considerations have already 
led “some European leaders to conclude that the ‘costs’ of saying ‘no’ to Turkey are 
ultimately much higher than so-called absorption costs” among them the Italian 
president Giorgio Napolitano (Alessandri 2010, p.17, see Napolitano 2009). 
 
6. Limitations 
This research endeavor has several short-comings and limitations, some of which I want 
to briefly highlight at this point. The precise level of knowledge of the Austrian public 
regarding the effects of Turkey’s EU accession for the EU and Austria has to my 
knowledge not yet been sufficiently explored and should thus be subject to extensive 
quantitative research. While originally included in the research design for this paper the 
mere magnitude of this project would exceed the scope of this thesis and the resources 
of the author and should perhaps be tackled in the context of a comprehensive research 
project or even be incorporated in the Eurobarometer surveys in order to ensure a 
sufficient sample size and representativeness. This seems vital in order to explore 
whether the Austrian public is informed on this issue and will indicate in which areas 
(constructive) political actors can provide the public with more in-depth information to 
correct existing misperceptions.  
 
One major weakness of this paper is that it does not adequately address distributional 
issues within the EU, but also within the national political arenas. It is important to 
understand that distributional conflicts within the EU are often at the center of political 
contestation at the European level, that not all countries will be equally affected by 
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Turkish membership and that also within a member state, not all segments of society 
and all actors will equally benefit or experience the negative side effects of Turkey’s 
accession. In this paper, public opinion within Austria is viewed from a rather holistic 
perspective and a differentiation between different segments of society may shed some 
light on how European issues affect each of them and how European interests may best 
be communicated to them. The study by Lordos, Kaymak and Tocci (2009) on public 
opinion in Cyprus could perhaps serve as a source of inspiration on how to structure 
such a research project. 
 
Moreover, it has to be considered that the growing interdependence between the 
member states and the painful realization thereof as a consequence of the financial and 
economic crisis and the “forced solidarity” with other member states may actually not 
lead to an increased incorporation of European interests into the national political 
framework. Rather, this will cause national actors to put a brake on functional 
integration and enlargement altogether, whether or not this is actually beneficial in the 
long run. This step may be an initial reflex and turn out to be impracticable in light of 
the “regionalization and globalization of issues” that have to be tackled at an adequate 
spatial level, but it is a course of events which has to be reckoned with.  
 
7. Conclusion 
This conclusion will come up with a fairly comprehensive account of the main findings 
of this thesis. It is deliberately kept rather long, in order to account for the complexity of 
the issue at hand. Also, I wanted to provide readers with little time with a substantial 
summary and an overview of the main points of the paper without excluding necessary 
data altogether.  
 
Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), revised in the Treaty of Lisbon, 
forms the legal basis of enlargement and states that “any European State which respects 
the values referred to in Article 2”, which cover freedom, democracy, respect for human 
rights and the rule of law, “may apply to become a member of the Union”. Certainly, 
Turkey still has deficits in the domain of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
These will have to be addressed if an EU membership is to become reality, especially 
since this dimension figures prominently in public opinion throughout the EU and is 
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also touching the very core of European values and principles, among them “the 
individual”, human dignity and equality of men and women, peace and freedom, 
democracy and the rule of law, as well as tolerance and solidarity. The progress of 
Turkey in this domain is being closely tracked by the European Commission in its 
yearly progress reports of enlargement candidates and full reflection of these values in 
Turkish laws and policies will certainly be a precondition for membership. A newly 
drafted civilian constitution, which tackles some of the current issues in the set-up of the 
Turkish political system and crafts a sustainable societal contract between the 
competing fractions and different segments of Turkish society could undoubtedly move 
Turkey closer towards Europe and underline its democratic credentials. 
 
An explicit aim of the European Union is to preserve differences in national identities of 
member states while emphasizing similarities, which is expressed in the term “unity in 
diversity”. It is not unreasonable to speak of “European cultural pluralism”(Yukleyen 
2008, p. 123) and the analogy between the EU and an orchestra in which several distinct 
instruments form an ensemble (see Johnson 1991, 9-10) is certainly apposite. 
Interestingly, the percussion section in the modern orchestra is actually owed to 
Ottoman influence (Quataert 2000, p.8) and in light of the plurality of European identity 
it does not seem inconceivable that Turkey will play its part in the “concert of Europe”. 
In this context, it is relevant, whether Turkey can or should be seen as a European 
country. It will be the question of European identity, which will undoubtedly be 
decisive for Turkey’s membership perspective. A look at the historical relations 
between Turkey and Europe reveals that the Turks have often been perceived as “the 
other” against which European identity was affirmed. On the other hand, the Ottoman 
Empire also became a European power that was incorporated into the framework of 
European powers in the 18th century and mutual cultural influence and interactions have 
been manifold. Most Europeans affiliate themselves culturally with Christianity and 
even if they do not actively practice their religion or attend church regularly, religion 
continues to play an important role in people’s lives. However, Europeans seem to be 
strikingly tolerant in their religious views and findings in this paper do not support the 
assumption that public opinion will be decisively shaped by considerations of “religious 
exclusivity within the EU”. The notion of Turkey as “the other” is still widely accepted 
in Austria. Austrians view the cultural differences between Turkey and the EU member 
states as too significant for Turkey to join the EU. Also, the geographical and historical 
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European credentials are challenged by a majority of Austrians. Among other factors, 
such as this feeling of unfamiliarity contributes to the fact that only 16% of the 
Austrians support Turkish accession, ranking last among the member states in support 
of Turkish membership (Eurobarometer 69, 2008). The survey of the Austrian Society 
for European Politics in 2010 showed that public support for Turkey’s EU ambitions 
has stabilized at relatively low levels of 17%. However, it should also be kept in mind 
that findings of public-opinion surveys have to be viewed carefully, as a study 
conducted by the Austrian Society of European Politics in 2005 drew a more 
differentiated picture. It concluded that 8% of the Austrian respondents already regarded 
Turkey as ready to join the EU, 28% saw this perspective within 10 years, 22% thought 
Turkey would be in a position to join the EU within the next 20 years and only 32% 
dismissed Turkey’s accession perspective altogether, which would somewhat alter the 
picture and simply reflect a more cautious view on the time frame of accession 
negotiations. 
 
Breuilly (1996) argues that “the myths of common descent, which often surround claims 
of ethnic homogeneity, are often selected, modified or even fabricated by nationalist 
elites who use them to forge a sense of loyalty to the national community they claim to 
represent” (pp. 150-152). In the case of Austria, it has to be mentioned that its identity 
has undergone fundamental transformation within the last century, away from an 
identity firmly rooted in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and elements of a pan-German 
identity towards a small state and exclusively Austrian identity (see Spohn 2003). Thus, 
the exclusivity of Austrian identity and the exceptionality of Austria may have been 
deliberately overstated in order to forge and fortify a common identity by national 
political elites.  
 
If current population trends continue Turkey will surpass Germany as largest EU 
member state population-wise in 2025, with 87 million people, accounting for 15.5% of 
the EU28 population, which is less than Germany’s 18.1% share of the EU25 
population, prior to the accession of Romania and Bulgaria. However, the mere size in 
addition with the low level of economic development raises questions whether the EU 
will be able to finance Turkey’s accession and whether it will be able to absorb the 
country in a way that will not impede the functioning of EU institutions. Despite the 
fact that the costs of Turkey’s EU accession in terms of transfer payments and 
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budgetary effects would be considerable (particularly under the current structural 
cohesion policy) they certainly seem manageable as they are similar in size to the 
previous enlargement round of CEE countries. Oskam et al. (2005, p. 147) projected the 
total financial impact of Turkey’s EU accession under existing policies. Assuming an 
accession of Turkey in 2015 (which does not seem to be a viable assumption any 
longer) concluded that “the overall net transfers to Turkey would range between €11-18 
billion (2004 values)”. A slightly modified model of Dervis et al. (2004) arrives at net 
transfers under the structural and cohesion policy of €12.9 billion. Other sources 
estimate that the net transfer under the CAP to Turkey could total about €1.6 billion in 
2014 and rise to €2.6 billion in 2024 due to full phasing in of direct payments and rural 
development policies. France in comparison, received €1.5 billion and Spain €2.9 
billion in net transfers under CAP in 2002. Romania and Bulgaria currently receive 1.7 
billion annually.  
 
It is not per se certain that Turkey's accession will have a crippling effect on further 
functional integration in the EU. Baldwin & Widgrén (2005) assessed the impact of an 
EU accession of Turkey and Croatia on the EU’s capacity to act and its effect on the 
voting power of current member states. They found that Turkey’s accession has “only a 
negligible effect on the EU’s power to act”. However, it will have a considerable impact 
on the distribution of power between the member states (p.137). Similarly, a study by 
Helen Wallace that looked into the effects of the enlargement round in 2004 on the 
decision-making process in various EU institutions in detail, came to the overarching 
conclusion that the “EU’s institutional processes and practice have stood up rather 
robustly to the impact of enlargement to EU25 in May 2004“ (Wallace 2007, p. 22). 
Therefore, the resistance of certain member states against further enlargement can in 
many cases be traced back to the selfish motive of retaining power and influence.  
 
Many politicians, other decision-makers and scholars emphasize the need for the EU to 
honor the principle of “pacta sunt servanda” especially in the domain of enlargement 
and that if explicit rules are laid out, they have to be generally applied or the EU runs 
the risk of being regarded as unreliable, inconsistent and driven by double-standards in 
its policies, which may have severe repercussions with regard to its credibility and 
influence in international affairs (see Balytska 2006, p.7). In this context, the propagated 
alternative to full membership- a privileged partnership- does not prove to be a viable 
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option. The EU has often been praised for its “soft power” to bring about policy 
changes and transformational processes in other countries but its transformative 
capacities have been contingent on extending the offer of EU-membership to countries 
on the periphery of the EU. In the absence of this membership perspective, the EU has 
mostly been lacking the ability to draw countries in its proximity closer to European 
values. This is also true for the EU’s relationship with Turkey. A rejection of Turkish 
membership bid cannot likely be substituted by a more integrated cooperation, as 
Turkey will most probably not accept “integration without participation”. 
 
A negative outcome of the accession process of Turkey would also likely put an end to 
the aspirations for a peaceful settlement in Cyprus between the two ethnic communities. 
Although there is a desire for the successful conclusion of negotiations and 
dissatisfaction with the status quo, both communities are at the moment highly 
pessimistic and do not think that a settlement can be negotiated in the near future. 
Lordos et al. (2009) found the position of Turkey to be highly relevant and Turkey’s 
influence to be evident, as 28 percent of the Turkish Cypriot swing voters assigned 
importance to Turkey’s position on any negotiated settlement in the future. 
Furthermore, they note “that the Greek Cypriot swing vote is highly sensitive to the 
perceptions of Turkey’s post-settlement intentions, that is, ‘whether Turkey will have 
convinced me that it intends to honor the agreement’ (45%). Thus, taken together, these 
two findings highlight the critical role that Turkey will play in securing a Cyprus 
settlement.” 
 
What happens if Turkey’s bid for EU membership is rejected? Breuss (2002) tried to 
estimate the (by now hypothetical) negative economic effects (or more precisely 
neglected economic potential) in case of a failure of the accession negotiations between 
the EU and the CEE countries. In the event of non-accession he projected missed 
economic potential of 0.2- 0.7 % of real GDP for the EU-15 and up to 10% for the CEE 
countries. These numbers only seem partly applicable to the case of Turkey as the 
Customs Union has already anticipated some of these economic gains. The immediate 
and measurable economic effects seem negligible; however, the long negotiations have 
already led to a build-up of expectations, which if disappointed, could have devastating 
effects for both, the EU and Turkey in volatile financial markets. The impact would be 
particularly severe for Turkey as foreign direct investment is contingent on a stable 
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environment, which could be seriously undermined in the event of a rejection of the 
accession bid. Also, the positive demographic impact on the EU’s population and the 
precise effect of the dynamic and growing Turkish market on the European economy (-
ies) in case of accession can hardly be predicted. The mere fact that Turkey’s 
association and accession process has already been an on-going process for decades 
would make a rejection all the more consequential and could led to severely strained 
relations between Turkey and the EU, could cause an estrangement between the two 
parties and in the worst case evoke tremendous instability at the EU’s external border, 
which could induce significant migratory flows but also entail other adverse effects for 
the EU. Moreover, as Turkey does not entirely want to detach cooperation in the energy 
sector from the general accession talks, a rejection of Turkey could have adverse 
consequences for the EU energy diversification strategy to which Turkey, with its 
privileged geo-strategic position could make considerable contributions. The issue of 
energy security and supply diversification has not yet arrived in Austrian public 
discourse on Turkey’s membership perspective and it remains doubtful, whether it will 
ever decisively influence public opinion. However, national political elites will soon be 
confronted with the necessity to take the strong European interest in this matter 
increasingly into account. 
 
Interestingly, the Austrian debate on Turkish accession has been closely linked with the 
more general debates on globalization, Austrian EU membership and immigration. The 
debate on Turkish EU accession has certainly become the lightning rod for fears and 
concerns in these domains and the rejection of Turkish EU ambitions is also an 
expression of a wide-spread resistance to change within large segments of the Austrian 
population. Despite the fact that all of these issues are in some aspects interrelated, it 
has to be kept in mind they cannot per-se be analytically tied to the discourse on 
Turkey’s prospective EU membership. The political elites in Austria have pursued 
opinion-polls driven politics and gave way to short-term political considerations that 
prevented a rational debate on the merits and short-comings of a full membership of 
Turkey. However, political leaders should seek to evoke a clear distinction between 
these issues in the minds of the Austrian public, be it for the sake of long-term national 
or community interests. 
 
This becomes evident in the domain of immigration. A study conducted by Erzan et al. 
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(2005, 2006) concludes that less Turks are likely to immigrate if Turkey becomes an EU 
member state than if Turkey is left out of the EU. The scenario that is based on the 
assumption that past trends of Turkish immigration will continue and that Turkish 
membership will occur and will be accompanied by unhindered freedom of movement 
with accession in 2015 forecasts that 2.1 million Turks will have migrated by the year 
2030. In the opposite scenario which assumes no membership hence no free movement 
of labor and also a slow down in the Turkish economy the numbers would be 2.7 
million (Erzan et al. 2005, 2006; Avci & Kirişci 2008, p. 158). These numbers - if 
corroborated by other studies - will undoubtedly be of relevance for the Austrian 
discourse on Turkish accession and given the negative public attitude towards more 
immigration and opinion-driven politics by the political elites could shift the tide 
towards a more favorable view on Turkish accession. More detailed studies, specifically 
exploring net migration to Austria could subsequently create additional relevance for 
Austrian constituencies, as these findings can be expected to be even more pronounced 
in the case of Austria due to the fact that immigration in the event of non-accession will 
to a large extent happen on the grounds of family reunification and will be contingent 
upon an already considerable Turkish immigrant population within the country. 
Network effects may thus become even more pronounced. In this context, it should be 
noted that disapproval ratings of Turkey's membership bid are among the highest in 
countries that will as a consequence of network effects be disproportionately affected by 
immigration, which may perhaps be an argument to tackle the issue of immigration on a 
European level and share the burden of large waves of immigration more evenly. It is 
certain that the Turkish migrants will not proportionately disperse over EU territory 
which is why some member states naturally will be more affected by these migration 
flows than others. 
 
Remarkably, Austria is, apart from Greece, the only country in the EU-15 in which a 
majority supported unanimous decision making in the EU in the 2000 Eurobarometer 
survey. While only 31% favor majority voting procedures, 52% support unanimous 
decision-making processes. This cannot simply be explained by a general tendency 
towards unanimous voting structures by smaller states, as this pattern was not found in 
other small member states. This ties in with another interesting aspect of Austrian 
public debate on Turkey’s accession bid that actually relates to the wider institutional 
perception of European and national political institutions. While the Austrian levels of 
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trust in European institutions are in line with the European average, Austrians have a 
relatively high trust in their national political institutions (51% Austrian parliament, 
54% Austrian government; Eurobarometer 73, 2010). This highlights the role that these 
institutions play in the formation of public opinion. 
 
In conclusion, it can be said that Turkey will have to specifically address fears in 
Europe that an accession of Turkey will dilute or even threaten European identity if it 
wants to ameliorate its image in European societies and increase support for its 
membership bid. However, perceived identity cannot be easily altered and encompasses 
a wide array of assumptions, thoughts and beliefs that have been entrenched in the 
mindset of many people and have persisted for decades, if not centuries. Despite the 
fluidity of identity, the notion of a primordial existence of a European identity based on 
Christian civilization still seems widely accepted. This is a political reality that 
European politicians will not disregard, especially in light of the fact that European 
issues are becoming increasingly politicized in national arenas. However, one cannot 
help but notice that the component of cultural or religious homogeneity does not always 
figure prominently in various surveys and are not reflected in the core values of the 
European Union. A comprehensive discourse about the true nature of European identity 
is thus needed, in order to clarify the actual foundation of the European Union. It is not 
possible to determine its future borders without a thorough understanding of the 
underlying values that shape Europe. While it seems necessary to highlight positive 
effects of Turkey's accession, it is even more important to illuminate negative public 
perceptions and reassess them with full analytical vigor. In my opinion, it seems vital to 
largely detach the discourse on immigration from the debate on Turkish accession, 
contrary to the initial impulse to constantly consider that “the image of Turkey in the 
minds of many Europeans has been formed by their encounter with Turkish immigrants. 
This encounter by and large has been a negative one and exacerbates European fears 
that Turks will actually invade their societies if Turkey was to become a member of the 
European Union” (Avci & Kirişci 2008, p. 167). This would embed the discourse on 
Turkey’s accession into the wider discourse on immigrant integration. As we have seen, 
a non-accession of Turkey would likely even increase migratory flows compared to a 
situation of Turkish accession and freedom of movement (which could in addition be 
subject to transition periods) and would certainly not affect the number of Turkish 
immigrants already living in the member states or for that matter have any positive 
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effect on their level of integration into European societies.  
 
Moreover, an effective nation brand management of Turkey seems vital in 
communicating the secular nature of the Turkish state as well as the historic 
interdependence and interaction between Turkey and European countries. This should 
be seen under the premise that rather undirected and unspecified prejudices that 
emphasize basic cultural and religious differences are perhaps the single most important 
underlying factor that influences negative attitudes towards Turkey's accession. All in 
all, the analysis of the arguments against Turkish accession shows that the issues at 
hand are certainly more complex than they may appear at first sight and the findings 
certainly do not justify a vigorous opposition of Turkey’s accession to the extent that we 
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Diese Arbeit setzt sich mit einem möglichen EU Beitritt der Türkei und der Diskussion 
darüber auseinander. Auf der einen Seite werden Argumente gegen einen Beitritt auf 
ihre Gültigkeit und Aussagekraft geprüft. Sie sollen vor allem im Hinblick auf EU 
Interessen beleuchtet werden, da eine rationale Betrachtung der 
Gemeinschaftsinteressen langfristig für ein prosperierendes Europa und durch die enge 
Verknüpfung zwischen den einzelnen Mitgliedsstaaten, auch für die positive 
Entwicklung jedes einzelnen Mitgliedsstaates essentiell ist. Auf der anderen Seite ist 
auch die österreichische Debatte, mit all ihren Facetten, Hintergründen und 
Besonderheiten von Interesse, da die Mitgliedsstaaten über die ultimative 
Entscheidungsgewalt über eine etwaige Erweiterung der Union verfügen und in 
nationalen Debatten Gemeinschaftsinteressen kurzfristig ausgeklammert sein können. In 
der österreichischen Debatte kommt es zu einer Verquickung des Diskurses über einen 
Türkeibeitritt zur EU mit verschiedenen anderen Diskursen wie zum Beispiel jenen über 
Immigration, Integration, Europa und Folgen der Globalisierung. Diese Diskurse 
müssten von einer analytischen Sichtweise her betrachtet, teilweise voneinander 
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